It would seem Saddam’s mistake was in thinking the USA was run by rational actors, and not run by morons who would sabotage their geopolitical interests in the interests of revenge against a “guy that tried to kill my dad at one time”.
If the US had been able to credibly pre-commit to the invasion if inspections were not allowed, then that pre-commitment would not be foolish. And once they had attempted such a pre-commitment, not following through would have harmed their ability to make pre-commitments in the future. A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy. If that’s “irrational”, you have a very narrow view of rationality, and your version of “rationality” will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation.
As my parable points out, one should not expect that sort of rational planning from the USA or indeed large countries in general.
So, if I’m following correctly, your position was that the US was foolish for following through … and Hussein was foolish for not realizing they would follow through. So if everyone is foolish, how can you argue that because X would be in hypothetical Stalin’s best interests, it somehow follows that he would do X?
So no, I think your objection does not hold water once one actually knows why the inspections were refused, and does not apply to the hypothetical involving Stalin.
Maybe it’s the late hour, but I’m having trouble seeing how “The other guy may decide we’re bluffing and call us on it” does not apply to hypothetical Stalin.
And once they had attempted such a pre-commitment, not following through would have harmed their ability to make pre-commitments in the future. A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy.
A willingness to incur losses is a useful part—if you are seeking useful goals. I may well want to follow through on a threat in order to preserve my credibility for future threats, but if I choose to make threats for stupid self-defeating goals, then precommitting is a horrible irrational thing which destroys me. The USA would have been much better off not invading Iraq and losing some credibility, because the invasion of Iraq would have predictably disastrous consequences for both the USA and Iraq which were far worse than the loss of credibility.
A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy. If that’s “irrational”, you have a very narrow view of rationality, and your version of “rationality” will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation.
The first rule of strategy: don’t pursue stupid goals. If you think that you can pursue any goal unrelated to what you actually want, then you have a very narrow view of rationality and your version of rationality will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation. You do not want to be able to precommit to shooting yourself in the foot.
So, if I’m following correctly, your position was that the US was foolish for following through … and Hussein was foolish for not realizing they would follow through.
The US was foolish for issuing threats to achieve a goal that harmed its actual interests, Saddam was mistaken but reasoning correctly in treating it as a bluff, and the US was even more foolish to carry through on the threat.
Maybe it’s the late hour, but I’m having trouble seeing how “The other guy may decide we’re bluffing and call us on it” does not apply to hypothetical Stalin.
Because in that scenario, Stalin would not be thinking the USA is doing something so stupid it must be a bluff, because it wouldn’t be so stupid it is probably a bluff.
A willingness to incur losses is a useful part—if you are seeking useful goals.
You are adding conditions. A willingness to incur losses is very much a necessary condition. Identifying other necessary conditions doesn’t change that.
I may well want to follow through on a threat in order to preserve my credibility for future threats, but if I choose to make threats for stupid self-defeating goals, then precommitting is a horrible irrational thing which destroys me.
How is enforcing the sanctions a stupid goal?
The USA would have been much better off not invading Iraq and losing some credibility, because the invasion of Iraq would have predictably disastrous consequences for both the USA and Iraq which were far worse than the loss of credibility.
I disagree that there were predictable disastrous consequences. The actual results are hardly disastrous, and the harmful results were not entirely predictable.
Saddam was mistaken but reasoning correctly in treating it as a bluff,
It’s hard to claim that Saddam was reasoning correctly when he arrived at the incorrect conclusions.
Because in that scenario, Stalin would not be thinking the USA is doing something so stupid it must be a bluff, because it wouldn’t be so stupid it is probably a bluff.
Maybe that’s an argument for Stalin being less likely to call the bluff, but it’s far from an argument that we can be sure of it.
A willingness to incur losses is very much a necessary condition.
And you are treating willingness to incur losses as a sufficient condition, when it is merely a necessary condition. Willingness to incur losses is only useful when pursuing desirable goals; if you are pursuing harmful goals like ‘invade Iraq, waste trillions, destablize the Middle East, and offer your regional enemy a weak divided pawn’, then being unwilling to incur loss such as in threats is actually making you better off.
How is enforcing the sanctions a stupid goal?
Who said anything about sanctions? I thought we were discussing the US invasion of Iraq.
I disagree that there were predictable disastrous consequences. The actual results are hardly disastrous, and the harmful results were not entirely predictable.
I strongly disagree they were not predictable. They were predicted long in advance by the many critics of the proposed invasion. I was paying very close attention to the runup to the invasion because I was shocked that something so moronic, so based on flimsy evidence, so unnecessary to fight the War on Terror, and going to entail hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in the best case. The military consequences of invading a mushedup pseudo state ruled by a brutal dictatorship run by an ethnic minority, where the minority vs the majority was only the major running conflict in the past millennium of Islamic history, did not take a Napoleon to extrapolate.
It’s hard to claim that Saddam was reasoning correctly when he arrived at the incorrect conclusions.
And was a lottery winner reasoning correctly because the consequences happened to be good? Does one example of a good outcome justify any bad reasoning?
Maybe that’s an argument for Stalin being less likely to call the bluff, but it’s far from an argument that we can be sure of it.
It’s an argument that the Saddam example does not tell us anything useful about Stalin, because the key reason Saddam refused does not exist in the Stalin situation.
And you are treating willingness to incur losses as a sufficient condition, when it is merely a necessary condition.
I don’t see how you’re interpreting me as saying that. Willingness to incur losses is a vital part of diplomacy. The fact that this can facilitate bad things doesn’t change that. It’s like responding to the claim that a rifle is a vital part of deer hunting by saying “Not if you shoot your foot rather the deer”.
Who said anything about sanctions? I thought we were discussing the US invasion of Iraq.
The inspection regime was part of the sanctions imposed against Iraq.
I strongly disagree they were not predictable. They were predicted long in advance by the many critics of the proposed invasion.
There were people predicting bad consequences, and there were people predicting good consequences. Looking at hindsight doesn’t make it predictable.
And was a lottery winner reasoning correctly because the consequences happened to be good?
It’s a bit odd to go from reasoning that it was predictable based on hindsight, to rejecting the idea that Saddam reasoned correctly based on hindsight. I didn’t say that Saddam definitely wasn’t reasoning correctly, only that it is hard to argue that position. Unlike a lottery winner, this wasn’t a random event. Clearly, if Saddam thought it was definitely a bluff, he was completely wrong. So you would have to argue that Saddam recognized that it likely was not a bluff, but he assigned such a high confidence to it being a bluff that calling it was worth the risk of death, and that level of confidence was well-justified. The very fact that it was not a bluff is quite strong evidence that thinking it was not a bluff was wrong.
Willingness to incur losses is a vital part of diplomacy. The fact that this can facilitate bad things doesn’t change that. It’s like responding to the claim that a rifle is a vital part of deer hunting by saying “Not if you shoot your foot rather the deer”.
Indeed. If you suck as much at shooting a rifle as the USA sucks at diplomacy in the Middle East, you should leave it at home.
The inspection regime was part of the sanctions imposed against Iraq.
The sanctions did not require the USA invasion which has been so disastrous.
There were people predicting bad consequences, and there were people predicting good consequences. Looking at hindsight doesn’t make it predictable.
If it was such a good idea, why did it take the patriotic fervor of 9/11 and a case about WMDs based on lies and exaggerations to convince the USA to invade Iraq? Because it was a predictably bad idea which a lot of people were skeptical of.
It’s a bit odd to go from reasoning that it was predictable based on hindsight, to rejecting the idea that Saddam reasoned correctly based on hindsight. I didn’t say that Saddam definitely wasn’t reasoning correctly, only that it is hard to argue that position. Unlike a lottery winner, this wasn’t a random event. Clearly, if Saddam thought it was definitely a bluff, he was completely wrong. So you would have to argue that Saddam recognized that it likely was not a bluff, but he assigned such a high confidence to it being a bluff that calling it was worth the risk of death, and that level of confidence was well-justified.
I don’t know what to say to this but to repeat myself: he was reasoning correctly about the consequences of it not being a bluff, and whether a rational self-interested USA would want to do it. To call this wrong is itself a post hoc argument from hindsight that he should have foreseen that the USA was irrational and self-sabotaging and acted accordingly, and voluntarily topple his regime & empower Iran solely on the odds of that.
The very fact that it was not a bluff is quite strong evidence that thinking it was not a bluff was wrong.
And is this ‘quite strong evidence’ neutralized by recent events in Syria? What’s the proper reference class here?
The sanctions did not require the USA invasion which has been so disastrous.
Saddam didn’t seem to be amenable to complying with them without serious action.
If it was such a good idea, why did it take the patriotic fervor of 9/11 and a case about WMDs based on lies and exaggerations to convince the USA to invade Iraq? Because it was a predictably bad idea which a lot of people were skeptical of.
I’m hardly denying that there were concerns.
I don’t know what to say to this but to repeat myself: he was reasoning correctly about the consequences of it not being a bluff, and whether a rational self-interested USA would want to do it.
I don’t know what definition of “rationality” you are using, that it is correct to trust one’s life to others following it.
To call this wrong is itself a post hoc argument from hindsight that he should have foreseen that the USA was irrational and self-sabotaging and acted accordingly, and voluntarily topple his regime & empower Iran solely on the odds of that.
It’s hindsight only in the most broad sense, and all empirical knowledge is based on hindsight in the most broad sense. And the literal reading of that sentence is that “Saddam” is the subject of “topple his regime”. Who is saying that Saddam should have toppled his own regime?
And is this ‘quite strong evidence’ neutralized by recent events in Syria? What’s the proper reference class here?
“Recent events in Syria”? You’ll have to be more specific. And you seem to be trying to slide from a discussion of the case itself to discussion of whether the case is the proper reference class.
If the US had been able to credibly pre-commit to the invasion if inspections were not allowed, then that pre-commitment would not be foolish. And once they had attempted such a pre-commitment, not following through would have harmed their ability to make pre-commitments in the future. A willingness to incur losses to punish others is a vital part of diplomacy. If that’s “irrational”, you have a very narrow view of rationality, and your version of “rationality” will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation.
So, if I’m following correctly, your position was that the US was foolish for following through … and Hussein was foolish for not realizing they would follow through. So if everyone is foolish, how can you argue that because X would be in hypothetical Stalin’s best interests, it somehow follows that he would do X?
Maybe it’s the late hour, but I’m having trouble seeing how “The other guy may decide we’re bluffing and call us on it” does not apply to hypothetical Stalin.
A willingness to incur losses is a useful part—if you are seeking useful goals. I may well want to follow through on a threat in order to preserve my credibility for future threats, but if I choose to make threats for stupid self-defeating goals, then precommitting is a horrible irrational thing which destroys me. The USA would have been much better off not invading Iraq and losing some credibility, because the invasion of Iraq would have predictably disastrous consequences for both the USA and Iraq which were far worse than the loss of credibility.
The first rule of strategy: don’t pursue stupid goals. If you think that you can pursue any goal unrelated to what you actually want, then you have a very narrow view of rationality and your version of rationality will be absolutely crushed in pretty much any negotiation. You do not want to be able to precommit to shooting yourself in the foot.
The US was foolish for issuing threats to achieve a goal that harmed its actual interests, Saddam was mistaken but reasoning correctly in treating it as a bluff, and the US was even more foolish to carry through on the threat.
Because in that scenario, Stalin would not be thinking the USA is doing something so stupid it must be a bluff, because it wouldn’t be so stupid it is probably a bluff.
You are adding conditions. A willingness to incur losses is very much a necessary condition. Identifying other necessary conditions doesn’t change that.
How is enforcing the sanctions a stupid goal?
I disagree that there were predictable disastrous consequences. The actual results are hardly disastrous, and the harmful results were not entirely predictable.
It’s hard to claim that Saddam was reasoning correctly when he arrived at the incorrect conclusions.
Maybe that’s an argument for Stalin being less likely to call the bluff, but it’s far from an argument that we can be sure of it.
And you are treating willingness to incur losses as a sufficient condition, when it is merely a necessary condition. Willingness to incur losses is only useful when pursuing desirable goals; if you are pursuing harmful goals like ‘invade Iraq, waste trillions, destablize the Middle East, and offer your regional enemy a weak divided pawn’, then being unwilling to incur loss such as in threats is actually making you better off.
Who said anything about sanctions? I thought we were discussing the US invasion of Iraq.
I strongly disagree they were not predictable. They were predicted long in advance by the many critics of the proposed invasion. I was paying very close attention to the runup to the invasion because I was shocked that something so moronic, so based on flimsy evidence, so unnecessary to fight the War on Terror, and going to entail hundreds of billions of dollars wasted in the best case. The military consequences of invading a mushedup pseudo state ruled by a brutal dictatorship run by an ethnic minority, where the minority vs the majority was only the major running conflict in the past millennium of Islamic history, did not take a Napoleon to extrapolate.
And was a lottery winner reasoning correctly because the consequences happened to be good? Does one example of a good outcome justify any bad reasoning?
It’s an argument that the Saddam example does not tell us anything useful about Stalin, because the key reason Saddam refused does not exist in the Stalin situation.
I don’t see how you’re interpreting me as saying that. Willingness to incur losses is a vital part of diplomacy. The fact that this can facilitate bad things doesn’t change that. It’s like responding to the claim that a rifle is a vital part of deer hunting by saying “Not if you shoot your foot rather the deer”.
The inspection regime was part of the sanctions imposed against Iraq.
There were people predicting bad consequences, and there were people predicting good consequences. Looking at hindsight doesn’t make it predictable.
It’s a bit odd to go from reasoning that it was predictable based on hindsight, to rejecting the idea that Saddam reasoned correctly based on hindsight. I didn’t say that Saddam definitely wasn’t reasoning correctly, only that it is hard to argue that position. Unlike a lottery winner, this wasn’t a random event. Clearly, if Saddam thought it was definitely a bluff, he was completely wrong. So you would have to argue that Saddam recognized that it likely was not a bluff, but he assigned such a high confidence to it being a bluff that calling it was worth the risk of death, and that level of confidence was well-justified. The very fact that it was not a bluff is quite strong evidence that thinking it was not a bluff was wrong.
Indeed. If you suck as much at shooting a rifle as the USA sucks at diplomacy in the Middle East, you should leave it at home.
The sanctions did not require the USA invasion which has been so disastrous.
If it was such a good idea, why did it take the patriotic fervor of 9/11 and a case about WMDs based on lies and exaggerations to convince the USA to invade Iraq? Because it was a predictably bad idea which a lot of people were skeptical of.
I don’t know what to say to this but to repeat myself: he was reasoning correctly about the consequences of it not being a bluff, and whether a rational self-interested USA would want to do it. To call this wrong is itself a post hoc argument from hindsight that he should have foreseen that the USA was irrational and self-sabotaging and acted accordingly, and voluntarily topple his regime & empower Iran solely on the odds of that.
And is this ‘quite strong evidence’ neutralized by recent events in Syria? What’s the proper reference class here?
Saddam didn’t seem to be amenable to complying with them without serious action.
I’m hardly denying that there were concerns.
I don’t know what definition of “rationality” you are using, that it is correct to trust one’s life to others following it.
It’s hindsight only in the most broad sense, and all empirical knowledge is based on hindsight in the most broad sense. And the literal reading of that sentence is that “Saddam” is the subject of “topple his regime”. Who is saying that Saddam should have toppled his own regime?
“Recent events in Syria”? You’ll have to be more specific. And you seem to be trying to slide from a discussion of the case itself to discussion of whether the case is the proper reference class.