This sounds like preference utilitarianism, the view that what matters for a person is the extent to which her utility function (“preferences”) is fulfilled. In academic ethics outside of Lesswrong, “utilitarianism” refers to a family of ethical views, of which the most commonly associated one is Bentham’s “classical utilitarianism”, where “utility” is very specifically defined as “suffering minus happiness” that a person experiences over time.
I see what you mean. Why I thought he meant preference:
1) talks about “utility of all humans”, whereas a classical utilitarian would more likely have used something like “well-being”. However, you can interpret is as a general placeholder for “whatever matters”.
3) is also something that you mention in economics usually, associated with preference-models. Here again, it is true that diminishing marginal utility also applies for classical utilitarianism.
This sounds like preference utilitarianism, the view that what matters for a person is the extent to which her utility function (“preferences”) is fulfilled. In academic ethics outside of Lesswrong, “utilitarianism” refers to a family of ethical views, of which the most commonly associated one is Bentham’s “classical utilitarianism”, where “utility” is very specifically defined as “suffering minus happiness” that a person experiences over time.
I’m not seeing where in Dagon’s comment they indicate preference utilitarianism vs (ex) hedonic?
I see what you mean. Why I thought he meant preference:
1) talks about “utility of all humans”, whereas a classical utilitarian would more likely have used something like “well-being”. However, you can interpret is as a general placeholder for “whatever matters”.
3) is also something that you mention in economics usually, associated with preference-models. Here again, it is true that diminishing marginal utility also applies for classical utilitarianism.