When you expect almost complete logical transparency, mathematical intuition won’t specify anything more than the logical axioms. But where you expect logical uncertainty, the probabilities given by mathematical intuition play the role analogous to that of prior distribution, with expected utilities associated with specific execution histories taken through another expectation according to probabilities given by mathematical intuition. I agree that to the extent mathematical intuition doesn’t play a role in decision-making, UDT utilities are analogous to expected utility, but in fact it plays that role, and it’s more natural to draw the analogy between the informal notion of possible worlds and execution histories rather than between the possible worlds and world-programs. See also this comment.
When you expect almost complete logical transparency, mathematical intuition won’t specify anything more than the logical axioms. But where you expect logical uncertainty, the probabilities given by mathematical intuition play the role analogous to that of prior distribution, with expected utilities associated with specific execution histories taken through another expectation according to probabilities given by mathematical intuition. I agree that to the extent mathematical intuition doesn’t play a role in decision-making, UDT utilities are analogous to expected utility, but in fact it plays that role, and it’s more natural to draw the analogy between the informal notion of possible worlds and execution histories rather than between the possible worlds and world-programs. See also this comment.