provided I think a question and its negation are equally likely to have been asked, there is a 50% chance that the answer to the question you have asked is yes.
Well, yes. But ought I believe that a yes/no question I have no idea about is as likely as its negation to have been asked? (Especially if it’s being asked implicitly by a situation, rather than explicitly by a human?)
Ratio of true statements to false ones: low.
Probability TraderJoe wants to make TheOtherDave look foolish: moderate, slightly on the higher end.
Ratio of the probability that giving an obviously false statement an answer of relatively high probability would make TheOtherDave look foolish to the probability that giving an obviously true statement a relatively low probability would make TheOtherDave look foolish: moderately high.
Probability that the statement is neither true nor false: low.
Ratio of the probability that giving an obviously false statement an answer of relatively high probability would make TheOtherDave look foolish to the probability that giving an obviously true statement a relatively low probability would make TheOtherDave look foolish: moderately high.
That’s interesting.
I considered a proposition like this, decided the ratio was roughly even, concluded that TraderJoe might therefore attempt to predict my answer (and choose their question so I’d be wrong), decided they’d have no reliable basis on which to do so and would know that, and ultimately discarded the whole line of reasoning.
I considered a proposition like this, decided the ratio was roughly even, concluded that TraderJoe might therefore attempt to predict my answer (and choose their question so I’d be wrong),
I figured that it would be more embarrassing to say something like “It is true that I am a sparkly unicorn” than to say “It is false that an apple is a fruit”. Falsehoods are much more malleable, largely as an effect of the fact that there are so many more of them than truths, also because they don’t have to be consistent. Since falsehoods are more malleable it seems that they’d be more likely to be ones used in an attempt to insult someone.
decided they’d have no reliable basis on which to do so and would know that, and ultimately discarded the whole line of reasoning.
My heuristic in situations with recursive mutual modeling is to assume that everyone else will discard whatever line of reasoning is recursive. I then go one layer deeper into the recursion than whatever the default assumption is. It works well.
Read the book years ago, but can’t recall if that phrase is in there. In any case, yes, that’s what I was referring to… it’s my favorite fictional portrayal of recursive mutual modeling.
it’s my favorite fictional portrayal of recursive mutual modeling.
The one I always think of is Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”:
But he perpetually errs by being too deep or too shallow, for the matter in hand; and many a schoolboy is a better reasoner than he. I knew one about eight years of age, whose success at guessing in the game of ‘even and odd’ attracted universal admiration. This game is simple, and is played with marbles. One player holds in his hand a number of these toys, and demands of another whether that number is even or odd. If the guess is right, the guesser wins one; if wrong, he loses one. The boy to whom I allude won all the marbles of the school. Of course he had some principle of guessing; and this lay in mere observation and admeasurement of the astuteness of his opponents. For example, an arrant simpleton is his opponent, and, holding up his closed hand, asks, ‘are they even or odd?’ Our schoolboy replies, ‘odd,’ and loses; but upon the second trial he wins, for he then says to himself, the simpleton had them even upon the first trial, and his amount of cunning is just sufficient to make him have them odd upon the second; I will therefore guess odd’; --he guesses odd, and wins. Now, with a simpleton a degree above the first, he would have reasoned thus: ‘This fellow finds that in the first instance I guessed odd, and, in the second, he will propose to himself upon the first impulse, a simple variation from even to odd, as did the first simpleton; but then a second thought will suggest that this is too simple a variation, and finally he will decide upon putting it even as before. I will therefore guess even’ guesses even, and wins. Now this mode of reasoning in the schoolboy, whom his fellows termed “lucky,”—what, in its last analysis, is it?”
“It is merely,” I said, “an identification of the reasoner’s intellect with that of his opponent.”
I wonder if there is an older appearance of this trope or if this is the Ur Example? (*checks TvTropes). The only older one listed is from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, so Poe’s might be the Ur Example in Western culture.
My heuristic in situations with recursive mutual modeling is to assume that everyone else will discard whatever line of reasoning is recursive. I then go one layer deeper into the recursion than whatever the default assumption is. It works well.
Preempt: None of you have any way of knowing whether this is a lie.
“None of you have any way of knowing whether this is a lie” is false because although you can’t definitively prove what my process is or isn’t you’ll still have access to information that allows you to assess and evaluate whether I was probably telling the truth.
Although “none of you have any way of knowing whether this is a lie” is false and thus my first instance of “the parent of this comment is a lie” seems justified, in reality the first instance of that statement is not true. The first instance of that statement is a lie because although “none of you have any way of knowing whether or not this is true” is false, it does not follow that it was a lie. In actuality, I thought that it was true at the time that I posted it, and only realized afterwards that it was false. There was no intent to deceive.
Therefore the grandparent of this comment is true, the greatgrandparent is true, the greatgreatgrandparent is false, and the greatgreatgreat grandparent is inaccurate.
My answer is roughly the same as TimS’s… it mostly depends on “Would TraderJoe pick a true statement in this context or a false one?” Which in turn mostly depends on “Would a randomly selected LWer pick a true statement in this context or a false one?” since I don’t know much about you as a distinct individual.
I seem to have a prior probability somewhat above 50% for “true”, though thinking about it I’m not sure why exactly that is.
Looking it up, it amuses me to discover that I’m still not sure if it’s true.
It seems like my guess should be based on how likely I think it is that your are trying to trick me in some sense. I assume you didn’t pick a sentence at random.
The transliteration does, but the actual Arabic means “V’z Sebz Nzrevpn”.
So in fact TraderJoe’s prediction of 0.5 was a simple average over the two statements given, and everyone else giving a prediction failed to take into account that the answer could be neither “true” nor “false”.
All questions that you encounter will be asked by a human. I get what you mean though, if other humans are asking a human a question then distortions are probably magnified.
Some questions are implicitly raised by a situation. “Is this coffee cup capable of holding coffee without spilling it?”, for example. When I pour coffee into the cup, I am implicitly expressing more than 50% confidence that the answer is “yes”.
What I’m saying is that what’s implicit is a fact about you, not the situation, and the way the question is formed is partially determined by you. I was vague in saying so, however.
I agree that the way the question is formed is partially determined by me. I agree that there’s a relevant implicit fact about me. I disagree that there’s no relevant implicit fact about the situation.
Nothing can be implicit without interpretation, sometimes the apparent implications of a situation are just misguided notions that we have inside our heads. You’re going to have a natural tendency to form your questions in certain ways, and some of these ways will lead you to asking nonsensical questions, such as questions with contradictory expectations.
I agree that the apparent implications of a situation are notions in our heads, and that sometimes those notions are nonsensical and/or contradictory and/or misguided.
Well, yes. But ought I believe that a yes/no question I have no idea about is as likely as its negation to have been asked? (Especially if it’s being asked implicitly by a situation, rather than explicitly by a human?)
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Ratio of true statements to false ones: low. Probability TraderJoe wants to make TheOtherDave look foolish: moderate, slightly on the higher end. Ratio of the probability that giving an obviously false statement an answer of relatively high probability would make TheOtherDave look foolish to the probability that giving an obviously true statement a relatively low probability would make TheOtherDave look foolish: moderately high. Probability that the statement is neither true nor false: low.
Conclusion: أنا من (أمريك is most likely false.
That’s interesting.
I considered a proposition like this, decided the ratio was roughly even, concluded that TraderJoe might therefore attempt to predict my answer (and choose their question so I’d be wrong), decided they’d have no reliable basis on which to do so and would know that, and ultimately discarded the whole line of reasoning.
I figured that it would be more embarrassing to say something like “It is true that I am a sparkly unicorn” than to say “It is false that an apple is a fruit”. Falsehoods are much more malleable, largely as an effect of the fact that there are so many more of them than truths, also because they don’t have to be consistent. Since falsehoods are more malleable it seems that they’d be more likely to be ones used in an attempt to insult someone.
My heuristic in situations with recursive mutual modeling is to assume that everyone else will discard whatever line of reasoning is recursive. I then go one layer deeper into the recursion than whatever the default assumption is. It works well.
Sadly, I appear to lack your dizzying intellect.
I used to play a lot of Rock, Paper, Scissors; I’m pretty much a pro.
It is possible that you may have missed TheOtherDave’s allusion there.
The phrase sounded familiar, but I don’t recognize where it’s from and a Google search for “lack your dizzying intellect” yielded no results.
Wait. Found it. Princess Bride? Is it in the book too, or just the movie?
Read the book years ago, but can’t recall if that phrase is in there. In any case, yes, that’s what I was referring to… it’s my favorite fictional portrayal of recursive mutual modeling.
The one I always think of is Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”:
I wonder if there is an older appearance of this trope or if this is the Ur Example? (*checks TvTropes). The only older one listed is from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, so Poe’s might be the Ur Example in Western culture.
I’m not sure what this phrase means.
It means making an accurate mental simulation of your opponent’s mental process to predict to which level they will iterate.
Here it is—the classic “battle of wits” scene from The Princess Bride. (This clip cuts off before the explanation of the trick used by the victor.)
Both. [EDITED: oops, no, misread you. Definitely in the movie; haven’t read the book.]
Preempt: None of you have any way of knowing whether this is a lie.
The parent of this comment (yes, this one) is a lie.
The parent of this comment (yes, this one) is a lie.
The parent of this comment is true. On my honor as a rationalist.
I would like people to try to solve the puzzle.
This comment (yes, this one) is true.
I think the solution is that you have no honor as a rationalist.
The solution I had in mind is:
“None of you have any way of knowing whether this is a lie” is false because although you can’t definitively prove what my process is or isn’t you’ll still have access to information that allows you to assess and evaluate whether I was probably telling the truth.
Although “none of you have any way of knowing whether this is a lie” is false and thus my first instance of “the parent of this comment is a lie” seems justified, in reality the first instance of that statement is not true. The first instance of that statement is a lie because although “none of you have any way of knowing whether or not this is true” is false, it does not follow that it was a lie. In actuality, I thought that it was true at the time that I posted it, and only realized afterwards that it was false. There was no intent to deceive.
Therefore the grandparent of this comment is true, the greatgrandparent is true, the greatgreatgrandparent is false, and the greatgreatgreat grandparent is inaccurate.
This whole line of riddling occurred because:
I wanted to confuse people, so they failed to properly evaluate the way I model people.
I wanted to distract people, so they chose not to bother properly evaluating the way I model people.
I wanted to amuse myself by pretending that I was the kind of person who cared about the above two.
I was wondering whether anyone would call me out on any of those.
I’m severely tempted to just continue making replies to myself and see how far down the rabbit hole I can get.
I laughed. The solution involves the relativity of wrong, if that helps.
PBEERPG.
I assume you mean without looking it up.
My answer is roughly the same as TimS’s… it mostly depends on “Would TraderJoe pick a true statement in this context or a false one?” Which in turn mostly depends on “Would a randomly selected LWer pick a true statement in this context or a false one?” since I don’t know much about you as a distinct individual.
I seem to have a prior probability somewhat above 50% for “true”, though thinking about it I’m not sure why exactly that is.
Looking it up, it amuses me to discover that I’m still not sure if it’s true.
This is a perfect situation for a poll.
How probable is it that TraderJoe’s statement, in the parent comment, is true?
[pollid:116]
I voted with what I thought my previous estimate was before I’d checked via rot13.
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It seems like my guess should be based on how likely I think it is that your are trying to trick me in some sense. I assume you didn’t pick a sentence at random.
[comment deleted]
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The transliteration does, but the actual Arabic means “V’z Sebz Nzrevpn”.
So in fact TraderJoe’s prediction of 0.5 was a simple average over the two statements given, and everyone else giving a prediction failed to take into account that the answer could be neither “true” nor “false”.
Not according to google translate. Incidentally, that string is particularly easy to uncypher by inspection.
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Yeah, that’s an interesting discrepancy.
All questions that you encounter will be asked by a human. I get what you mean though, if other humans are asking a human a question then distortions are probably magnified.
Some questions are implicitly raised by a situation. “Is this coffee cup capable of holding coffee without spilling it?”, for example. When I pour coffee into the cup, I am implicitly expressing more than 50% confidence that the answer is “yes”.
What I’m saying is that what’s implicit is a fact about you, not the situation, and the way the question is formed is partially determined by you. I was vague in saying so, however.
I agree that the way the question is formed is partially determined by me. I agree that there’s a relevant implicit fact about me. I disagree that there’s no relevant implicit fact about the situation.
Nothing can be implicit without interpretation, sometimes the apparent implications of a situation are just misguided notions that we have inside our heads. You’re going to have a natural tendency to form your questions in certain ways, and some of these ways will lead you to asking nonsensical questions, such as questions with contradictory expectations.
I agree that the apparent implications of a situation are notions in our heads, and that sometimes those notions are nonsensical and/or contradictory and/or misguided.