What I don’t understand is why there should be a link between trapped priors and an moral philosophy.
I mean, if moral realism was correct, i.e. if moral tenets such as “don’t eat pork”, “don’t have sex with your sister”, or “avoid killing sentient beings” had an universal truth value for all beings capable of moral behavior, then one might argue that the reason why people’s ethics differ is that they have trapped priors which prevent them from recognizing these universal truths.
This might be my trapped priors talking, but I am a non-cognitivist. I simply believe that assigning truth values to moral sentences such as “killing is wrong” is pointless, and they are better parsed as prescriptive sentences such as “don’t kill” or “boo on killing”.
In my view, moral codes are intrinsically subjective. There is no factual disagreement between Harry and Professor Quirrell which they could hope to overcome through empiricism, they simply have different utility functions.
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My second point is that if moral realism was true, and one of the key roles of religion was to free people from trapped priors so they could recognize these universal moral truths, then at least during the founding of religions, we should see some evidence of higher moral standards before they invariably mutate into institutions devoid of moral truths. I would argue that either, our commonly accepted humanitarian moral values are all wrong or this mutation process happened almost instantly:
Whatever Jesus thought about gender equality when he achieved moral enlightenment, Paul had his own ideas a few decades later.
Mohammed was clearly not opposed to offensive warfare.
Martin Luther evidently believed that serfs should not rebel against their lords.
On the other hand, for instances where religions did advocate for tenets compatible with humanitarianism, such as in Christian abolitionism, do not seem to correspond to strong spiritualism. Was Pope Benedict XIV condemning the slave trade because he was more spiritual (and thus in touch with the universal moral truth) than his predecessors who had endorsed it?
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My last point is that especially with regard to relational conflicts, our map not corresponding to the territory might often not be a bug, but a feature. Per Hanson, we deceive ourselves so that we can better deceive others. Evolution has not shaped our brains to be objective cognitive engines. In some cases, objective cognition is what it advantageous—if you are alone hunting a rabbit, no amount of self-deception will fill your stomach—but in any social situation, expect evolution to put the hand on the scales of your impartial judgement. Arguing that your son should become the new chieftain because he is the best hunter and strongest warrior is much more effective than arguing for that simply because he is your son—and the best way to argue that is to believe it, no matter if it is objectively true.
The adulterer, the slave owner and the wartime rapist all have solid evolutionary reasons to engage in behaviors most of us might find immoral. I think their moral blind spots are likely not caused by trapped priors, like an exaggerated fear of dogs is. Also, I have no reason to believe that I don’t have similar moral blind spots hard-wired into my brain by evolution.
I would bet that most of the serious roadblocks to a true moral theory (if such a thing existed) are of that kind, instead of being maladaptive trapped priors. Thus, even if religion and spirituality are effective at overcoming maladaptive trapped priors, I don’t see how they would us bring closer to moral cognition.
The adulterer, the slave owner and the wartime rapist all have solid evolutionary reasons to engage in behaviors most of us might find immoral. I think their moral blind spots are likely not caused by trapped priors, like an exaggerated fear of dogs is.
I don’t think the evopsych and trapped-prior views are incompatible. A selection pressure towards immoral behavior could select for genes/memes that tend to result in certain kinds of trapped prior.
Regarding your second point, I’m leaving this comment as a placeholder to indicate my intention to give a proper response at some point. My views here have some subtlely that I want to make sure I unpack correctly, and it’s getting late here!
In response to your third point, I want to echo ABlue’s comment about the compatibility of the trapped prior view and the evopsych view. I also want to emphasize that my usage of “trapped prior” includes genetically pre-specified priors, like a fear of snakes, which I think can be overriden.
In any case, I don’t see why priors that predispose us to e.g. adultery couldn’t be similarly overriden. I wonder if our main source of disagreement has to do with the feasibility of overriding “hard-wired” evolutionary priors?
In response to your first point, I think of moral codes as being contextual more than I think of them as being subjective, but I do think of them as fundamentally being about pragmatism (“let’s all agree to coordinate in ABC way to solve PQR problem in XYZ environment, and socially punish people who aren’t willing to do so”). I also think religions often make the mistake of generalizing moral codes beyond the contexts in which they arose as helpful adaptations.
I think of decision theory as being the basis for morality—see e.g. Critch’s take here and Richard Ngo’s take here. I evaluate how ethical people are based on how good they are at paying causal costs for larger acausal gains.
What I don’t understand is why there should be a link between trapped priors and an moral philosophy.
I mean, if moral realism was correct, i.e. if moral tenets such as “don’t eat pork”, “don’t have sex with your sister”, or “avoid killing sentient beings” had an universal truth value for all beings capable of moral behavior, then one might argue that the reason why people’s ethics differ is that they have trapped priors which prevent them from recognizing these universal truths.
This might be my trapped priors talking, but I am a non-cognitivist. I simply believe that assigning truth values to moral sentences such as “killing is wrong” is pointless, and they are better parsed as prescriptive sentences such as “don’t kill” or “boo on killing”.
In my view, moral codes are intrinsically subjective. There is no factual disagreement between Harry and Professor Quirrell which they could hope to overcome through empiricism, they simply have different utility functions.
--
My second point is that if moral realism was true, and one of the key roles of religion was to free people from trapped priors so they could recognize these universal moral truths, then at least during the founding of religions, we should see some evidence of higher moral standards before they invariably mutate into institutions devoid of moral truths. I would argue that either, our commonly accepted humanitarian moral values are all wrong or this mutation process happened almost instantly:
Whatever Jesus thought about gender equality when he achieved moral enlightenment, Paul had his own ideas a few decades later.
Mohammed was clearly not opposed to offensive warfare.
Martin Luther evidently believed that serfs should not rebel against their lords.
On the other hand, for instances where religions did advocate for tenets compatible with humanitarianism, such as in Christian abolitionism, do not seem to correspond to strong spiritualism. Was Pope Benedict XIV condemning the slave trade because he was more spiritual (and thus in touch with the universal moral truth) than his predecessors who had endorsed it?
--
My last point is that especially with regard to relational conflicts, our map not corresponding to the territory might often not be a bug, but a feature. Per Hanson, we deceive ourselves so that we can better deceive others. Evolution has not shaped our brains to be objective cognitive engines. In some cases, objective cognition is what it advantageous—if you are alone hunting a rabbit, no amount of self-deception will fill your stomach—but in any social situation, expect evolution to put the hand on the scales of your impartial judgement. Arguing that your son should become the new chieftain because he is the best hunter and strongest warrior is much more effective than arguing for that simply because he is your son—and the best way to argue that is to believe it, no matter if it is objectively true.
The adulterer, the slave owner and the wartime rapist all have solid evolutionary reasons to engage in behaviors most of us might find immoral. I think their moral blind spots are likely not caused by trapped priors, like an exaggerated fear of dogs is. Also, I have no reason to believe that I don’t have similar moral blind spots hard-wired into my brain by evolution.
I would bet that most of the serious roadblocks to a true moral theory (if such a thing existed) are of that kind, instead of being maladaptive trapped priors. Thus, even if religion and spirituality are effective at overcoming maladaptive trapped priors, I don’t see how they would us bring closer to moral cognition.
I don’t think the evopsych and trapped-prior views are incompatible. A selection pressure towards immoral behavior could select for genes/memes that tend to result in certain kinds of trapped prior.
Regarding your second point, I’m leaving this comment as a placeholder to indicate my intention to give a proper response at some point. My views here have some subtlely that I want to make sure I unpack correctly, and it’s getting late here!
In response to your third point, I want to echo ABlue’s comment about the compatibility of the trapped prior view and the evopsych view. I also want to emphasize that my usage of “trapped prior” includes genetically pre-specified priors, like a fear of snakes, which I think can be overriden.
In any case, I don’t see why priors that predispose us to e.g. adultery couldn’t be similarly overriden. I wonder if our main source of disagreement has to do with the feasibility of overriding “hard-wired” evolutionary priors?
In response to your first point, I think of moral codes as being contextual more than I think of them as being subjective, but I do think of them as fundamentally being about pragmatism (“let’s all agree to coordinate in ABC way to solve PQR problem in XYZ environment, and socially punish people who aren’t willing to do so”). I also think religions often make the mistake of generalizing moral codes beyond the contexts in which they arose as helpful adaptations.
I think of decision theory as being the basis for morality—see e.g. Critch’s take here and Richard Ngo’s take here. I evaluate how ethical people are based on how good they are at paying causal costs for larger acausal gains.