More fundamentally the notion of simplicity that Eliezer and Luke are using is entirely based off of their assessments of which kinds of hypotheses have historically been more or less fruitful
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Coming up with a notion of “simplicity” after the fact based on past observations is coding theory and has nothing to do with the universal prior. Arguments should be about evidence, not “priors”.
It isn’t technically a universal prior, but it counts as evidence because it’s historically fruitful. That leaves you with a nitpick rather than showing “LW folk (including I think Eliezer and lukeprog) mistakenly believe that algorithmic probability theory implies a low prior for supernaturalism.”
I don’t think it’s nitpicking as such to point out that the probability of supernaturalism is unrelated to algorithmic probability. Bringing in Kolmogorov complexity is needlessly confusing, and even Bayesian probability isn’t necessary because all we’re really concerned with is the likelihood ratio. The error I want to discourage is bringing in confusing uncomputable mathematics for no reason and then asserting that said mathematics somehow justify a position one holds for what are actually entirely unrelated reasons. Such errors harm group epistemology.
I don’t think it’s nitpicking as such to point out that the probability of supernaturalism is unrelated to algorithmic probability.
I don’t see how you’ve done that. If KC isn’t a universal prior like objective isn’t technically objective but inter-subjective then you can still use KC as evidence for a class of propositions (and probably the only meaningful class of propositions). For that class of propositions you have automatic evidence for or against them (in the form of KC), and so it’s basically a ready-made prior because it passes from the posterior to the prior immediately anyway.
The error I want to discourage is bringing in confusing uncomputable mathematics for no reason and then asserting that said mathematics somehow justify a position one holds for what are actually entirely unrelated reasons.
So a) you think LWers reasons for not believing in supernaturalism have nothing to do with KC, and b) you think supernaturalism exists outside the class of propositions KC can count as evidence as for or against?
I don’t care about A, but If B is your position I wonder: why?
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It isn’t technically a universal prior, but it counts as evidence because it’s historically fruitful. That leaves you with a nitpick rather than showing “LW folk (including I think Eliezer and lukeprog) mistakenly believe that algorithmic probability theory implies a low prior for supernaturalism.”
I don’t think it’s nitpicking as such to point out that the probability of supernaturalism is unrelated to algorithmic probability. Bringing in Kolmogorov complexity is needlessly confusing, and even Bayesian probability isn’t necessary because all we’re really concerned with is the likelihood ratio. The error I want to discourage is bringing in confusing uncomputable mathematics for no reason and then asserting that said mathematics somehow justify a position one holds for what are actually entirely unrelated reasons. Such errors harm group epistemology.
I don’t see how you’ve done that. If KC isn’t a universal prior like objective isn’t technically objective but inter-subjective then you can still use KC as evidence for a class of propositions (and probably the only meaningful class of propositions). For that class of propositions you have automatic evidence for or against them (in the form of KC), and so it’s basically a ready-made prior because it passes from the posterior to the prior immediately anyway.
So a) you think LWers reasons for not believing in supernaturalism have nothing to do with KC, and b) you think supernaturalism exists outside the class of propositions KC can count as evidence as for or against?
I don’t care about A, but If B is your position I wonder: why?