I don’t understand your comment, could you explain? Science seems to generate more knowledge than LW-style rationality. Maybe you meant to say “LW-style rationality is not about knowledge”?
Science has a large scale academic infrastructure to draw on, wherein people can propose research that they want to get done, and those who argue sufficiently persuasively that their research is solid and productive receive money and resources to conduct it.
You could make a system that produces more knowledge than modern science just by diverting a substantial portion of the national budget to fund it, so only the people proposing experiments that are too poorly designed to be useful don’t get funding.
Besides which, improved rationality can’t simply replace entire bodies of domain specific knowledge.
There are plenty of ways though, in which mainstream science is inefficient at producing knowledge, such as improper use of statistics, publication bias, and biased interpretation of results. There are ways to do better, and most scientists (at least those I’ve spoken to about it,) acknowledge this, but science is very significantly a social process which individual scientists have neither the power nor the social incentives to change.
“There are plenty of ways though, in which mainstream science is inefficient at producing knowledge, such as improper use of statistics, publication bias, and biased interpretation of results. There are ways to do better, and most scientists (at least those I’ve spoken to about it,) acknowledge this, but science is very significantly a social process which individual scientists have neither the power nor the social incentives to change.”
I am an academic. Can you suggest three concrete ways for me to improve my knowledge production, which will not leave me worse off?
Ways for science as an academic institution, or for you personally? For the latter, Luke has already done the work of creating a post on that. For the former, it’s more difficult, since a lot of productivity in science requires cooperation with the existing institution. At the least, I would suggest registering your experiments in a public database before conducting them, if any exist within your field, and using Bayesian probability software to process the statistics of your experiments (this will probably not help you at all in getting published, but if you do it in addition to regular significance testing, it should hopefully not inhibit it either.)
My default answer for anything regarding Hanson is ‘signaling’. How to fix science is a good start.
Science isn’t just about getting things wrong or right, but an intricate signaling game. This is why most of what comes out of journals is wrong. Scientists are rewarded for publishing results, right or wrong, so they comb data for correlations which may or may not be relevant. (Statically speaking, if you comb data 20 different ways, you’ll get at least 1 thing which shows a statistically significant correlation, just from sheer random chance.) Journals are rewarded for publishing sensational results, and not confirmations or even refutations (especially refutations of things they published in the first place). The rewards system does not set up coming with right answers, but coming up with answers that are sensational and cannot be easily refuted. Being right does make them hard to refute, which is why science is useful at all but that’s not the only way things are made hard to refute.
An ideal bayesian unconstrained with signaling could completely outdo our current scientific system (as it could do for in all spheres of life). Even shifting our current system to be more bayesian by abandoning the journal system and creating pre-registration of scientific studies would be a huge upgrade. But science isn’t about knowledge, knowledge is just a very useful byproduct we get from it.
But Grognor (not, as this comment read earlier, army1987) said that “we mere mortals can do better with Bayes”, not that “an ideal bayesian unconstrained with signaling could completely outdo our current scientific system”. Arguing, in response to cousin_it, that scientists are concerned with signalling makes the claim even stronger, and the question more compelling—“why aren’t we doing better already?”
I had taken “we” to mean the 21st-century civilization in general rather than just Bayesians, and the question to mean “why is science doing so bad, if it could do much better just by using Bayes”?
I’m fairly confident that “we” refers to LW / Bayesians, especially given the response to your comment earlier. Unfortunately we’ve got a bunch of comments addressing a different question, and some providing reasons why we shouldn’t expect to be “doing better”, all of which strengthen cousin_it’s question, as Grognor claims we can. Though naturally Grognor’s intended meanings are up for grabs.
The Hansonian answer would be “science is not about knowledge”, I guess. (I don’t think it’s that simple, anyway.)
I don’t understand your comment, could you explain? Science seems to generate more knowledge than LW-style rationality. Maybe you meant to say “LW-style rationality is not about knowledge”?
Science has a large scale academic infrastructure to draw on, wherein people can propose research that they want to get done, and those who argue sufficiently persuasively that their research is solid and productive receive money and resources to conduct it.
You could make a system that produces more knowledge than modern science just by diverting a substantial portion of the national budget to fund it, so only the people proposing experiments that are too poorly designed to be useful don’t get funding.
Besides which, improved rationality can’t simply replace entire bodies of domain specific knowledge.
There are plenty of ways though, in which mainstream science is inefficient at producing knowledge, such as improper use of statistics, publication bias, and biased interpretation of results. There are ways to do better, and most scientists (at least those I’ve spoken to about it,) acknowledge this, but science is very significantly a social process which individual scientists have neither the power nor the social incentives to change.
“There are plenty of ways though, in which mainstream science is inefficient at producing knowledge, such as improper use of statistics, publication bias, and biased interpretation of results. There are ways to do better, and most scientists (at least those I’ve spoken to about it,) acknowledge this, but science is very significantly a social process which individual scientists have neither the power nor the social incentives to change.”
I am an academic. Can you suggest three concrete ways for me to improve my knowledge production, which will not leave me worse off?
Well...
Ways for science as an academic institution, or for you personally? For the latter, Luke has already done the work of creating a post on that. For the former, it’s more difficult, since a lot of productivity in science requires cooperation with the existing institution. At the least, I would suggest registering your experiments in a public database before conducting them, if any exist within your field, and using Bayesian probability software to process the statistics of your experiments (this will probably not help you at all in getting published, but if you do it in addition to regular significance testing, it should hopefully not inhibit it either.)
My default answer for anything regarding Hanson is ‘signaling’. How to fix science is a good start.
Science isn’t just about getting things wrong or right, but an intricate signaling game. This is why most of what comes out of journals is wrong. Scientists are rewarded for publishing results, right or wrong, so they comb data for correlations which may or may not be relevant. (Statically speaking, if you comb data 20 different ways, you’ll get at least 1 thing which shows a statistically significant correlation, just from sheer random chance.) Journals are rewarded for publishing sensational results, and not confirmations or even refutations (especially refutations of things they published in the first place). The rewards system does not set up coming with right answers, but coming up with answers that are sensational and cannot be easily refuted. Being right does make them hard to refute, which is why science is useful at all but that’s not the only way things are made hard to refute.
An ideal bayesian unconstrained with signaling could completely outdo our current scientific system (as it could do for in all spheres of life). Even shifting our current system to be more bayesian by abandoning the journal system and creating pre-registration of scientific studies would be a huge upgrade. But science isn’t about knowledge, knowledge is just a very useful byproduct we get from it.
But Grognor (not, as this comment read earlier, army1987) said that “we mere mortals can do better with Bayes”, not that “an ideal bayesian unconstrained with signaling could completely outdo our current scientific system”. Arguing, in response to cousin_it, that scientists are concerned with signalling makes the claim even stronger, and the question more compelling—“why aren’t we doing better already?”
I had taken “we” to mean the 21st-century civilization in general rather than just Bayesians, and the question to mean “why is science doing so bad, if it could do much better just by using Bayes”?
I’m fairly confident that “we” refers to LW / Bayesians, especially given the response to your comment earlier. Unfortunately we’ve got a bunch of comments addressing a different question, and some providing reasons why we shouldn’t expect to be “doing better”, all of which strengthen cousin_it’s question, as Grognor claims we can. Though naturally Grognor’s intended meanings are up for grabs.