I mean numerical non identity given qualitative identity (both bodies are made of identical particles in identical configurations). Those are terms of art you can look up.
Giving up on numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not an option given physics.
I was under the impression that the opposite was the case, that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is moonshine. I’m not a physician though, so I can’t argue with you on the object level. Do you think that your position would be a majority view on LW?
I was under the impression that the opposite was the case, that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is moonshine.
If you believe that, you shouldn’t be talking about cloning except to say it is impossible.
Consider a thought experiment: you make a very nearly identical copy of something, differing in only one atom, you move the copy and the original to opposite ends of the galaxy, and you add the missing atom to the copy. What happens next?
Do you think that your position would be a majority view on LW?
Ok, so I think our exchange can be summarized like this: I am operating on the assumption that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not a thing, and you doubt that assumption. We both agree that the assumption is necessary for the argument I made to be convincing.
I mean numerical non identity given qualitative identity (both bodies are made of identical particles in identical configurations). Those are terms of art you can look up.
Giving up on numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not an option given physics.
I was under the impression that the opposite was the case, that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is moonshine. I’m not a physician though, so I can’t argue with you on the object level. Do you think that your position would be a majority view on LW?
If you believe that, you shouldn’t be talking about cloning except to say it is impossible.
Consider a thought experiment: you make a very nearly identical copy of something, differing in only one atom, you move the copy and the original to opposite ends of the galaxy, and you add the missing atom to the copy. What happens next?
I neither know nor care.
Ok, so I think our exchange can be summarized like this: I am operating on the assumption that numerical non-identity given qualitative identity is not a thing, and you doubt that assumption. We both agree that the assumption is necessary for the argument I made to be convincing.