Least convenient possible world—we discover the universe will definitely expand forever. Now what?
Or what about the past? If I tell you an alien living three million years ago threw either a red or a blue ball into the black hole at the center of the galaxy but destroyed all evidence as to which, is there a fact of the matter as to which color ball it was?
“Possible” is an important qualifier there. Since 0 and 1 are not probabilities, you are not describing a possible world.
The comment doesn’t lose too much if we take ‘definite’ to mean 0.99999 instead of 1. (I would tend to write ‘almost certainly’ in such contexts to avoid this kind of problem.)
Yvain’s objection fails if “definitely” means “with probability 0.99999″. In that case the conditional probability P( encounter civilization | universe contracts) is well-defined.
Yvain’s objection fails if “definitely” means “with probability 0.99999″. In that case the conditional probability P( encounter civilization | universe contracts) is well-defined.
Oh, I thought I retracted the grandparent. Nevermind—it does need more caveats in the expression for it to return to being meaningful.
I think it loses its force entirely in that case. Nisan’s proposal was a counterfactual, and Yvain’s counter was a possible world where that counterfactual cannot obtain. Since there is no such possible world, the objection falls flat.
I suspect that the answer to the alien-ball case may be empirical rather than philosophical.
Suppose that there existed quantum configurations in which the alien threw in a red ball, and there existed quantum configurations in which the alien threw in a blue ball, and both of those have approximately equal causal influence on the configuration-cluster in which we are having (approximately) this conversation. In this case, we would happen to be living in a particular type of world such that there was no fact of the matter as to which color ball it was (except that e.g. it mostly wasn’t green).
we discover the universe will definitely expand forever. Now what?
You’re right, my principle doesn’t work if there’s something we believe with absolute certainty.
If I tell you an alien living three million years ago threw either a red or a blue ball into the black hole at the center of the galaxy but destroyed all evidence as to which, is there a fact of the matter as to which color ball it was?
If we later find out that the alien did in fact leave some evidence, and recover that evidence, we’ll have an opinion about the color of the ball.
If I tell you an alien living three million years ago threw either a red or a blue ball into the black hole at the center of the galaxy but destroyed all evidence as to which, is there a fact of the matter as to which color ball it was?
If we later find out that the alien did in fact leave some evidence, and recover that evidence, we’ll have an opinion about the color of the ball.
This seems to be avoiding Yvain’s question by answering a preferred one.
The position expressed so far, combined with the avoidance here would seem to give the answer ‘No’.
Least convenient possible world—we discover the universe will definitely expand forever. Now what?
Or what about the past? If I tell you an alien living three million years ago threw either a red or a blue ball into the black hole at the center of the galaxy but destroyed all evidence as to which, is there a fact of the matter as to which color ball it was?
“Possible” is an important qualifier there. Since 0 and 1 are not probabilities, you are not describing a possible world.
The comment doesn’t lose too much if we take ‘definite’ to mean 0.99999 instead of 1. (I would tend to write ‘almost certainly’ in such contexts to avoid this kind of problem.)
Yvain’s objection fails if “definitely” means “with probability 0.99999″. In that case the conditional probability P( encounter civilization | universe contracts) is well-defined.
Oh, I thought I retracted the grandparent. Nevermind—it does need more caveats in the expression for it to return to being meaningful.
I think it loses its force entirely in that case. Nisan’s proposal was a counterfactual, and Yvain’s counter was a possible world where that counterfactual cannot obtain. Since there is no such possible world, the objection falls flat.
If this claim is meaningful, isn’t Nisan’s proposal false?
No. Why would that be?
I suspect that the answer to the alien-ball case may be empirical rather than philosophical.
Suppose that there existed quantum configurations in which the alien threw in a red ball, and there existed quantum configurations in which the alien threw in a blue ball, and both of those have approximately equal causal influence on the configuration-cluster in which we are having (approximately) this conversation. In this case, we would happen to be living in a particular type of world such that there was no fact of the matter as to which color ball it was (except that e.g. it mostly wasn’t green).
You’re right, my principle doesn’t work if there’s something we believe with absolute certainty.
If we later find out that the alien did in fact leave some evidence, and recover that evidence, we’ll have an opinion about the color of the ball.
This seems to be avoiding Yvain’s question by answering a preferred one.
The position expressed so far, combined with the avoidance here would seem to give the answer ‘No’.