If I put you in a coma and make a perfect clone, either that clone and you are the same person or not. If not, then the universe has super-material information, and if so, then there has to be a qualitative difference between a perfect clone and a clone with one atom in the wrong place
The two bodies aren’t the selfsame body (numerical identity) , they are two entities with identical properties (qualitative identity). You seem to be allowing qualitative identity without numerical identity in the case of the body, but not in the case of consciousness.
If not, then the universe has super-material information,
That would be spatio temporal location. Even in austere physicalism, you have to accept that not all information is an intrinsic property of a material body.
I mean numerical non identity given qualitative identity (both bodies are made of identical particles in identical configurations). Those are terms of art you can look up.
Giving up on numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not an option given physics.
I was under the impression that the opposite was the case, that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is moonshine. I’m not a physician though, so I can’t argue with you on the object level. Do you think that your position would be a majority view on LW?
I was under the impression that the opposite was the case, that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is moonshine.
If you believe that, you shouldn’t be talking about cloning except to say it is impossible.
Consider a thought experiment: you make a very nearly identical copy of something, differing in only one atom, you move the copy and the original to opposite ends of the galaxy, and you add the missing atom to the copy. What happens next?
Do you think that your position would be a majority view on LW?
Ok, so I think our exchange can be summarized like this: I am operating on the assumption that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not a thing, and you doubt that assumption. We both agree that the assumption is necessary for the argument I made to be convincing.
The two bodies aren’t the selfsame body (numerical identity) , they are two entities with identical properties (qualitative identity). You seem to be allowing qualitative identity without numerical identity in the case of the body, but not in the case of consciousness.
That would be spatio temporal location. Even in austere physicalism, you have to accept that not all information is an intrinsic property of a material body.
You mean identity of particles? I was just assuming that there is no such thing. I agree that if there was, that would be a simpler explanation.
I mean numerical non identity given qualitative identity (both bodies are made of identical particles in identical configurations). Those are terms of art you can look up.
Giving up on numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not an option given physics.
I was under the impression that the opposite was the case, that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is moonshine. I’m not a physician though, so I can’t argue with you on the object level. Do you think that your position would be a majority view on LW?
If you believe that, you shouldn’t be talking about cloning except to say it is impossible.
Consider a thought experiment: you make a very nearly identical copy of something, differing in only one atom, you move the copy and the original to opposite ends of the galaxy, and you add the missing atom to the copy. What happens next?
I neither know nor care.
Ok, so I think our exchange can be summarized like this: I am operating on the assumption that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not a thing, and you doubt that assumption. We both agree that the assumption is necessary for the argument I made to be convincing.