But—it doesn’t matter how plausible your axioms are if they give paradoxical results! Is it really more plausible that there’s an invisible flaw in our reasoning than that we’ve failed to think of another possibility?
Hell, there are unlimited possibilities! It could be a duck, for example. That doesn’t make any sense as an answer, but neither do those three answers. So why are we privileging them?
But—it doesn’t matter how plausible your axioms are if they give paradoxical results!
One way I differ is that the results don’t feel paradoxical to me. They feel a bit counterintuitive, but not so much so that my internal paradox alarm goes off.
Is it really more plausible that there’s an invisible flaw in our reasoning than that we’ve failed to think of another possibility?
I’ll bite that bullet, sure.
Some people find quantum mechanics paradoxical because it directly contradicts a deep intuition that any & every physical object necessarily has to have an unambiguous position & velocity. That philosophical intuition is simply false; it’s a flawed insistence that the universe conform to a flawed induction. The right course of action is to throw out the intuition, not the axioms, despite the apparently paradoxical results.
I think I’m applying the same basic decision rule here: when a robust formalism clashes with an informal, inductive philosophical intuition, let the formalism bulldoze the intuition.
I don’t think the “intuition” that we probably didn’t make a mistake in our proof is analogous to the “intuition” that objects have unambiguous positions & velocities.
More to the point, I could say the same thing about your “intuition” that there are no other possible explanations for the universe.
I don’t think the “intuition” that we probably didn’t make a mistake in our proof is analogous to the “intuition” that objects have unambiguous positions & velocities.
I agree! Maybe I made the analogy too ambiguous by trying to keep it concise. Being more explicit, here are four intuitions:
1A. There is an unambiguous position & velocity for every object.
1B. Every object obeys Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
2A. All concrete things have intelligible, psychologically satisfying explanations for what caused them to exist.
2B. Every causal chain must go on forever, have a loop, or bottom out in an uncaused cause.
I was drawing the analogy 2A:2B::1A:1B, rather than 2B:2A::1A:1B. 2B is backed by a straightforward, semi-formal plausibility argument (if not an outright formal proof); 2A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life. 1B is backed by the formalism of QM; 1A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life.
More to the point, I could say the same thing about your “intuition” that there are no other possible explanations for the universe.
I’d disagree, since 2B is backed by something at least resembling a formal argument, whereas 2A is backed by my gut insisting “it’s just common sense!”
Except that my point isn’t that 2B, true or false, is a statement about causal chains, not explanations. If it were rephrased as “everything is either explained by an “uncaused cause”, a causal loop, or an infinite causal chain” we would see that it fails to address the question.
As for whether things need explanations … if there’s no reason for the way things are, why aren’t they otherwise? Why am I still confused after hearing your answer?
I’m not sure I follow the first paragraph (the two sentences seem to contradict each other).
As for whether things need explanations … if there’s no reason for the way things are, why aren’t they otherwise?
The answer to this, for me, follows from how I interpret “why are there”-type questions. If there’s no reason why things are as they are, there’s no counterfactual change that could have been made to render things “otherwise”.
As a concrete example, I’m not allowed to ask “why didn’t the Big Bang happen in some other way?” (if I understand orthodox cosmology correctly). There’s no pre-Big Bang initial condition that could’ve been any different.
Let me rephrase this in terms of your strength as a rationalist: why are you not more confused by the fictional universe where something (could be the universe, could Hinduism, could be a magic indestructible rock) wasn’t always there/created in a time loop? Compared to reality, that is?
These “explanations” are notable only in that they perfectly “explain” any possible state of reality.
I’m still not really following but I’ll try to answer your question as best I can.
why are you not more confused by the fictional universe where something (could be the universe, could Hinduism, could be a magic indestructible rock) wasn’t always there/created in a time loop?
And wasn’t created by an infinite series of preceding things? (I’m guessing your question is intended to ask about a thing for which none of my 3 possibilities hold, and omitting one of those possibilities from your question was an oversight.) If so, I don’t even know how to conceptualize that fictional thing in that fictional universe. So (at least in this respect) I am more confused by your hypothetical than by reality.
But—it doesn’t matter how plausible your axioms are if they give paradoxical results! Is it really more plausible that there’s an invisible flaw in our reasoning than that we’ve failed to think of another possibility?
Hell, there are unlimited possibilities! It could be a duck, for example. That doesn’t make any sense as an answer, but neither do those three answers. So why are we privileging them?
One way I differ is that the results don’t feel paradoxical to me. They feel a bit counterintuitive, but not so much so that my internal paradox alarm goes off.
I’ll bite that bullet, sure.
Some people find quantum mechanics paradoxical because it directly contradicts a deep intuition that any & every physical object necessarily has to have an unambiguous position & velocity. That philosophical intuition is simply false; it’s a flawed insistence that the universe conform to a flawed induction. The right course of action is to throw out the intuition, not the axioms, despite the apparently paradoxical results.
I think I’m applying the same basic decision rule here: when a robust formalism clashes with an informal, inductive philosophical intuition, let the formalism bulldoze the intuition.
I don’t think the “intuition” that we probably didn’t make a mistake in our proof is analogous to the “intuition” that objects have unambiguous positions & velocities.
More to the point, I could say the same thing about your “intuition” that there are no other possible explanations for the universe.
I agree! Maybe I made the analogy too ambiguous by trying to keep it concise. Being more explicit, here are four intuitions:
1A. There is an unambiguous position & velocity for every object.
1B. Every object obeys Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
2A. All concrete things have intelligible, psychologically satisfying explanations for what caused them to exist.
2B. Every causal chain must go on forever, have a loop, or bottom out in an uncaused cause.
I was drawing the analogy 2A:2B::1A:1B, rather than 2B:2A::1A:1B. 2B is backed by a straightforward, semi-formal plausibility argument (if not an outright formal proof); 2A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life. 1B is backed by the formalism of QM; 1A is a gut-level induction from observing things in everyday life.
I’d disagree, since 2B is backed by something at least resembling a formal argument, whereas 2A is backed by my gut insisting “it’s just common sense!”
Except that my point isn’t that 2B, true or false, is a statement about causal chains, not explanations. If it were rephrased as “everything is either explained by an “uncaused cause”, a causal loop, or an infinite causal chain” we would see that it fails to address the question.
As for whether things need explanations … if there’s no reason for the way things are, why aren’t they otherwise? Why am I still confused after hearing your answer?
I’m not sure I follow the first paragraph (the two sentences seem to contradict each other).
The answer to this, for me, follows from how I interpret “why are there”-type questions. If there’s no reason why things are as they are, there’s no counterfactual change that could have been made to render things “otherwise”.
As a concrete example, I’m not allowed to ask “why didn’t the Big Bang happen in some other way?” (if I understand orthodox cosmology correctly). There’s no pre-Big Bang initial condition that could’ve been any different.
Let me rephrase this in terms of your strength as a rationalist: why are you not more confused by the fictional universe where something (could be the universe, could Hinduism, could be a magic indestructible rock) wasn’t always there/created in a time loop? Compared to reality, that is?
These “explanations” are notable only in that they perfectly “explain” any possible state of reality.
I’m still not really following but I’ll try to answer your question as best I can.
And wasn’t created by an infinite series of preceding things? (I’m guessing your question is intended to ask about a thing for which none of my 3 possibilities hold, and omitting one of those possibilities from your question was an oversight.) If so, I don’t even know how to conceptualize that fictional thing in that fictional universe. So (at least in this respect) I am more confused by your hypothetical than by reality.