I think at this point the question in play is “What was the First Cause?”, rather than “Why is there anything?”, and the two are distinct for practical purposes. Bill Maher might get hung up on the second, but I’d be surprised if he got hung up on the first, given that it’s such an old argument against naturalism.
What justifies my saying that we’ve ended up at the cosmological argument? I think it follows from accepting Maitzen’s dissolution. There’s a chain of turtles, and we’d like to explain the chain. Maitzen points out that instead of trying to explain the chain in itself, we need only explain each individual turtle. Once you or I accept Maitzen’s argument we just have to explain the first turtle, because every subsequent turtle is explained by its predecessor. And asking “what explains the first turtle?” (with the implication that the first turtle, or whatever implicit zeroth turtle hides behind it, is supernatural) is pretty much the cosmological argument. Granted, Maitzen doesn’t address that argument in his essay, but I don’t see a problem with that; it’s a separate argument IMO with its own well-known counterarguments.
Well, we’re mostly discussing Maitzen’s answer to the of the First Cause, the Infinitely Old Universe. Unless a First Cause is somehow (magic?) self-explanatory, it doesn’t answer the question of “Why is there anything?”—but the same applies if you replace a First Cause with an infinite string of causes, or even a future cause + time travel.
Anyways the whole question seems a confusion: either the answer will be something that does exist or it will be something that does not exist, if it exists it would appear to be part of “anything” and therefore the question is not addressed, and if it does not exist then that appears to be contradictory.
That’s not exactly a confusion, that’s a paradox. And a faulty one; something might (somehow) “explain itself” or, more likely, we could discover a logical reason things had to exist. Or we might have some unknown insight into rationality and dissolve the question, I suppose, but that’s not really helpful. The point is it’s still an open question; the good Mr. Maitzen has not helped us.
Applying Greek thought to “Ehyeh asher ehyeh” is an attempt to get at something that “explain(s) itself”, I am sure you are familiar with St. Thomas Aquinas and his five ways.
I suppose you are also familiar with Divine Sophia in Gnosticism? Saying we have a logical reason for things existing seems to be on that same level of reasoning and appears to just add another turtle to me.
Applying Greek thought to “Ehyeh asher ehyeh” is an attempt to get at something that “explain(s) itself”, I am sure you are familiar with St. Thomas Aquinas and his five ways.
Yup. Being a theist, I suspect God is in some way the cause of everything, although I’m not really smart enough to understand how that could be. I leave the answer to some future genius (or, more likely, superintelligent AI.)
Saying we have a logical reason for things existing seems to be on that same level of reasoning and appears to just add another turtle to me.
Really? But logic, as a mathematical construct, “exists” (in the sense that it exists at all) independently of physical objects; a calculator on mars will get the same result as one on Earth, even if they have no causal connection. Logic seems like it can explain things in terms of platonic mathematical structure, not contingent physical causes.
Not entirely sure what “exists” even means in cases like this, but yeah, then I guess you’re restricted to self-causing entities in that case, whatever that might mean.
I disagree. If I go looking for a First Cause and discover an infinite string of causes instead, that’s reality’s way of telling me that there just isn’t a First Cause, and the premise of my investigation was simply wrong. Equivalently, then, discovering an infinite string of causes indicates that the question “What is the First Cause?” (and hence “Why is there anything?”, since that question reduces to the First Cause question once one accepts Maitzen’s argument) is a wrong question, since it hinges on a false premise.
“What is the First Cause?” is not the same question as “Why is there anything?”.
This is true in the absence of further assumptions. But once you or I assume Maitzen’s argument is true (and I think we both do) the second becomes a mere instantiation of the first.
An infinite string would answer the former, not the latter.
This is false if Maitzen’s argument is true. Conditional on Maitzen’s argument, an infinite string answers the former and hence the latter. I could justify this by repeating what I’ve written in my two comments upthread, but it might be more productive if I give a different argument.
How do we usually answer “Why is there X?”? I think we usually pick out X’s most salient cause. “Why is there an ambulance outside my neighbour’s house?” “Because the neighbour had a heart attack.” We’re basically saying, “here’s the most interesting antecedent node in the causal graph, and had we deleted or substantially altered it, there wouldn’t have been X”. If we’d deleted the “neighbour’s heart attack” node, there wouldn’t be an “ambulance outside neighbour’s house” node.
This gives me a way to interpret “What’s the First Cause?”, or “Why is there anything?”, or “Why is there everything?”, or “Why isn’t the universe in the counterfactual no-turtle state?” (to paraphrase you). These questions are asking for a node in the causal graph that’s antecedent to everything. But how can I do that if the causal graph is an infinitely long string? There’s no such node!
That question fails in the same way as the others. It’s asking for a causal node which, if altered or deleted, would turn the infinite string of causal nodes into a finite one. But no node in an infinitely long string has that power, so the question’s implicit assumption is false.
This might be true of “Why” questions in general but I’m talking about the more specific class of questions that start “Why is there”. Can you think of examples of the latter that have a sensible answer that isn’t a salient cause?
Sure. “Why are there airbags in cars” is answered with “to protect the occupants”. it would be inane to give a a causal
answer, such as “because someone fitted airbags”.
“Why are there airbags in cars” is answered wit “to protect the occupants”. it would be inane to give a a causal answer, such as “because someone fitted airbags”.
“to protect the occupants” is merely syntactically simpler than “because of the builder’s desire to protect the occupants.”—the two statements equally well indicate causality.
To be fair, this could be phrased as “because someone decided they were the best way to protect the occupants, and fitted them.” However, I would define an answer to a “why is there” question more broadly—what explains why the universe is not in the counterfactual situation of this not being there? If you count any causal antecedent as an answer, you can’t explain causal loops, and you can only explain parts of infinite chains, not the whole.
The paraphrase introduces some efficient causality without removing all the teleology.
what explains why the universe is not in the counterfactual situation of this not being there? If you count any causal antecedent as an answer, you can’t explain causal loops, and you can only explain parts of infinite chains, not the whole.
The point I was making is that a preceding cause is not the only kind of answer to a “why” question.
The paraphrase introduces some efficient causality without removing all the teleology.
I’d say the causality was there all along and MugaSofer & ArisKatsaris just made it explicit. Causality can become teleology by operating through a mind, but it remains causal for all that.
There is some evidence of that within the universe, but it is not a conceptual identity. The big Why question could still have an answer that is irreducibly teleological. The universe as a whole has to have some unique properties.
There is some evidence of that within the universe, but it is not a conceptual identity.
Note that I think of teleology as a subset of causation rather than as coextensive with causation.
The big Why question could still have an answer that is irreducibly teleological.
I don’t think I can imagine how this could work. A teleological answer to “why does the universe exist?” implies (at least to me) some goal-seeking agent that makes the universe happen, or orients it towards some particular end. But making stuff happen or pushing it in a particular direction is causality.
The universe as a whole has to have some unique properties.
I agree, but I don’t see why the universe would have to be uniquely irreducibly teleological instead of, say, uniquely acausal (being the only entity that just springs into existence without a cause).
Note that I think of teleology as a subset of causation rather than as coextensive with causation.
Thinking in a certain way doesn’t prove anything. The evidence for teleology being reducible to causality comes from within the universe, like the evidence for everything being finite, or for everything being contained in some larger structure.
I don’t think I can imagine how [irreducible teleology] could work.
If you canno explain how agent-based causally-reducible teleology is the only possible kind, irreducible teleology
remains a conceptual possibility.
I agree, but I don’t see why the universe would have to be uniquely irreducibly teleologica
I doesn’t. That is only one of the unique properties it could have.
Thinking in a certain way doesn’t prove anything. The evidence for teleology being reducible to causality comes from within the universe, [...]
I don’t think I can imagine how [irreducible teleology] could work.
If you canno explain how agent-based causally-reducible teleology is the only possible kind, irreducible teleology remains a conceptual possibility.
Yes. It’s always possible for me to be simply wrong; something might exist even if I think that something is logically impossible. But (1) by induction from within-the-universe evidence, I find it very unlikely, and (2) even if I wanted to include irreducible teleology in my model, I wouldn’t know how. So it’s expedient for me to treat it as an impossibility. I’m content to agree to disagree with you on this one!
by induction from within-the-universe evidence, I find it very unlikely
That doesn’t have any bearing at all. An inhabitant of an infinite universe could notice that every single thing in it is finite, but would be completely wrong in assuming that the universe they are in is finite.
even if I wanted to include irreducible teleology in my model, I wouldn’t know how.
You take your assumption—which is presumable not justfiable apriori—that the past causes the future, and invert it.
This sounds like just as much of an a priori assumption as my working assumption that it does have some bearing.
An inhabitant of an infinite universe could notice that every single thing in it is finite, but would be completely wrong in assuming that the universe they are in is finite.
Yes, induction can lead to incorrect conclusions. But this is not a very strong argument against any given induction.
You take your assumption—which is presumable not justfiable apriori—that the past causes the future, and invert it.
I change my existing model so that the future causes the past within my model? I’m not sure how to do that either. I picture flipping the direction of every arrow in my causal graph, but that doesn’t introduce any irreducible teleology; I’m still left with an ordinary causal graph when I finish.
Yes, induction can lead to incorrect conclusions. But this is not a very strong argument against any given induction.
Induction only ever works, inasmuch as it works, across tokens of the same type. Parts and wholes are almost always of different types. Trying to derive properties of wholes from properties of part is the fallacy of composition.
I would define an answer to a “why is there” question more broadly—what explains why the universe is not in the counterfactual situation of this not being there? If you count any causal antecedent as an answer, you can’t explain causal loops, and you can only explain parts of infinite chains, not the whole.
I agree with you about this. (And also agree with you & ArisKatsaris’s response to PrawnOfFate’s airbag example.) I suspect we just differ in our reactions to this inability to explain: you think it’s a bug while I think it’s expected behaviour.
Any causal chain eventually has to (1) end, (2) loop back on itself, or (3) go on forever without looping. So it’s inevitable that if I try to locate the universe’s cause, I’ll get a counterintuitive answer. I’ll find that it either just sprang into existence without being caused, that it caused itself, or that there’s a never-ending procession of turtles.
None of these feel like Real Explanations, but (at least?) one of them must be the case. So I already know, a priori, that the universe’s causal chain has no Real Explanation. If I think one exists, that just means I’ve failed to notice my confusion. Asking “Why is there everything?” and its equivalents is a failure to notice confusion.
By time you are saying things like “Well I’m confused, but… …and therefore, it must be the case that A, B, or C”, you should worry that you have already baked your confusion into your formulation of the question.
What do you think you are confused about? You have grounds for thinking the question has no answer, but those are not per se grounds for thinking there was never a question.
About the reason the universe exists. I’m using “confusion” as shorthand for not having an explanation that feels adequate on a gut level (which leads to a sensation of confusion), whether or not that confusion is justified.
You have grounds for thinking the question has no answer, but those are not per se grounds for thinking there was never a question.
I don’t doubt the question’s existence. I doubt the question is worth asking.
Because I already know the three possible answers that question can have, and I already know none of them will feel adequate. As my only motivation for asking the question would be getting an answer that feels adequate, there’s no point in asking it.
My conclusion that I can’t answer it follows from my existing knowledge of those boundaries, however, so I don’t learn novel boundaries from that conclusion.
Most fully general counterarguments are valid, taken at face value. This does not mean they’re worth giving much weight. For example, someone could answer any argument I post on LW with “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” Which would be correct but rarely helpful.
Similarly, although I’m sympathetic to the idea of never assigning p=0 or p=1 to anything, any well-specified model I make is going to leave something out. So for me to make any inferences at all, I have to implicitly assign p=0 or p=1 to something. If I started throwing out models on that basis I’d have nothing left.
For example, someone could answer any argument I post on LW with “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” Which would be correct but rarely helpful.
You don’t know why that objection is wrong?
Because it is. It’s not a valid argument we reject anyway, it’s an invalid argument.
Most fully general counterarguments are valid, taken at face value.
There’s an important difference between “valid” and “valid, taken at face value.”
If the objection is invalid, answer it! Let your arguments screen off your labels.
You don’t know why that objection is wrong?
Because it is. It’s not a valid argument we reject anyway, it’s an invalid argument.
Alright, call it “invalid” and “wrong” if you like. I’m not trying to make some clever-clever semantic nitpick about the meanings of the words “valid” & “invalid”; I’m trying to communicate why “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” is all but useless to me.
I’ll try it again without using the words “valid” & “invalid”: although the BS,IAPYAWAT! counterargument is literally true (which gives it a veneer of reasonable-soundingness) it rarely tells me anything new, because when I post something on LW I usually already know I could be wrong. Being told BS,IAPYAWAT! isn’t substantial evidence for me being wrong, because someone can just as easily say it whether I’m wrong or not.
There’s an important difference between “valid” and “valid, taken at face value.”
Exactly.
If the objection is invalid, answer it! Let your arguments screen off your labels.
I’ll try it again without using the words “valid” & “invalid”: although the BS,IAPYAWAT! counterargument is literally true (which gives it a veneer of reasonable-soundingness) it rarely tells me anything new, because when I post something on LW I usually already know I could be wrong.
Ah, I think I see.
Sat, we’re not saying that the fact you might be wrong invalidates all arguments ever, because you can never be totally certain.
We’re saying it invalidates the argument “X is wrong, therefore Y”, unless you have a proof that X and Y are the only possibilities.
Sat, we’re not saying that the fact you might be wrong invalidates all arguments ever, because you can never be totally certain.
I know. Nonetheless, if someone says to me “there could be an (n+1)th explanation neither of us has thought of” without elaborating, that does amount to a but-you-might-be-wrong-about-that argument (even if not intended as such).
We’re saying it invalidates the argument “X is wrong, therefore Y”, unless you have a proof that X and Y are the only possibilities.
I don’t have a proof, just the plausibility argument I gave earlier. A plausibility argument is not a proof, but this plausibility argument is so straightforward I find it pretty convincing.
But—it doesn’t matter how plausible your axioms are if they give paradoxical results! Is it really more plausible that there’s an invisible flaw in our reasoning than that we’ve failed to think of another possibility?
Hell, there are unlimited possibilities! It could be a duck, for example. That doesn’t make any sense as an answer, but neither do those three answers. So why are we privileging them?
But—it doesn’t matter how plausible your axioms are if they give paradoxical results!
One way I differ is that the results don’t feel paradoxical to me. They feel a bit counterintuitive, but not so much so that my internal paradox alarm goes off.
Is it really more plausible that there’s an invisible flaw in our reasoning than that we’ve failed to think of another possibility?
I’ll bite that bullet, sure.
Some people find quantum mechanics paradoxical because it directly contradicts a deep intuition that any & every physical object necessarily has to have an unambiguous position & velocity. That philosophical intuition is simply false; it’s a flawed insistence that the universe conform to a flawed induction. The right course of action is to throw out the intuition, not the axioms, despite the apparently paradoxical results.
I think I’m applying the same basic decision rule here: when a robust formalism clashes with an informal, inductive philosophical intuition, let the formalism bulldoze the intuition.
I don’t think the “intuition” that we probably didn’t make a mistake in our proof is analogous to the “intuition” that objects have unambiguous positions & velocities.
More to the point, I could say the same thing about your “intuition” that there are no other possible explanations for the universe.
I don’t think the “intuition” that we probably didn’t make a mistake in our proof is analogous to the “intuition” that objects have unambiguous positions & velocities.
I agree! Maybe I made the analogy too ambiguous by trying to keep it concise. Being more explicit, here are four intuitions:
1A. There is an unambiguous position & velocity for every object.
1B. Every object obeys Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
2A. All concrete things have intelligible, psychologically satisfying explanations for what caused them to exist.
2B. Every causal chain must go on forever, have a loop, or bottom out in an uncaused cause.
I was drawing the analogy 2A:2B::1A:1B, rather than 2B:2A::1A:1B. 2B is backed by a straightforward, semi-formal plausibility argument (if not an outright formal proof); 2A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life. 1B is backed by the formalism of QM; 1A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life.
More to the point, I could say the same thing about your “intuition” that there are no other possible explanations for the universe.
I’d disagree, since 2B is backed by something at least resembling a formal argument, whereas 2A is backed by my gut insisting “it’s just common sense!”
Except that my point isn’t that 2B, true or false, is a statement about causal chains, not explanations. If it were rephrased as “everything is either explained by an “uncaused cause”, a causal loop, or an infinite causal chain” we would see that it fails to address the question.
As for whether things need explanations … if there’s no reason for the way things are, why aren’t they otherwise? Why am I still confused after hearing your answer?
I’m not sure I follow the first paragraph (the two sentences seem to contradict each other).
As for whether things need explanations … if there’s no reason for the way things are, why aren’t they otherwise?
The answer to this, for me, follows from how I interpret “why are there”-type questions. If there’s no reason why things are as they are, there’s no counterfactual change that could have been made to render things “otherwise”.
As a concrete example, I’m not allowed to ask “why didn’t the Big Bang happen in some other way?” (if I understand orthodox cosmology correctly). There’s no pre-Big Bang initial condition that could’ve been any different.
Let me rephrase this in terms of your strength as a rationalist: why are you not more confused by the fictional universe where something (could be the universe, could Hinduism, could be a magic indestructible rock) wasn’t always there/created in a time loop? Compared to reality, that is?
These “explanations” are notable only in that they perfectly “explain” any possible state of reality.
I’m still not really following but I’ll try to answer your question as best I can.
why are you not more confused by the fictional universe where something (could be the universe, could Hinduism, could be a magic indestructible rock) wasn’t always there/created in a time loop?
And wasn’t created by an infinite series of preceding things? (I’m guessing your question is intended to ask about a thing for which none of my 3 possibilities hold, and omitting one of those possibilities from your question was an oversight.) If so, I don’t even know how to conceptualize that fictional thing in that fictional universe. So (at least in this respect) I am more confused by your hypothetical than by reality.
Arguing that someone else is wrong, therefore you are right is a well-known cheap debating trick.
When I wascomplaining about the “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” argument, I wasn’t complaining about all arguments that have “you are wrong, satt, therefore I am right” as a conclusion. I’m only taking issue with people mumbling “well, have you ever considered you might be wrong?” without elaborating. There’s nothing wrong with someone arguing I might be wrong about something. But they should at least give a hint as to why I’d be wrong.
Would you care to explain why I’m wrong, rather than sorting my argument into a low-status category?
In this case, “there could be a fourth explanation neither of us has thought of” amounts to saying “there could be a fourth possible terminal state for a causal chain”. Well, sure, it’s always possible. But why should I assign that possibility any substantial probability?
Causal chains are pretty basic, abstract objects — directed graphs. I’m not talking about a set of concrete objects, where a fourth example could be hiding somewhere in the physical world where no one can see it. I’m not talking about some abstruse mathematical object that’s liable to have weird properties I’m not even aware of. I’m talking about boxes connected by arrows. If there were some fourth terminal state I could arrange them to have I’d expect to know about it.
What I’ve just said might be mistaken. But you haven’t given any specifics as to where or how it goes wrong, so your comment is just another form of “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!”, which doesn’t help me.
When I was complaining about the “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” argument, I wasn’t complaining about all arguments that have “you are wrong, satt, therefore I am right” as a conclusion. I’m only taking issue with people mumbling “well, have you ever considered you might be wrong?” without elaborating. There’s nothing wrong with someone arguing I might be wrong about something. But they should at least give a hint as to why I’d be wrong.
If someone demonstrates all the known options are wrong, that doesn’t mean it’s a wrong question, it means we don’t have an answer yet.
What I’ve just said might be mistaken. But you haven’t given any specifics as to where or how it goes wrong, so your comment is just another form of “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!”, which doesn’t help me.
Allow me to elaborate.
Explanation A, “The buck stops here because it just does” is not an explanation. See “Explain, Worship, Ignore”.
B & C, “It’s always been there” and “It’s in a causal loop” both fail to explain why the universe is not in another counterfactual state, and thus are not explanations, they are merely descriptions of the thing we are trying to explain.
Since the explanation cannot be A, B or C, it must be something other than A, B or C. (Almost a tautology, but worth stating explicitly.)
You are taking it as axiomatic that there are no other possible answers—which, indeed, has a high prior probability, since neither of us can think of any others. Thus, you conclude that there is something wrong with this argument.
I, on the other hand, feel that this little proof should cause us to update our prior that these are the only possibilities.
If someone demonstrates all the known options are wrong, that doesn’t mean it’s a wrong question, it means we don’t have an answer yet.
That’s one possibility. Another is that a satisfactory answer doesn’t exist because the question is just broken...but now we start going around in circles.
[elaboration snipped] Does that answer your question?
Not really; I still don’t know why I shouldn’t take it as axiomatic that there are no other possible answers. But you have nicely summarized what we disagree about.
That’s one possibility. Another is that a satisfactory answer doesn’t exist because the question is just broken...but now we start going around in circles.
Indeed.
I still don’t know why I shouldn’t take it as axiomatic that there are no other possible answers.
Well, if you’re taking it as axiomatic, there’s no argument I could make that could persuade you otherwise, right? So I guess I may as well tap out.
Still, at least we managed to pinpoint our disagreement, eh?
If propositional calculus (simpler than it sounds is a good way of describing causality in the territory, I very much doubt there is a fourth option. If I’m doing logic right:
1.¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause (1)(By NOT-3)
2.A has a cause→ ¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause(1)(By THEN-1)
3.A has a cause→ ¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause(1)→A has a cause ∧¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause(1)(By AND-3)
4.A has a cause→A has a cause ∧¬A is A’s cause(1)∨ A is A’s cause(1)(Modus Ponens on 3)
¬A has a cause∨A has a cause⊢A has a cause ∧ A is A’s cause(1)∨¬A is A’s cause* (By NOT-3)
6.¬A has a cause∨A has a cause ∧ A is A’s cause(1)∨¬A is A’s cause(1)(Modus ponens on 5)
Which, translated back into English, means that something either has a cause apart from itself, is it’s own cause*,or has no cause. If you apply “has a cause apart from itself” recursively, you end up with an infinite chain of causes. Otherwise, you have to go with “is it’s own cause(1)”, which means the causal chain loops back on itself or “has no cause” which means the causal chain ends.
Nothing thus far, to my knowledge, has been found to defy the axioms of PC, and thus, if PC were wrong, it would seem not only unsatisfying but downright crazy. I believe that I could make at least a thousand claims which I believe as strongly as “If the Universe defied the principles of logic, it would seem crazy to me.” and be wrong at most once, so I assign at least a 99.9% probability to the claim that “Why is everything” has no satisfying answer if “It spontaneously sprang into being”, “Causality is cyclical.” and “an infinite chain of causes” are unsatisfying.
If propositional calculus (simpler than it sounds is a good way of describing causality in the territory, I very much doubt there is a fourth option. If I’m doing logic right:
A problem, or a strength, depending on the context, with this sort of argument is that it does not depend on the meaning of the phrase “X is caused by Y”. Logically, any binary relation forms chains that are either infinite, lead to a cycle, or stop. If the words “X is caused by Y” indeed define a binary relation, then the argument tells you this fact about that relation.
If the concept being groped for with the words is vague, ill-defined, or confused, then the argument will be working from a wrong ontology, and the precision and soundness of the argument may distract from noticing that. Hume denied causation, in favour of correlation; Pearl asserts causation as distinct but as far as I can see takes it as unproblematic enough for his purposes to leave undefined. The discussion here suggests the concept of causation is still unclear. Or if there is a clear concept, people are still unclear what it is.
As I have stated elsewhere, we would still like to know why the universe is not in a counterfactual no-infinite-chain (or loop) state. If this cannot be answered with propositional calculus, then that’s propositional calculus’ fault for containing ontological paradoxes.
Note that this applies in all situations featuring infinite chains or loops, not merely those contaning everything that exists.
I think at this point the question in play is “What was the First Cause?”, rather than “Why is there anything?”, and the two are distinct for practical purposes. Bill Maher might get hung up on the second, but I’d be surprised if he got hung up on the first, given that it’s such an old argument against naturalism.
What justifies my saying that we’ve ended up at the cosmological argument? I think it follows from accepting Maitzen’s dissolution. There’s a chain of turtles, and we’d like to explain the chain. Maitzen points out that instead of trying to explain the chain in itself, we need only explain each individual turtle. Once you or I accept Maitzen’s argument we just have to explain the first turtle, because every subsequent turtle is explained by its predecessor. And asking “what explains the first turtle?” (with the implication that the first turtle, or whatever implicit zeroth turtle hides behind it, is supernatural) is pretty much the cosmological argument. Granted, Maitzen doesn’t address that argument in his essay, but I don’t see a problem with that; it’s a separate argument IMO with its own well-known counterarguments.
Well, we’re mostly discussing Maitzen’s answer to the of the First Cause, the Infinitely Old Universe. Unless a First Cause is somehow (magic?) self-explanatory, it doesn’t answer the question of “Why is there anything?”—but the same applies if you replace a First Cause with an infinite string of causes, or even a future cause + time travel.
Have you seen Gods as Topological Invarients? Note the date submitted as it is relevant.
Anyways the whole question seems a confusion: either the answer will be something that does exist or it will be something that does not exist, if it exists it would appear to be part of “anything” and therefore the question is not addressed, and if it does not exist then that appears to be contradictory.
That’s not exactly a confusion, that’s a paradox. And a faulty one; something might (somehow) “explain itself” or, more likely, we could discover a logical reason things had to exist. Or we might have some unknown insight into rationality and dissolve the question, I suppose, but that’s not really helpful. The point is it’s still an open question; the good Mr. Maitzen has not helped us.
Applying Greek thought to “Ehyeh asher ehyeh” is an attempt to get at something that “explain(s) itself”, I am sure you are familiar with St. Thomas Aquinas and his five ways.
I suppose you are also familiar with Divine Sophia in Gnosticism? Saying we have a logical reason for things existing seems to be on that same level of reasoning and appears to just add another turtle to me.
Yup. Being a theist, I suspect God is in some way the cause of everything, although I’m not really smart enough to understand how that could be. I leave the answer to some future genius (or, more likely, superintelligent AI.)
Really? But logic, as a mathematical construct, “exists” (in the sense that it exists at all) independently of physical objects; a calculator on mars will get the same result as one on Earth, even if they have no causal connection. Logic seems like it can explain things in terms of platonic mathematical structure, not contingent physical causes.
Logic is independent of particular objects (multiply realisable), but there is is no evidence that it exists immaterially
Not entirely sure what “exists” even means in cases like this, but yeah, then I guess you’re restricted to self-causing entities in that case, whatever that might mean.
I disagree. If I go looking for a First Cause and discover an infinite string of causes instead, that’s reality’s way of telling me that there just isn’t a First Cause, and the premise of my investigation was simply wrong. Equivalently, then, discovering an infinite string of causes indicates that the question “What is the First Cause?” (and hence “Why is there anything?”, since that question reduces to the First Cause question once one accepts Maitzen’s argument) is a wrong question, since it hinges on a false premise.
“What is the First Cause?” is not the same question as “Why is there anything?”. An infinite string would answer the former, not the latter.
This is true in the absence of further assumptions. But once you or I assume Maitzen’s argument is true (and I think we both do) the second becomes a mere instantiation of the first.
This is false if Maitzen’s argument is true. Conditional on Maitzen’s argument, an infinite string answers the former and hence the latter. I could justify this by repeating what I’ve written in my two comments upthread, but it might be more productive if I give a different argument.
How do we usually answer “Why is there X?”? I think we usually pick out X’s most salient cause. “Why is there an ambulance outside my neighbour’s house?” “Because the neighbour had a heart attack.” We’re basically saying, “here’s the most interesting antecedent node in the causal graph, and had we deleted or substantially altered it, there wouldn’t have been X”. If we’d deleted the “neighbour’s heart attack” node, there wouldn’t be an “ambulance outside neighbour’s house” node.
This gives me a way to interpret “What’s the First Cause?”, or “Why is there anything?”, or “Why is there everything?”, or “Why isn’t the universe in the counterfactual no-turtle state?” (to paraphrase you). These questions are asking for a node in the causal graph that’s antecedent to everything. But how can I do that if the causal graph is an infinitely long string? There’s no such node!
There is still the question of why there is an infinitely long string.
That question fails in the same way as the others. It’s asking for a causal node which, if altered or deleted, would turn the infinite string of causal nodes into a finite one. But no node in an infinitely long string has that power, so the question’s implicit assumption is false.
A why question has more possible anwers than efficient causality.
This might be true of “Why” questions in general but I’m talking about the more specific class of questions that start “Why is there”. Can you think of examples of the latter that have a sensible answer that isn’t a salient cause?
Sure. “Why are there airbags in cars” is answered with “to protect the occupants”. it would be inane to give a a causal answer, such as “because someone fitted airbags”.
“to protect the occupants” is merely syntactically simpler than “because of the builder’s desire to protect the occupants.”—the two statements equally well indicate causality.
To be fair, this could be phrased as “because someone decided they were the best way to protect the occupants, and fitted them.” However, I would define an answer to a “why is there” question more broadly—what explains why the universe is not in the counterfactual situation of this not being there? If you count any causal antecedent as an answer, you can’t explain causal loops, and you can only explain parts of infinite chains, not the whole.
The paraphrase introduces some efficient causality without removing all the teleology.
The point I was making is that a preceding cause is not the only kind of answer to a “why” question.
I’d say the causality was there all along and MugaSofer & ArisKatsaris just made it explicit. Causality can become teleology by operating through a mind, but it remains causal for all that.
There is some evidence of that within the universe, but it is not a conceptual identity. The big Why question could still have an answer that is irreducibly teleological. The universe as a whole has to have some unique properties.
Note that I think of teleology as a subset of causation rather than as coextensive with causation.
I don’t think I can imagine how this could work. A teleological answer to “why does the universe exist?” implies (at least to me) some goal-seeking agent that makes the universe happen, or orients it towards some particular end. But making stuff happen or pushing it in a particular direction is causality.
I agree, but I don’t see why the universe would have to be uniquely irreducibly teleological instead of, say, uniquely acausal (being the only entity that just springs into existence without a cause).
Thinking in a certain way doesn’t prove anything. The evidence for teleology being reducible to causality comes from within the universe, like the evidence for everything being finite, or for everything being contained in some larger structure.
If you canno explain how agent-based causally-reducible teleology is the only possible kind, irreducible teleology remains a conceptual possibility.
I doesn’t. That is only one of the unique properties it could have.
Yes. It’s always possible for me to be simply wrong; something might exist even if I think that something is logically impossible. But (1) by induction from within-the-universe evidence, I find it very unlikely, and (2) even if I wanted to include irreducible teleology in my model, I wouldn’t know how. So it’s expedient for me to treat it as an impossibility. I’m content to agree to disagree with you on this one!
That doesn’t have any bearing at all. An inhabitant of an infinite universe could notice that every single thing in it is finite, but would be completely wrong in assuming that the universe they are in is finite.
You take your assumption—which is presumable not justfiable apriori—that the past causes the future, and invert it.
This sounds like just as much of an a priori assumption as my working assumption that it does have some bearing.
Yes, induction can lead to incorrect conclusions. But this is not a very strong argument against any given induction.
I change my existing model so that the future causes the past within my model? I’m not sure how to do that either. I picture flipping the direction of every arrow in my causal graph, but that doesn’t introduce any irreducible teleology; I’m still left with an ordinary causal graph when I finish.
Induction only ever works, inasmuch as it works, across tokens of the same type. Parts and wholes are almost always of different types. Trying to derive properties of wholes from properties of part is the fallacy of composition.
I agree with you about this. (And also agree with you & ArisKatsaris’s response to PrawnOfFate’s airbag example.) I suspect we just differ in our reactions to this inability to explain: you think it’s a bug while I think it’s expected behaviour.
Any causal chain eventually has to (1) end, (2) loop back on itself, or (3) go on forever without looping. So it’s inevitable that if I try to locate the universe’s cause, I’ll get a counterintuitive answer. I’ll find that it either just sprang into existence without being caused, that it caused itself, or that there’s a never-ending procession of turtles.
None of these feel like Real Explanations, but (at least?) one of them must be the case. So I already know, a priori, that the universe’s causal chain has no Real Explanation. If I think one exists, that just means I’ve failed to notice my confusion. Asking “Why is there everything?” and its equivalents is a failure to notice confusion.
By time you are saying things like “Well I’m confused, but… …and therefore, it must be the case that A, B, or C”, you should worry that you have already baked your confusion into your formulation of the question.
What do you think you are confused about? You have grounds for thinking the question has no answer, but those are not per se grounds for thinking there was never a question.
About the reason the universe exists. I’m using “confusion” as shorthand for not having an explanation that feels adequate on a gut level (which leads to a sensation of confusion), whether or not that confusion is justified.
I don’t doubt the question’s existence. I doubt the question is worth asking.
Because?
Because I already know the three possible answers that question can have, and I already know none of them will feel adequate. As my only motivation for asking the question would be getting an answer that feels adequate, there’s no point in asking it.
Realising that you can’t answer it can set boundaries on your knowledge.
My conclusion that I can’t answer it follows from my existing knowledge of those boundaries, however, so I don’t learn novel boundaries from that conclusion.
Or there could be a fourth explanation neither of us has thought of.
“There could be an (n+1)th explanation neither of us has thought of” is a fully general counterargument to any argument by cases.
It’s valid too. Which is one reason not to put p=1.0 on anything.
Most fully general counterarguments are valid, taken at face value. This does not mean they’re worth giving much weight. For example, someone could answer any argument I post on LW with “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” Which would be correct but rarely helpful.
Similarly, although I’m sympathetic to the idea of never assigning p=0 or p=1 to anything, any well-specified model I make is going to leave something out. So for me to make any inferences at all, I have to implicitly assign p=0 or p=1 to something. If I started throwing out models on that basis I’d have nothing left.
You don’t know why that objection is wrong?
Because it is. It’s not a valid argument we reject anyway, it’s an invalid argument.
There’s an important difference between “valid” and “valid, taken at face value.”
If the objection is invalid, answer it! Let your arguments screen off your labels.
Alright, call it “invalid” and “wrong” if you like. I’m not trying to make some clever-clever semantic nitpick about the meanings of the words “valid” & “invalid”; I’m trying to communicate why “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” is all but useless to me.
I’ll try it again without using the words “valid” & “invalid”: although the BS,IAPYAWAT! counterargument is literally true (which gives it a veneer of reasonable-soundingness) it rarely tells me anything new, because when I post something on LW I usually already know I could be wrong. Being told BS,IAPYAWAT! isn’t substantial evidence for me being wrong, because someone can just as easily say it whether I’m wrong or not.
Exactly.
OK, gimme a sec.
Ah, I think I see.
Sat, we’re not saying that the fact you might be wrong invalidates all arguments ever, because you can never be totally certain.
We’re saying it invalidates the argument “X is wrong, therefore Y”, unless you have a proof that X and Y are the only possibilities.
I know. Nonetheless, if someone says to me “there could be an (n+1)th explanation neither of us has thought of” without elaborating, that does amount to a but-you-might-be-wrong-about-that argument (even if not intended as such).
I don’t have a proof, just the plausibility argument I gave earlier. A plausibility argument is not a proof, but this plausibility argument is so straightforward I find it pretty convincing.
But—it doesn’t matter how plausible your axioms are if they give paradoxical results! Is it really more plausible that there’s an invisible flaw in our reasoning than that we’ve failed to think of another possibility?
Hell, there are unlimited possibilities! It could be a duck, for example. That doesn’t make any sense as an answer, but neither do those three answers. So why are we privileging them?
One way I differ is that the results don’t feel paradoxical to me. They feel a bit counterintuitive, but not so much so that my internal paradox alarm goes off.
I’ll bite that bullet, sure.
Some people find quantum mechanics paradoxical because it directly contradicts a deep intuition that any & every physical object necessarily has to have an unambiguous position & velocity. That philosophical intuition is simply false; it’s a flawed insistence that the universe conform to a flawed induction. The right course of action is to throw out the intuition, not the axioms, despite the apparently paradoxical results.
I think I’m applying the same basic decision rule here: when a robust formalism clashes with an informal, inductive philosophical intuition, let the formalism bulldoze the intuition.
I don’t think the “intuition” that we probably didn’t make a mistake in our proof is analogous to the “intuition” that objects have unambiguous positions & velocities.
More to the point, I could say the same thing about your “intuition” that there are no other possible explanations for the universe.
I agree! Maybe I made the analogy too ambiguous by trying to keep it concise. Being more explicit, here are four intuitions:
1A. There is an unambiguous position & velocity for every object.
1B. Every object obeys Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
2A. All concrete things have intelligible, psychologically satisfying explanations for what caused them to exist.
2B. Every causal chain must go on forever, have a loop, or bottom out in an uncaused cause.
I was drawing the analogy 2A:2B::1A:1B, rather than 2B:2A::1A:1B. 2B is backed by a straightforward, semi-formal plausibility argument (if not an outright formal proof); 2A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life. 1B is backed by the formalism of QM; 1A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life.
I’d disagree, since 2B is backed by something at least resembling a formal argument, whereas 2A is backed by my gut insisting “it’s just common sense!”
Except that my point isn’t that 2B, true or false, is a statement about causal chains, not explanations. If it were rephrased as “everything is either explained by an “uncaused cause”, a causal loop, or an infinite causal chain” we would see that it fails to address the question.
As for whether things need explanations … if there’s no reason for the way things are, why aren’t they otherwise? Why am I still confused after hearing your answer?
I’m not sure I follow the first paragraph (the two sentences seem to contradict each other).
The answer to this, for me, follows from how I interpret “why are there”-type questions. If there’s no reason why things are as they are, there’s no counterfactual change that could have been made to render things “otherwise”.
As a concrete example, I’m not allowed to ask “why didn’t the Big Bang happen in some other way?” (if I understand orthodox cosmology correctly). There’s no pre-Big Bang initial condition that could’ve been any different.
Let me rephrase this in terms of your strength as a rationalist: why are you not more confused by the fictional universe where something (could be the universe, could Hinduism, could be a magic indestructible rock) wasn’t always there/created in a time loop? Compared to reality, that is?
These “explanations” are notable only in that they perfectly “explain” any possible state of reality.
I’m still not really following but I’ll try to answer your question as best I can.
And wasn’t created by an infinite series of preceding things? (I’m guessing your question is intended to ask about a thing for which none of my 3 possibilities hold, and omitting one of those possibilities from your question was an oversight.) If so, I don’t even know how to conceptualize that fictional thing in that fictional universe. So (at least in this respect) I am more confused by your hypothetical than by reality.
Why yes, yes it is. Arguing that someone else is wrong, therefore you are right is a well-known cheap debating trick.
Would you care to explain why I’m wrong, rather than sorting my argument into a low-status category?
When I was complaining about the “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!” argument, I wasn’t complaining about all arguments that have “you are wrong, satt, therefore I am right” as a conclusion. I’m only taking issue with people mumbling “well, have you ever considered you might be wrong?” without elaborating. There’s nothing wrong with someone arguing I might be wrong about something. But they should at least give a hint as to why I’d be wrong.
In this case, “there could be a fourth explanation neither of us has thought of” amounts to saying “there could be a fourth possible terminal state for a causal chain”. Well, sure, it’s always possible. But why should I assign that possibility any substantial probability?
Causal chains are pretty basic, abstract objects — directed graphs. I’m not talking about a set of concrete objects, where a fourth example could be hiding somewhere in the physical world where no one can see it. I’m not talking about some abstruse mathematical object that’s liable to have weird properties I’m not even aware of. I’m talking about boxes connected by arrows. If there were some fourth terminal state I could arrange them to have I’d expect to know about it.
What I’ve just said might be mistaken. But you haven’t given any specifics as to where or how it goes wrong, so your comment is just another form of “but satt, it’s always possible you are wrong about that!”, which doesn’t help me.
If someone demonstrates all the known options are wrong, that doesn’t mean it’s a wrong question, it means we don’t have an answer yet.
Allow me to elaborate.
You are taking it as axiomatic that there are no other possible answers—which, indeed, has a high prior probability, since neither of us can think of any others. Thus, you conclude that there is something wrong with this argument.
I, on the other hand, feel that this little proof should cause us to update our prior that these are the only possibilities.
Does that answer your question?
That’s one possibility. Another is that a satisfactory answer doesn’t exist because the question is just broken...but now we start going around in circles.
Not really; I still don’t know why I shouldn’t take it as axiomatic that there are no other possible answers. But you have nicely summarized what we disagree about.
Indeed.
Well, if you’re taking it as axiomatic, there’s no argument I could make that could persuade you otherwise, right? So I guess I may as well tap out.
Still, at least we managed to pinpoint our disagreement, eh?
Wholly agreed!
If propositional calculus (simpler than it sounds is a good way of describing causality in the territory, I very much doubt there is a fourth option. If I’m doing logic right:
1.¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause (1)(By NOT-3)
2.A has a cause→ ¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause(1)(By THEN-1)
3.A has a cause→ ¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause(1)→A has a cause ∧¬A is A’s cause(1)∨A is A’s cause(1)(By AND-3)
4.A has a cause→A has a cause ∧¬A is A’s cause(1)∨ A is A’s cause(1)(Modus Ponens on 3)
¬A has a cause∨A has a cause⊢A has a cause ∧ A is A’s cause(1)∨¬A is A’s cause* (By NOT-3)
6.¬A has a cause∨A has a cause ∧ A is A’s cause(1)∨¬A is A’s cause(1)(Modus ponens on 5)
Which, translated back into English, means that something either has a cause apart from itself, is it’s own cause*,or has no cause. If you apply “has a cause apart from itself” recursively, you end up with an infinite chain of causes. Otherwise, you have to go with “is it’s own cause(1)”, which means the causal chain loops back on itself or “has no cause” which means the causal chain ends.
Nothing thus far, to my knowledge, has been found to defy the axioms of PC, and thus, if PC were wrong, it would seem not only unsatisfying but downright crazy. I believe that I could make at least a thousand claims which I believe as strongly as “If the Universe defied the principles of logic, it would seem crazy to me.” and be wrong at most once, so I assign at least a 99.9% probability to the claim that “Why is everything” has no satisfying answer if “It spontaneously sprang into being”, “Causality is cyclical.” and “an infinite chain of causes” are unsatisfying.
(1)Directly or indirectly
A problem, or a strength, depending on the context, with this sort of argument is that it does not depend on the meaning of the phrase “X is caused by Y”. Logically, any binary relation forms chains that are either infinite, lead to a cycle, or stop. If the words “X is caused by Y” indeed define a binary relation, then the argument tells you this fact about that relation.
If the concept being groped for with the words is vague, ill-defined, or confused, then the argument will be working from a wrong ontology, and the precision and soundness of the argument may distract from noticing that. Hume denied causation, in favour of correlation; Pearl asserts causation as distinct but as far as I can see takes it as unproblematic enough for his purposes to leave undefined. The discussion here suggests the concept of causation is still unclear. Or if there is a clear concept, people are still unclear what it is.
As I have stated elsewhere, we would still like to know why the universe is not in a counterfactual no-infinite-chain (or loop) state. If this cannot be answered with propositional calculus, then that’s propositional calculus’ fault for containing ontological paradoxes.
Note that this applies in all situations featuring infinite chains or loops, not merely those contaning everything that exists.
Sorry, which argument is this? He makes several.
The argument that once the elements in the string are individually explained, the string as a whole is explained.
Edit: maybe I should call it the Hume-Edwards principle instead.
Ah. Well, I agree with it in principle; I just think he misapplies it.