I’m not sure what your argument is here? Eliezer already wrote a post on this so no one should bother writing anything about the same topic ever again?
Eliezer already wrote a post on this, so no one should bother writing anything about the same topic that does not add anything new to Eliezer’s post, or do anything to result in changing one’s conclusion from that described in Eliezer’s post. This post does not (indeed, it would be quite difficult to write anything that does).
As best I can tell you are making an argument here for pragmatism but want to skip talking about epistemology.
My point is precisely that conundrums of epistemology, and epistemological questions in general, are motivated by pragmatic things or else by nothing.
I do not think there is any “problem of the criterion”, except in a way such as is already addressed to the maximum possible degree of satisfaction by the linked Sequence post. Hence no “conundrum” exists.
When I said that nothing remains to say, I meant that anything else that’s said on this topic, over and above the linked post, is strictly superfluous—not that in general saying things is bad.
(Alright, breaking my own rule; we’ll see how it goes.)
Eliezer already wrote a post on this, so no one should bother writing anything about the same topic that does not add anything new to Eliezer’s post, or do anything to result in changing one’s conclusion from that described in Eliezer’s post. This post does not (indeed, it would be quite difficult to write anything that does).
I guess I don’t have much to say to this, as I disagree with your judgement here that there’s no value in saying the same things in a new way even if nothing new is added, although I also disagree of course that I don’t add anything. Sometimes saying the same thing in a different way clicks for someone when it didn’t click for someone else because not everyone has literally the same mind. Cf. Anna Salamon on learning soft skills and the project of distillation.
My point is precisely that conundrums of epistemology, and epistemological questions in general, are motivated by pragmatic things or else by nothing.
This is literally also one of my main points, so I guess we at least agree on something.
I do not think there is any “problem of the criterion”, except in a way such as is already addressed to the maximum possible degree of satisfaction by the linked Sequence post. Hence no “conundrum” exists.
Sure, but I’m not satisfied with his post, hence I think there is more to say, though you obviously disagree.
Thus I’m left struggling to figure out a charitable motivation for your comments. That is, I’m not sure what point you are trying to make here other than you are annoyed I wrote something you didn’t want to read since I already agree with pragmatism, linked and highlighted your preferred Yudkowsky article on this topic, and we otherwise agree that there is something going on to be addressed regarding grounding problems.
My point is precisely that conundrums of epistemology, and epistemological questions in general, are motivated by pragmatic things or else by nothing
They are motivated by whatever they are motivated by. It is possible for someone to value truth as a end in itself. Maybe you are not that person, but you have solved nothing for the people who value truth terminally
Eliezer already wrote a post on this, so no one should bother writing anything about the same topic that does not add anything new to Eliezer’s post, or do anything to result in changing one’s conclusion from that described in Eliezer’s post
He’s one of those people. He hasn’t put forward a solution where he sticks only to doing things of measurable value. He insists that MWI is the correct interpretation of QM , and is so to a high degree of certitude. But an interpretation of QM cant be tested empirically, and has no empirical consequences So he needs a justification of epistemology that allows for a) high credibility about b) abstract topics of no practical significance. And he hasn’t got one, and he hasn’t solved epistemology for the wider rationalist community, because they also haven’t adopted pure pragmatism.
I do not think there is any “problem of the criterion”, except in a way such as is already addressed to the maximum possible degree of satisfaction
If there were already a satisfactory answer to the problem of the criterion , there would be no need to lower the bar by adopting pragmatism or instrumentalism. Solving epistemology for self confident epistemology is even harder.
Eliezer already wrote a post on this, so no one should bother writing anything about the same topic that does not add anything new to Eliezer’s post, or do anything to result in changing one’s conclusion from that described in Eliezer’s post. This post does not (indeed, it would be quite difficult to write anything that does).
My point is precisely that conundrums of epistemology, and epistemological questions in general, are motivated by pragmatic things or else by nothing.
I do not think there is any “problem of the criterion”, except in a way such as is already addressed to the maximum possible degree of satisfaction by the linked Sequence post. Hence no “conundrum” exists.
When I said that nothing remains to say, I meant that anything else that’s said on this topic, over and above the linked post, is strictly superfluous—not that in general saying things is bad.
(Alright, breaking my own rule; we’ll see how it goes.)
I guess I don’t have much to say to this, as I disagree with your judgement here that there’s no value in saying the same things in a new way even if nothing new is added, although I also disagree of course that I don’t add anything. Sometimes saying the same thing in a different way clicks for someone when it didn’t click for someone else because not everyone has literally the same mind. Cf. Anna Salamon on learning soft skills and the project of distillation.
This is literally also one of my main points, so I guess we at least agree on something.
Sure, but I’m not satisfied with his post, hence I think there is more to say, though you obviously disagree.
Thus I’m left struggling to figure out a charitable motivation for your comments. That is, I’m not sure what point you are trying to make here other than you are annoyed I wrote something you didn’t want to read since I already agree with pragmatism, linked and highlighted your preferred Yudkowsky article on this topic, and we otherwise agree that there is something going on to be addressed regarding grounding problems.
It’s the dream of covering every topic with a minimum web of posts, that only grows, without overlap? (The dream of non-redundant scholarship)
Or SA doesn’t think ‘the problem of the criterion’ is motivated by a purpose (or SA’s purpose)?
writing something on a topic is quite different to solving it forever.
Yes. Though even if something is solved, it can be solved again in a different way.
They are motivated by whatever they are motivated by. It is possible for someone to value truth as a end in itself. Maybe you are not that person, but you have solved nothing for the people who value truth terminally
He’s one of those people. He hasn’t put forward a solution where he sticks only to doing things of measurable value. He insists that MWI is the correct interpretation of QM , and is so to a high degree of certitude. But an interpretation of QM cant be tested empirically, and has no empirical consequences So he needs a justification of epistemology that allows for a) high credibility about b) abstract topics of no practical significance. And he hasn’t got one, and he hasn’t solved epistemology for the wider rationalist community, because they also haven’t adopted pure pragmatism.
If there were already a satisfactory answer to the problem of the criterion , there would be no need to lower the bar by adopting pragmatism or instrumentalism. Solving epistemology for self confident epistemology is even harder.