I don’t think you understand what happened. Saddamthought that his former close sponsor & ally needed him against Iran because without our Sunni man in Iraq and the fear of WMDs the country would become a Shi’a & Persian pawn*. (You remember the whole Iran-Iraq War and ‘exporting the revolution’ and Hezbollah, right?)
Huh. How about that. Why, it looks like that’s what happened under Maliki and that’s why the country is currently being torn apart and the Iraqi government is inviting Iranian troops in to help restore order.
It would seem Saddam’s mistake was in thinking the USA was run by rational actors, and not run by morons who would sabotage their geopolitical interests in the interests of revenge against a “guy that tried to kill my dad at one time”. As my parable points out, one should not expect that sort of rational planning from the USA or indeed large countries in general.
So no, I think your objection does not hold water once one actually knows why the inspections were refused, and does not apply to the hypothetical involving Stalin.
* EDIT: BTW, I will note that this is a classic example of failing to apply the principle of charity, demonizing enemies, and not caring about contexts. No, Saddam couldn’t have been acting in a complex Middle Eastern complex where the USA and Iraq were natural allies for which ultimatums made no sense; no, he had to be going against his own rational self-interests and be crazy.
I think you actually illustrate how correct I am. When there’s uncertainty about how sincere a threat is, especially because virtually all threats of military action are negative value for both parties if executed, and when the threat sets a precedent that the threatening party could continually impose its will, it’s natural to test the threatening parties commitment.
All you’re saying is that Saddam called the USA’s bluff and was wrong and it was disastrous. That could EASILY have happened with an attempt by the US to demand inspections from Russia.
Think about it further: you are threatened by a nation with a newly developed super-weapon, but only modest stockpiles and uncertain ability to deliver it, to not develop your own version of the super-weapon. The demand is that you submit to thorough inspections, which your enemy would certainly use to spy as extensively as possible on you.
Not to mention that it would set a precedent where you’d have to back down for the next demand, and the next; anythings’ better than being a smear of ash after all, isn’t it?
Or you could consider your excellent military position right next to your enemy’s allies, along with the amount of safety provided by a combination of secrecy and bunkers, and decide that the best move—the only move if you want to resist the slide towards subjugation—is to call your enemy’s bluff.
All you’re saying is that Saddam called the USA’s bluff and was wrong and it was disastrous. That could EASILY have happened with an attempt by the US to demand inspections from Russia.
Um, no, because the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs that were best ridden out lest it damage both allies’ long-term goals.
I’m amazed. You present an example which you think is a great example of irrationality on a dictator’s part, I show you are wrong and have no idea why Saddam resisted and you think you can spin it to support your claims and it actually illustrates how correct you are! What could possibly falsify your criticisms?
Not to mention that it would set a precedent where you’d have to back down for the next demand, and the next; anythings’ better than being a smear of ash after all, isn’t it?
How well did that work in the Cold War against non-nuclear nations..? Everyone understands the logic of blackmail and the point of using Schelling fences to avoid sliding down the slippery slope.
Or you could consider your excellent military position right next to your enemy’s allies, along with the amount of safety provided by a combination of secrecy and bunkers, and decide that the best move—the only move if you want to resist the slide towards subjugation—is to call your enemy’s bluff.
And likely lose, with no superweapon of your own, no prospect of developing it soon under the chaos of war (it was already a top-priority program for Stalin, war could only have delayed it), being cutoff from one of one’s most important trading partners which kept one from economic collapse during WWII, and a self-centered psychopath like Stalin would have to worry about how well bunkers would really protect him against weapons they have no direct experience with and which were increasing in tonnage each year.
Um, no, because the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs that were best ridden out lest it damage both allies’ long-term goals.
Do you mean “Iraq”, rather than “USSR”?
I’m amazed. You present an example which you think is a great example of irrationality on a dictator’s part, I show you are wrong and have no idea why Saddam resisted and you think you can spin it to support your claims and it actually illustrates how correct you are!
I don’t think Punoxysm is saying that it’s an example of irrationality. Punoxysm is saying that it’s a reasonable reaction, and it shows that calling the bluff would also be a reasonable response in Stalin’s case. You haven’t shown that Punoxysm is wrong, you’ve argued that Punoxysm is wrong.
What could possibly falsify your criticisms?
I think the answer to that is rather obvious. If Hussein had allowed the inspections, that would support your position. It’s rather odd to be calling someone’s position unfalsifiable, simply because they are not accepting your explanations for why evidence falsifying your position is unpersuasive.
No, I meant USSR. Iraq was in a special position of being both a former close US ally and still in the valuable-to-the-US geopolitical position which made it an ally in the first place, and that is why Saddam engaged in the reasoning he did. The USSR was a former close US ally, yes, but played no such valuable role and both recognized each other as their principal threat after the Nazis were defeated.
You haven’t shown that Punoxysm is wrong, you’ve argued that Punoxysm is wrong.
I don’t know how I can point out he’s wrong any more clearly. Saddam had good reason to think the threats were bluffs. Stalin would not have because those reasons did not apply to the USSR. The situations are not the same.
If Hussein had allowed the inspections, that would support your position.
Yes, but we already know he didn’t. So the question is his motivations; Punoxysm has asserted that if he did it for irrational reasons, then it supports his criticism, and when I pointed out that he did it for rational reasons, he then did it supported his position! So why did he not say in the first place simply, ‘Saddam didn’t allow inspections; this is evidence the strategy cannot work’? Obviously, because he felt the irrational qualifier was necessary right up until I produced the references. (It is a basic principal of natural language that you do not use unnecessary restrictions or qualifiers when they are not relevant.)
So, just to be clear: you believe that in the hypothetical world in which the US threatens to attack the USSR if it does not allow inspections, the USSR would have no reason to think this serves a useful purpose, and would be therefore justified in concluding it was a bluff?
Stalin would not have because those reasons did not apply to the USSR. The situations are not the same.
You are saying that there are reasons for thinking it was a bluff that did not apply to the USSR. That’s denying the antecedent.
So the question is his motivations; Punoxysm has asserted that if he did it for irrational reasons,
you believe that in the hypothetical world in which the US threatens to attack the USSR if it does not allow inspections, the USSR would have no reason to think this serves a useful purpose, and would be therefore justified in concluding it was a bluff?
No, that’s like, the opposite of what I mean. I’m baffled you could not understand this (and similarly that you had to ask for clarification about my BMR example in the other comment when I had said clearly that a statement would be evidence against an impending bust). If this is the best you can read what I’ve written, then I think maybe it’s time for me to call this conversation quits. I don’t know if you’re being deliberately obtuse or think too differently, but either way...
You are saying that there are reasons for thinking it was a bluff that did not apply to the USSR. That’s denying the antecedent.
Good thing we’re not using deductive logic! Denying the antecedent is, like almost all classical fallacies, a useful Bayesian piece of evidence. By removing one potential way for it to be a bluff, the probability of being a bluff necessarily falls; by removing the antecedent, the consequent is that much less likely.
It’s not clear to me what you’re referring to.
‘He’ is Saddam. Obviously. That was how the comment thread started and what I was objecting to and I even name Saddam in the same paragraph you claim to be confused by!
EDIT: looking back through your comments, you seem to consistently and repeatedly misunderstand what I said and ignore parts where I explained clearly what I meant, in a way well beyond an ordinarily obtuse commenter. I now think you’re doing this deliberately, and so I’m going to stop now.
All you’re saying is that Saddam called the USA’s bluff and was wrong and it was disastrous. That could EASILY have happened with an attempt by the US to demand inspections from Russia.
Um, no, because the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs that were best ridden out lest it damage both allies’ long-term goals.
I read “it” in “it served a useful role” as referring to “demanding inspections”. And I took “which meant the threats were bluffs” to mean “in the hypothetical involving the USSR, the threats were bluffs”. Because the prior clause had clearly established that you were talking about the USSR. Maybe instead of accusing me of bad faith, you could actually try to clear up the confusion. I’ll be downvoting your posts until you do. It would be nice if you could write your sentence with correct and clear grammar, especially when dealing with complex compound sentences, and if you can’t be bothered to do so, then don’t complain about people having trouble parsing your sentences. When there’s a failure in communication, attributing all of the blame to the other person is a very anti-rationalist position to take.
By removing one potential way for it to be a bluff, the probability of being a bluff necessarily falls
You didn’t merely say that the probability is lower; you presented it as a logical certainty.
‘He’ is Saddam. Obviously. That was how the comment thread started and what I was objecting to and I even name Saddam in the same paragraph you claim to be confused by!
You said that Punoxysm asserted that Saddam did it for irrational reasons. I don’t think that it is entirely clear as to what statement by Punoxysm you consider to be the making that assertion. If I had been unclear about who you were talking about, I would have said who, rather than what.
gwern, I was under the impression that this is a rationalist site, dedicated to the idea that people are fallible creatures, and should not act with the conviction that they are right and anyone who disagrees with them is wrong. I have done more than my fair share to resolve this misunderstanding. I have politely asked for clarification. I have even gone to the trouble of asking a third party to read the posts, and this third party agrees that the sentence “Um, no, because the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs that were best ridden out lest it damage both allies’ long-term goals.” is confusing. Now, the question is: are you willing to act like an adult, or are you going to just have a temper tantrum because someone doesn’t understand you? Are you willing to go to the same effort that I have, and get your own third party (fourth party, I suppose) to read the sentence, and see whether they understand it? There are all sorts of ambiguities in your sentence, such as whether it is intended to be parsed as “(the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA) which meant the threats were bluffs” or “the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking (it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs)”. Note that the latter is grammatically incorrect, in that the “which” should be a “that”. And no, it’s not being a Grammar Nazi to point out grammatical errors that affect readability. If you can’t have a calm, rational, and civil conversation about this, then I can only conclude that it you are not a rationalist.
gwern, I was under the impression that this is a rationalist site, dedicated to the idea that people are fallible creatures, and should not act with the conviction that they are right and anyone who disagrees with them is wrong...Now, the question is: are you willing to act like an adult, or are you going to just have a temper tantrum because someone doesn’t understand you?...If you can’t have a calm, rational, and civil conversation about this, then I can only conclude that it you are not a rationalist.
I really don’t care about your underhanded attempts to shame me into further engagement, and I stand by my earlier comment.
Openly asking you to explain your post is “underhanded”? You have already engaged in further engagement. It’s just that that engagement consists of going to another thread and insulting me, rather than actually addressing the issue in the thread that it came up in like an adult.
In a world where a possibly-irrational actor is using “do what we tell you or you get nuked” as an instrument of foreign policy against a load of other possibly-irrational actors, how long would it be before something went horribly wrong?
Is a world in which only one possibly-irrational actor has nukes and can make threats more likely to go wrong or upon going wrong go horribly wrong, than a world in which dozens of possibly-irrational actors have nukes and can make threats?
I don’t think this is a terribly strong reply. Saddam Hussein’s hypothesis of US policy towards him was mistaken. Perhaps his hypothesis was based on a solid conceptual framework about the US acting in its own long-term self-interest. But we’ve tested Hussein’s hypothesis, it was mistaken, and Saddam died.
It is a strong reply. What the Saddam example shows is that ultimatum givers can be irrational; but that’s not what you need to show to show that a USA ultimatum to the USSR would have failed! You need to show that the USSR would have been irrational. The Saddam example doesn’t show that. It shows that ‘crazy’ totalitarian dictators can actually be more rational than liberal Western democracies, which is what is needed for proposed plan to work.
That’s why I say that the Saddam example supports the proposed plan, it doesn’t undermine it: it establishes the sanity of the only actor who matters once the plan has been put into action—the person receiving the ultimatum.
That’s why I say that the Saddam example supports the proposed plan
So, all else held constant: if Saddam Hussein had capitulated to US demands and (counterfactually) did not rebuff inspectors, you would count that as evidence against the proposed plan?
ETA In the interests of positive feedback—I like the overall post, and I’m just picking on this individual comment.
No, that would be evidence for it. I know you are trying to show I am having it both ways, but I am not. Think of the full tree of possibilities: ultimatum/no-ultimatum, bluff/real, rational-refusal/irrational-refusal. If real ultimatum had been issued and Saddam had then refused for irrational reasons, that would be strong evidence against the plan, because that’s the situation which is predicted to go well. And that’s the situation Punoxysm thought he’d found, but he hadn’t.
(Actually, you’re the second person today to think I was doing something like that. I mentioned on IRC I had correctly predicted to Gawker in late 2013 that the black-market BMR would soon be busted by law enforcement—as most of its employees would be within two months or so while setting up the successor Utopia black-market—mentioning that among other warning signs, BMR had never mentioned detecting attempts by law enforcement to infiltrate it; someone quoted at me that surely ‘absence of evidence is evidence of absence’? Surely if BMR had claimed to be seeing law enforcement infiltration I would consider that evidence for infiltration, so how could I turn around and argue that lack of BMR claims was also evidence for infiltration? Yes, this is a good criticism—in a binary context.
But this was more complex than a binary observation: there were at least 3 possibilities. 1. it could be that law enforcement was not trying to infiltrate at all, 2. it could be they were trying & had failed, or 3. it could be that they were trying & succeeded. BMR’s silence was evidence they didn’t spot any attacks, so this is evidence that law enforcement was not trying, but it was also evidence for the other proposition that law enforcement was trying & succeeding; a priori, the former was massively improbable because BMR was old and notorious and it’s inconceivable LE was not actively trying to bust it, while the latter was quite probable & had just been done to Silk Road. Hence, observing BMR silence pushed the infiltration outcome to a high posterior while the not-trying remained still pretty unlikely.
Of course, for an obscure small marketplace, the reasoning would happen the other way around: because it starts off more likely to be ignored than infiltrated, silence is golden. I’m thinking of titling any writeup “The Pig That Didn’t Oink”.)
Incidentally, the same argument also applies to Governor Earl Warren’s statement quoted in Absence of evidence is evidence of absence: He can be seen as arguing that there are at least three possibilities, (1) there is no fifth column, (2) there is a fifth column and it supposed to do sabotage independent from an invasion, (3) there is a fifth column and it is supposed to aid a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. In case (2), you would expect to have seen sabotage; in case (1) and (3), you wouldn’t, because if the fifth column were known to exist by the time of the invasion, it would be much less effective. Thus, while observing no sabotage is evidence against the fifth column existing, it is evidence in favor of a fifth column existing and being intended to support an invasion. I recently heard Eliezer claim that this was giving Warren too much credit when someone was pointing out an interpretation similar to this, but I’m pretty sure this argument was represented in Warren’s brain (if not in explicit words) when he made his statement, even if it’s pretty plausible that his choice of words was influenced by making it sound as if the absence of sabotage was actually supporting the contention that there was a fifth column.
In particular, Warren doesn’t say that the lack of subversive activity convinces him that there is a fifth column, he says that it convinces him “that the sabotage we are to get, the Fifth Column activities are to get, are timed just like Pearl Harbor was timed”. Moreover, in the full transcript, he claims that there are reasons to think (1) very unlikely, namely that, he alleges, the Axis powers all use them everywhere else:
To assume that the enemy has not planned fifth column activities for us in a wave of sabotage is simply to live in a fool’s paradise. These activities, whether you call them “fifth column activities” or “sabotage” or “war behind the lines upon civilians,” or whatever you may call it, are just as much an integral part of Axis warfare as any of their military and naval operations. When I say that I refer to all of the Axis powers with which we are at war. [...] Those activities are now being used actively in the war in the Pacific, in every field of operations about which I have read. They have unquestionably, gentlemen, planned such activities for California. For us to believe to the contrary is just not realistic.
I.e., he claims that (1) would be very unique given the Axis powers’ behavior elsewhere. On the other hand, he suggests that (3) fits a pattern of surprise attacks:
[...] It convinces me more than perhaps any other factor that the sabotage that we are to get, the fifth column activities that we are to get, are timed just like Pearl Harbor was timed and just like the invasion of France, and of Denmark, and of Norway, and all of those other countries.
And later, he explicitly argues that you wouldn’t expect to have seen sabotage in case (3):
If there were sporadic sabotage at this time or if there had been for the last 2 months, the people of California or the Federal authorities would be on the alert to such an extent that they could not possibly have any real fifth column activities when the M-day comes.
So he has the pieces there for a correct Bayesian argument that a fifth column still has high posterior probability after seeing no sabotage, and that a fifth column intended to support an invasion has higher posterior than prior probability: Low prior probability of (1); (comparatively) high prior probability of (3); and an argument that (3) predicts the evidence nearly as well as (1) does. I’m not saying his premises are true, just that the fact that he claims all of them suggests that his brain did in fact represent the correct argument. The fact that he doesn’t say that this argument convinces him “more than anything” that there is a fifth column, but rather says that it convinces him that the sabotage will be timed like Pearl Harbor (and France, Denmark and Norway), further supports this—though, as noted above, while I think that his brain did represent the correct argument, it does seem plausible that his words were chosen so as to suggest the alternative interpretation as well.
Surely if BMR had claimed to be seeing law enforcement infiltration I would consider that evidence for infiltration, so how could I turn around and argue that lack of BMR claims was also evidence for infiltration? Yes, this is a good criticism—in a binary context.
So, if BMR had claimed to be seeing infiltration, would you consider that evidence that BMR is not about to be busted?
Yes. If a big market one expects to be under attack reports fending off attack, then one would be more optimistic about it:
Hence, observing BMR silence pushed the infiltration outcome to a high posterior while the not-trying remained still pretty unlikely. Of course, for an obscure small marketplace, the reasoning would happen the other way around: because it starts off more likely to be ignored than infiltrated, silence is golden
(That said, that only applies to the one particular kind of observation/argument from silence; as I told Chen, there were several reasons to expect BMR to be short-lived on top of the general short-livedness of black-markets, but I think the logic behind those other reasons doesn’t need to be explained since they’re not tricky or counterintuitive like the argument from silence.)
Then it seems to me that when responding to “Surely if BMR had claimed to be seeing law enforcement infiltration I would consider that evidence for infiltration, so how could I turn around and argue that lack of BMR claims was also evidence for infiltration?”, you should lead off with “I would consider that evidence for infiltration, but against an imminent bust”, before launching into all the explanation. That way, it would more clear whether you are denying the premise (“you’d consider that evidence for your thesis, too”), rather than just the conclusion. And the phrase “If a big market one expects” would a lot clearer with “that” between “market” and “one”.
It would seem Saddam’s mistake was in thinking the USA was run by rational actors, and not run by morons who would sabotage their geopolitical interests in the interests of revenge against a “guy that tried to kill my dad at one time”.
If the US had been able to credibly pre-commit to the invasion if inspections were not allowed, then that pre-commitment would not be foolish. And once they had attempted such a pre-commitment, not following through would have harmed their ability to make pre-commitments in the future. A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy. If that’s “irrational”, you have a very narrow view of rationality, and your version of “rationality” will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation.
As my parable points out, one should not expect that sort of rational planning from the USA or indeed large countries in general.
So, if I’m following correctly, your position was that the US was foolish for following through … and Hussein was foolish for not realizing they would follow through. So if everyone is foolish, how can you argue that because X would be in hypothetical Stalin’s best interests, it somehow follows that he would do X?
So no, I think your objection does not hold water once one actually knows why the inspections were refused, and does not apply to the hypothetical involving Stalin.
Maybe it’s the late hour, but I’m having trouble seeing how “The other guy may decide we’re bluffing and call us on it” does not apply to hypothetical Stalin.
And once they had attempted such a pre-commitment, not following through would have harmed their ability to make pre-commitments in the future. A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy.
A willingness to incur losses is a useful part—if you are seeking useful goals. I may well want to follow through on a threat in order to preserve my credibility for future threats, but if I choose to make threats for stupid self-defeating goals, then precommitting is a horrible irrational thing which destroys me. The USA would have been much better off not invading Iraq and losing some credibility, because the invasion of Iraq would have predictably disastrous consequences for both the USA and Iraq which were far worse than the loss of credibility.
A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy. If that’s “irrational”, you have a very narrow view of rationality, and your version of “rationality” will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation.
The first rule of strategy: don’t pursue stupid goals. If you think that you can pursue any goal unrelated to what you actually want, then you have a very narrow view of rationality and your version of rationality will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation. You do not want to be able to precommit to shooting yourself in the foot.
So, if I’m following correctly, your position was that the US was foolish for following through … and Hussein was foolish for not realizing they would follow through.
The US was foolish for issuing threats to achieve a goal that harmed its actual interests, Saddam was mistaken but reasoning correctly in treating it as a bluff, and the US was even more foolish to carry through on the threat.
Maybe it’s the late hour, but I’m having trouble seeing how “The other guy may decide we’re bluffing and call us on it” does not apply to hypothetical Stalin.
Because in that scenario, Stalin would not be thinking the USA is doing something so stupid it must be a bluff, because it wouldn’t be so stupid it is probably a bluff.
A willingness to incur losses is a useful part—if you are seeking useful goals.
You are adding conditions. A willingness to incur losses is very much a necessary condition. Identifying other necessary conditions doesn’t change that.
I may well want to follow through on a threat in order to preserve my credibility for future threats, but if I choose to make threats for stupid self-defeating goals, then precommitting is a horrible irrational thing which destroys me.
How is enforcing the sanctions a stupid goal?
The USA would have been much better off not invading Iraq and losing some credibility, because the invasion of Iraq would have predictably disastrous consequences for both the USA and Iraq which were far worse than the loss of credibility.
I disagree that there were predictable disastrous consequences. The actual results are hardly disastrous, and the harmful results were not entirely predictable.
Saddam was mistaken but reasoning correctly in treating it as a bluff,
It’s hard to claim that Saddam was reasoning correctly when he arrived at the incorrect conclusions.
Because in that scenario, Stalin would not be thinking the USA is doing something so stupid it must be a bluff, because it wouldn’t be so stupid it is probably a bluff.
Maybe that’s an argument for Stalin being less likely to call the bluff, but it’s far from an argument that we can be sure of it.
A willingness to incur losses is very much a necessary condition.
And you are treating willingness to incur losses as a sufficient condition, when it is merely a necessary condition. Willingness to incur losses is only useful when pursuing desirable goals; if you are pursuing harmful goals like ‘invade Iraq, waste trillions, destablize the Middle East, and offer your regional enemy a weak divided pawn’, then being unwilling to incur loss such as in threats is actually making you better off.
How is enforcing the sanctions a stupid goal?
Who said anything about sanctions? I thought we were discussing the US invasion of Iraq.
I disagree that there were predictable disastrous consequences. The actual results are hardly disastrous, and the harmful results were not entirely predictable.
I strongly disagree they were not predictable. They were predicted long in advance by the many critics of the proposed invasion. I was paying very close attention to the runup to the invasion because I was shocked that something so moronic, so based on flimsy evidence, so unnecessary to fight the War on Terror, and going to entail hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in the best case. The military consequences of invading a mushedup pseudo state ruled by a brutal dictatorship run by an ethnic minority, where the minority vs the majority was only the major running conflict in the past millennium of Islamic history, did not take a Napoleon to extrapolate.
It’s hard to claim that Saddam was reasoning correctly when he arrived at the incorrect conclusions.
And was a lottery winner reasoning correctly because the consequences happened to be good? Does one example of a good outcome justify any bad reasoning?
Maybe that’s an argument for Stalin being less likely to call the bluff, but it’s far from an argument that we can be sure of it.
It’s an argument that the Saddam example does not tell us anything useful about Stalin, because the key reason Saddam refused does not exist in the Stalin situation.
And you are treating willingness to incur losses as a sufficient condition, when it is merely a necessary condition.
I don’t see how you’re interpreting me as saying that. Willingness to incur losses is a vital part of diplomacy. The fact that this can facilitate bad things doesn’t change that. It’s like responding to the claim that a rifle is a vital part of deer hunting by saying “Not if you shoot your foot rather the deer”.
Who said anything about sanctions? I thought we were discussing the US invasion of Iraq.
The inspection regime was part of the sanctions imposed against Iraq.
I strongly disagree they were not predictable. They were predicted long in advance by the many critics of the proposed invasion.
There were people predicting bad consequences, and there were people predicting good consequences. Looking at hindsight doesn’t make it predictable.
And was a lottery winner reasoning correctly because the consequences happened to be good?
It’s a bit odd to go from reasoning that it was predictable based on hindsight, to rejecting the idea that Saddam reasoned correctly based on hindsight. I didn’t say that Saddam definitely wasn’t reasoning correctly, only that it is hard to argue that position. Unlike a lottery winner, this wasn’t a random event. Clearly, if Saddam thought it was definitely a bluff, he was completely wrong. So you would have to argue that Saddam recognized that it likely was not a bluff, but he assigned such a high confidence to it being a bluff that calling it was worth the risk of death, and that level of confidence was well-justified. The very fact that it was not a bluff is quite strong evidence that thinking it was not a bluff was wrong.
Willingness to incur losses is a vital part of diplomacy. The fact that this can facilitate bad things doesn’t change that. It’s like responding to the claim that a rifle is a vital part of deer hunting by saying “Not if you shoot your foot rather the deer”.
Indeed. If you suck as much at shooting a rifle as the USA sucks at diplomacy in the Middle East, you should leave it at home.
The inspection regime was part of the sanctions imposed against Iraq.
The sanctions did not require the USA invasion which has been so disastrous.
There were people predicting bad consequences, and there were people predicting good consequences. Looking at hindsight doesn’t make it predictable.
If it was such a good idea, why did it take the patriotic fervor of 9/11 and a case about WMDs based on lies and exaggerations to convince the USA to invade Iraq? Because it was a predictably bad idea which a lot of people were skeptical of.
It’s a bit odd to go from reasoning that it was predictable based on hindsight, to rejecting the idea that Saddam reasoned correctly based on hindsight. I didn’t say that Saddam definitely wasn’t reasoning correctly, only that it is hard to argue that position. Unlike a lottery winner, this wasn’t a random event. Clearly, if Saddam thought it was definitely a bluff, he was completely wrong. So you would have to argue that Saddam recognized that it likely was not a bluff, but he assigned such a high confidence to it being a bluff that calling it was worth the risk of death, and that level of confidence was well-justified.
I don’t know what to say to this but to repeat myself: he was reasoning correctly about the consequences of it not being a bluff, and whether a rational self-interested USA would want to do it. To call this wrong is itself a post hoc argument from hindsight that he should have foreseen that the USA was irrational and self-sabotaging and acted accordingly, and voluntarily topple his regime & empower Iran solely on the odds of that.
The very fact that it was not a bluff is quite strong evidence that thinking it was not a bluff was wrong.
And is this ‘quite strong evidence’ neutralized by recent events in Syria? What’s the proper reference class here?
The sanctions did not require the USA invasion which has been so disastrous.
Saddam didn’t seem to be amenable to complying with them without serious action.
If it was such a good idea, why did it take the patriotic fervor of 9/11 and a case about WMDs based on lies and exaggerations to convince the USA to invade Iraq? Because it was a predictably bad idea which a lot of people were skeptical of.
I’m hardly denying that there were concerns.
I don’t know what to say to this but to repeat myself: he was reasoning correctly about the consequences of it not being a bluff, and whether a rational self-interested USA would want to do it.
I don’t know what definition of “rationality” you are using, that it is correct to trust one’s life to others following it.
To call this wrong is itself a post hoc argument from hindsight that he should have foreseen that the USA was irrational and self-sabotaging and acted accordingly, and voluntarily topple his regime & empower Iran solely on the odds of that.
It’s hindsight only in the most broad sense, and all empirical knowledge is based on hindsight in the most broad sense. And the literal reading of that sentence is that “Saddam” is the subject of “topple his regime”. Who is saying that Saddam should have toppled his own regime?
And is this ‘quite strong evidence’ neutralized by recent events in Syria? What’s the proper reference class here?
“Recent events in Syria”? You’ll have to be more specific. And you seem to be trying to slide from a discussion of the case itself to discussion of whether the case is the proper reference class.
I don’t think you understand what happened. Saddam thought that his former close sponsor & ally needed him against Iran because without our Sunni man in Iraq and the fear of WMDs the country would become a Shi’a & Persian pawn*. (You remember the whole Iran-Iraq War and ‘exporting the revolution’ and Hezbollah, right?)
Huh. How about that. Why, it looks like that’s what happened under Maliki and that’s why the country is currently being torn apart and the Iraqi government is inviting Iranian troops in to help restore order.
It would seem Saddam’s mistake was in thinking the USA was run by rational actors, and not run by morons who would sabotage their geopolitical interests in the interests of revenge against a “guy that tried to kill my dad at one time”. As my parable points out, one should not expect that sort of rational planning from the USA or indeed large countries in general.
So no, I think your objection does not hold water once one actually knows why the inspections were refused, and does not apply to the hypothetical involving Stalin.
* EDIT: BTW, I will note that this is a classic example of failing to apply the principle of charity, demonizing enemies, and not caring about contexts. No, Saddam couldn’t have been acting in a complex Middle Eastern complex where the USA and Iraq were natural allies for which ultimatums made no sense; no, he had to be going against his own rational self-interests and be crazy.
I think you actually illustrate how correct I am. When there’s uncertainty about how sincere a threat is, especially because virtually all threats of military action are negative value for both parties if executed, and when the threat sets a precedent that the threatening party could continually impose its will, it’s natural to test the threatening parties commitment.
All you’re saying is that Saddam called the USA’s bluff and was wrong and it was disastrous. That could EASILY have happened with an attempt by the US to demand inspections from Russia.
Think about it further: you are threatened by a nation with a newly developed super-weapon, but only modest stockpiles and uncertain ability to deliver it, to not develop your own version of the super-weapon. The demand is that you submit to thorough inspections, which your enemy would certainly use to spy as extensively as possible on you.
Not to mention that it would set a precedent where you’d have to back down for the next demand, and the next; anythings’ better than being a smear of ash after all, isn’t it?
Or you could consider your excellent military position right next to your enemy’s allies, along with the amount of safety provided by a combination of secrecy and bunkers, and decide that the best move—the only move if you want to resist the slide towards subjugation—is to call your enemy’s bluff.
Um, no, because the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs that were best ridden out lest it damage both allies’ long-term goals.
I’m amazed. You present an example which you think is a great example of irrationality on a dictator’s part, I show you are wrong and have no idea why Saddam resisted and you think you can spin it to support your claims and it actually illustrates how correct you are! What could possibly falsify your criticisms?
How well did that work in the Cold War against non-nuclear nations..? Everyone understands the logic of blackmail and the point of using Schelling fences to avoid sliding down the slippery slope.
And likely lose, with no superweapon of your own, no prospect of developing it soon under the chaos of war (it was already a top-priority program for Stalin, war could only have delayed it), being cutoff from one of one’s most important trading partners which kept one from economic collapse during WWII, and a self-centered psychopath like Stalin would have to worry about how well bunkers would really protect him against weapons they have no direct experience with and which were increasing in tonnage each year.
Do you mean “Iraq”, rather than “USSR”?
I don’t think Punoxysm is saying that it’s an example of irrationality. Punoxysm is saying that it’s a reasonable reaction, and it shows that calling the bluff would also be a reasonable response in Stalin’s case. You haven’t shown that Punoxysm is wrong, you’ve argued that Punoxysm is wrong.
I think the answer to that is rather obvious. If Hussein had allowed the inspections, that would support your position. It’s rather odd to be calling someone’s position unfalsifiable, simply because they are not accepting your explanations for why evidence falsifying your position is unpersuasive.
No, I meant USSR. Iraq was in a special position of being both a former close US ally and still in the valuable-to-the-US geopolitical position which made it an ally in the first place, and that is why Saddam engaged in the reasoning he did. The USSR was a former close US ally, yes, but played no such valuable role and both recognized each other as their principal threat after the Nazis were defeated.
I don’t know how I can point out he’s wrong any more clearly. Saddam had good reason to think the threats were bluffs. Stalin would not have because those reasons did not apply to the USSR. The situations are not the same.
Yes, but we already know he didn’t. So the question is his motivations; Punoxysm has asserted that if he did it for irrational reasons, then it supports his criticism, and when I pointed out that he did it for rational reasons, he then did it supported his position! So why did he not say in the first place simply, ‘Saddam didn’t allow inspections; this is evidence the strategy cannot work’? Obviously, because he felt the irrational qualifier was necessary right up until I produced the references. (It is a basic principal of natural language that you do not use unnecessary restrictions or qualifiers when they are not relevant.)
So, just to be clear: you believe that in the hypothetical world in which the US threatens to attack the USSR if it does not allow inspections, the USSR would have no reason to think this serves a useful purpose, and would be therefore justified in concluding it was a bluff?
You are saying that there are reasons for thinking it was a bluff that did not apply to the USSR. That’s denying the antecedent.
It’s not clear to me what you’re referring to.
No, that’s like, the opposite of what I mean. I’m baffled you could not understand this (and similarly that you had to ask for clarification about my BMR example in the other comment when I had said clearly that a statement would be evidence against an impending bust). If this is the best you can read what I’ve written, then I think maybe it’s time for me to call this conversation quits. I don’t know if you’re being deliberately obtuse or think too differently, but either way...
Good thing we’re not using deductive logic! Denying the antecedent is, like almost all classical fallacies, a useful Bayesian piece of evidence. By removing one potential way for it to be a bluff, the probability of being a bluff necessarily falls; by removing the antecedent, the consequent is that much less likely.
‘He’ is Saddam. Obviously. That was how the comment thread started and what I was objecting to and I even name Saddam in the same paragraph you claim to be confused by!
EDIT: looking back through your comments, you seem to consistently and repeatedly misunderstand what I said and ignore parts where I explained clearly what I meant, in a way well beyond an ordinarily obtuse commenter. I now think you’re doing this deliberately, and so I’m going to stop now.
I read “it” in “it served a useful role” as referring to “demanding inspections”. And I took “which meant the threats were bluffs” to mean “in the hypothetical involving the USSR, the threats were bluffs”. Because the prior clause had clearly established that you were talking about the USSR. Maybe instead of accusing me of bad faith, you could actually try to clear up the confusion. I’ll be downvoting your posts until you do. It would be nice if you could write your sentence with correct and clear grammar, especially when dealing with complex compound sentences, and if you can’t be bothered to do so, then don’t complain about people having trouble parsing your sentences. When there’s a failure in communication, attributing all of the blame to the other person is a very anti-rationalist position to take.
You didn’t merely say that the probability is lower; you presented it as a logical certainty.
You said that Punoxysm asserted that Saddam did it for irrational reasons. I don’t think that it is entirely clear as to what statement by Punoxysm you consider to be the making that assertion. If I had been unclear about who you were talking about, I would have said who, rather than what.
gwern, I was under the impression that this is a rationalist site, dedicated to the idea that people are fallible creatures, and should not act with the conviction that they are right and anyone who disagrees with them is wrong. I have done more than my fair share to resolve this misunderstanding. I have politely asked for clarification. I have even gone to the trouble of asking a third party to read the posts, and this third party agrees that the sentence “Um, no, because the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs that were best ridden out lest it damage both allies’ long-term goals.” is confusing. Now, the question is: are you willing to act like an adult, or are you going to just have a temper tantrum because someone doesn’t understand you? Are you willing to go to the same effort that I have, and get your own third party (fourth party, I suppose) to read the sentence, and see whether they understand it? There are all sorts of ambiguities in your sentence, such as whether it is intended to be parsed as “(the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking it served a useful role for the USA) which meant the threats were bluffs” or “the USSR had no reason to think and be correct in thinking (it served a useful role for the USA which meant the threats were bluffs)”. Note that the latter is grammatically incorrect, in that the “which” should be a “that”. And no, it’s not being a Grammar Nazi to point out grammatical errors that affect readability. If you can’t have a calm, rational, and civil conversation about this, then I can only conclude that it you are not a rationalist.
I really don’t care about your underhanded attempts to shame me into further engagement, and I stand by my earlier comment.
Openly asking you to explain your post is “underhanded”? You have already engaged in further engagement. It’s just that that engagement consists of going to another thread and insulting me, rather than actually addressing the issue in the thread that it came up in like an adult.
no, saying shit like “I thought this was a rationalist site” is an underhanded attempt to shame someone into saying what you want them to say.
In a world where a possibly-irrational actor is using “do what we tell you or you get nuked” as an instrument of foreign policy against a load of other possibly-irrational actors, how long would it be before something went horribly wrong?
Is a world in which only one possibly-irrational actor has nukes and can make threats more likely to go wrong or upon going wrong go horribly wrong, than a world in which dozens of possibly-irrational actors have nukes and can make threats?
I don’t think this is a terribly strong reply. Saddam Hussein’s hypothesis of US policy towards him was mistaken. Perhaps his hypothesis was based on a solid conceptual framework about the US acting in its own long-term self-interest. But we’ve tested Hussein’s hypothesis, it was mistaken, and Saddam died.
It is a strong reply. What the Saddam example shows is that ultimatum givers can be irrational; but that’s not what you need to show to show that a USA ultimatum to the USSR would have failed! You need to show that the USSR would have been irrational. The Saddam example doesn’t show that. It shows that ‘crazy’ totalitarian dictators can actually be more rational than liberal Western democracies, which is what is needed for proposed plan to work.
That’s why I say that the Saddam example supports the proposed plan, it doesn’t undermine it: it establishes the sanity of the only actor who matters once the plan has been put into action—the person receiving the ultimatum.
So, all else held constant: if Saddam Hussein had capitulated to US demands and (counterfactually) did not rebuff inspectors, you would count that as evidence against the proposed plan?
ETA In the interests of positive feedback—I like the overall post, and I’m just picking on this individual comment.
No, that would be evidence for it. I know you are trying to show I am having it both ways, but I am not. Think of the full tree of possibilities: ultimatum/no-ultimatum, bluff/real, rational-refusal/irrational-refusal. If real ultimatum had been issued and Saddam had then refused for irrational reasons, that would be strong evidence against the plan, because that’s the situation which is predicted to go well. And that’s the situation Punoxysm thought he’d found, but he hadn’t.
(Actually, you’re the second person today to think I was doing something like that. I mentioned on IRC I had correctly predicted to Gawker in late 2013 that the black-market BMR would soon be busted by law enforcement—as most of its employees would be within two months or so while setting up the successor Utopia black-market—mentioning that among other warning signs, BMR had never mentioned detecting attempts by law enforcement to infiltrate it; someone quoted at me that surely ‘absence of evidence is evidence of absence’? Surely if BMR had claimed to be seeing law enforcement infiltration I would consider that evidence for infiltration, so how could I turn around and argue that lack of BMR claims was also evidence for infiltration? Yes, this is a good criticism—in a binary context.
But this was more complex than a binary observation: there were at least 3 possibilities. 1. it could be that law enforcement was not trying to infiltrate at all, 2. it could be they were trying & had failed, or 3. it could be that they were trying & succeeded. BMR’s silence was evidence they didn’t spot any attacks, so this is evidence that law enforcement was not trying, but it was also evidence for the other proposition that law enforcement was trying & succeeding; a priori, the former was massively improbable because BMR was old and notorious and it’s inconceivable LE was not actively trying to bust it, while the latter was quite probable & had just been done to Silk Road. Hence, observing BMR silence pushed the infiltration outcome to a high posterior while the not-trying remained still pretty unlikely.
Of course, for an obscure small marketplace, the reasoning would happen the other way around: because it starts off more likely to be ignored than infiltrated, silence is golden. I’m thinking of titling any writeup “The Pig That Didn’t Oink”.)
Incidentally, the same argument also applies to Governor Earl Warren’s statement quoted in Absence of evidence is evidence of absence: He can be seen as arguing that there are at least three possibilities, (1) there is no fifth column, (2) there is a fifth column and it supposed to do sabotage independent from an invasion, (3) there is a fifth column and it is supposed to aid a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. In case (2), you would expect to have seen sabotage; in case (1) and (3), you wouldn’t, because if the fifth column were known to exist by the time of the invasion, it would be much less effective. Thus, while observing no sabotage is evidence against the fifth column existing, it is evidence in favor of a fifth column existing and being intended to support an invasion. I recently heard Eliezer claim that this was giving Warren too much credit when someone was pointing out an interpretation similar to this, but I’m pretty sure this argument was represented in Warren’s brain (if not in explicit words) when he made his statement, even if it’s pretty plausible that his choice of words was influenced by making it sound as if the absence of sabotage was actually supporting the contention that there was a fifth column.
In particular, Warren doesn’t say that the lack of subversive activity convinces him that there is a fifth column, he says that it convinces him “that the sabotage we are to get, the Fifth Column activities are to get, are timed just like Pearl Harbor was timed”. Moreover, in the full transcript, he claims that there are reasons to think (1) very unlikely, namely that, he alleges, the Axis powers all use them everywhere else:
I.e., he claims that (1) would be very unique given the Axis powers’ behavior elsewhere. On the other hand, he suggests that (3) fits a pattern of surprise attacks:
And later, he explicitly argues that you wouldn’t expect to have seen sabotage in case (3):
So he has the pieces there for a correct Bayesian argument that a fifth column still has high posterior probability after seeing no sabotage, and that a fifth column intended to support an invasion has higher posterior than prior probability: Low prior probability of (1); (comparatively) high prior probability of (3); and an argument that (3) predicts the evidence nearly as well as (1) does. I’m not saying his premises are true, just that the fact that he claims all of them suggests that his brain did in fact represent the correct argument. The fact that he doesn’t say that this argument convinces him “more than anything” that there is a fifth column, but rather says that it convinces him that the sabotage will be timed like Pearl Harbor (and France, Denmark and Norway), further supports this—though, as noted above, while I think that his brain did represent the correct argument, it does seem plausible that his words were chosen so as to suggest the alternative interpretation as well.
So, if BMR had claimed to be seeing infiltration, would you consider that evidence that BMR is not about to be busted?
Yes. If a big market one expects to be under attack reports fending off attack, then one would be more optimistic about it:
(That said, that only applies to the one particular kind of observation/argument from silence; as I told Chen, there were several reasons to expect BMR to be short-lived on top of the general short-livedness of black-markets, but I think the logic behind those other reasons doesn’t need to be explained since they’re not tricky or counterintuitive like the argument from silence.)
Then it seems to me that when responding to “Surely if BMR had claimed to be seeing law enforcement infiltration I would consider that evidence for infiltration, so how could I turn around and argue that lack of BMR claims was also evidence for infiltration?”, you should lead off with “I would consider that evidence for infiltration, but against an imminent bust”, before launching into all the explanation. That way, it would more clear whether you are denying the premise (“you’d consider that evidence for your thesis, too”), rather than just the conclusion. And the phrase “If a big market one expects” would a lot clearer with “that” between “market” and “one”.
If the US had been able to credibly pre-commit to the invasion if inspections were not allowed, then that pre-commitment would not be foolish. And once they had attempted such a pre-commitment, not following through would have harmed their ability to make pre-commitments in the future. A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy. If that’s “irrational”, you have a very narrow view of rationality, and your version of “rationality” will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation.
So, if I’m following correctly, your position was that the US was foolish for following through … and Hussein was foolish for not realizing they would follow through. So if everyone is foolish, how can you argue that because X would be in hypothetical Stalin’s best interests, it somehow follows that he would do X?
Maybe it’s the late hour, but I’m having trouble seeing how “The other guy may decide we’re bluffing and call us on it” does not apply to hypothetical Stalin.
A willingness to incur losses is a useful part—if you are seeking useful goals. I may well want to follow through on a threat in order to preserve my credibility for future threats, but if I choose to make threats for stupid self-defeating goals, then precommitting is a horrible irrational thing which destroys me. The USA would have been much better off not invading Iraq and losing some credibility, because the invasion of Iraq would have predictably disastrous consequences for both the USA and Iraq which were far worse than the loss of credibility.
The first rule of strategy: don’t pursue stupid goals. If you think that you can pursue any goal unrelated to what you actually want, then you have a very narrow view of rationality and your version of rationality will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation. You do not want to be able to precommit to shooting yourself in the foot.
The US was foolish for issuing threats to achieve a goal that harmed its actual interests, Saddam was mistaken but reasoning correctly in treating it as a bluff, and the US was even more foolish to carry through on the threat.
Because in that scenario, Stalin would not be thinking the USA is doing something so stupid it must be a bluff, because it wouldn’t be so stupid it is probably a bluff.
You are adding conditions. A willingness to incur losses is very much a necessary condition. Identifying other necessary conditions doesn’t change that.
How is enforcing the sanctions a stupid goal?
I disagree that there were predictable disastrous consequences. The actual results are hardly disastrous, and the harmful results were not entirely predictable.
It’s hard to claim that Saddam was reasoning correctly when he arrived at the incorrect conclusions.
Maybe that’s an argument for Stalin being less likely to call the bluff, but it’s far from an argument that we can be sure of it.
And you are treating willingness to incur losses as a sufficient condition, when it is merely a necessary condition. Willingness to incur losses is only useful when pursuing desirable goals; if you are pursuing harmful goals like ‘invade Iraq, waste trillions, destablize the Middle East, and offer your regional enemy a weak divided pawn’, then being unwilling to incur loss such as in threats is actually making you better off.
Who said anything about sanctions? I thought we were discussing the US invasion of Iraq.
I strongly disagree they were not predictable. They were predicted long in advance by the many critics of the proposed invasion. I was paying very close attention to the runup to the invasion because I was shocked that something so moronic, so based on flimsy evidence, so unnecessary to fight the War on Terror, and going to entail hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in the best case. The military consequences of invading a mushedup pseudo state ruled by a brutal dictatorship run by an ethnic minority, where the minority vs the majority was only the major running conflict in the past millennium of Islamic history, did not take a Napoleon to extrapolate.
And was a lottery winner reasoning correctly because the consequences happened to be good? Does one example of a good outcome justify any bad reasoning?
It’s an argument that the Saddam example does not tell us anything useful about Stalin, because the key reason Saddam refused does not exist in the Stalin situation.
I don’t see how you’re interpreting me as saying that. Willingness to incur losses is a vital part of diplomacy. The fact that this can facilitate bad things doesn’t change that. It’s like responding to the claim that a rifle is a vital part of deer hunting by saying “Not if you shoot your foot rather the deer”.
The inspection regime was part of the sanctions imposed against Iraq.
There were people predicting bad consequences, and there were people predicting good consequences. Looking at hindsight doesn’t make it predictable.
It’s a bit odd to go from reasoning that it was predictable based on hindsight, to rejecting the idea that Saddam reasoned correctly based on hindsight. I didn’t say that Saddam definitely wasn’t reasoning correctly, only that it is hard to argue that position. Unlike a lottery winner, this wasn’t a random event. Clearly, if Saddam thought it was definitely a bluff, he was completely wrong. So you would have to argue that Saddam recognized that it likely was not a bluff, but he assigned such a high confidence to it being a bluff that calling it was worth the risk of death, and that level of confidence was well-justified. The very fact that it was not a bluff is quite strong evidence that thinking it was not a bluff was wrong.
Indeed. If you suck as much at shooting a rifle as the USA sucks at diplomacy in the Middle East, you should leave it at home.
The sanctions did not require the USA invasion which has been so disastrous.
If it was such a good idea, why did it take the patriotic fervor of 9/11 and a case about WMDs based on lies and exaggerations to convince the USA to invade Iraq? Because it was a predictably bad idea which a lot of people were skeptical of.
I don’t know what to say to this but to repeat myself: he was reasoning correctly about the consequences of it not being a bluff, and whether a rational self-interested USA would want to do it. To call this wrong is itself a post hoc argument from hindsight that he should have foreseen that the USA was irrational and self-sabotaging and acted accordingly, and voluntarily topple his regime & empower Iran solely on the odds of that.
And is this ‘quite strong evidence’ neutralized by recent events in Syria? What’s the proper reference class here?
Saddam didn’t seem to be amenable to complying with them without serious action.
I’m hardly denying that there were concerns.
I don’t know what definition of “rationality” you are using, that it is correct to trust one’s life to others following it.
It’s hindsight only in the most broad sense, and all empirical knowledge is based on hindsight in the most broad sense. And the literal reading of that sentence is that “Saddam” is the subject of “topple his regime”. Who is saying that Saddam should have toppled his own regime?
“Recent events in Syria”? You’ll have to be more specific. And you seem to be trying to slide from a discussion of the case itself to discussion of whether the case is the proper reference class.