what’s his relativistically invariant mathematical model of world splitting for multiple spacelike-separated events?
I don’t think Eliezer (or Everett or Deutsch) thinks “worlds” are ontologically fundamental. You just have an amplitude distribution on your Hilbert space that changes with time. This can (and does) happen in a Lorentz invariant way.
The “worlds” are a phenomenon that appear at a higher level. If you take each blob (i.e. concentrated region) and call it a “world” then they split in the same way that a large raindrop might split into two smaller ones. In particular, two quantum coin flips occurring at spacelike separated points would look like a single blob splitting into four (if we look in a frame where the flips are not simultaneous then we would see it split into two, and then each small blob would again split).
I’m not sure if this is the same as what Luke_A_Somers says in the comment sibling to this one, that comment is trying to describe how splitting looks from the inside.
I don’t think Eliezer (or Everett or Deutsch) thinks “worlds” are ontologically fundamental.
Neither is the wave function collapse, but it is much simpler a concept. The most common objection “how does it do that?” is now irrelevant, since the collapse is not “ontologically fundamental”.
The “worlds” are a phenomenon...
And now you are talking about it like it is some real thing, not an emotional crutch.
Neither is the wave function collapse, but it is much simpler a concept. The most common objection “how does it do that?” is now irrelevant, since the collapse is not “ontologically fundamental”.
How does collapse appear as a non-ontological phenomenon?
The “worlds” are a phenomenon...
And now you are talking about it like it is some real thing, not an emotional crutch.
Well it was you who brought up “worlds” in the first place! I’m happy to just talk about a wave function on all of Hilbert space evolving through time.
(EDIT: I just noticed I used “Hilbert space” wrongly in this post and the grandparent. I meant to say something like “classical configuration space”. The Hilbert space is the space of complex functions on the configuration space.
I think. QM has so many vector spaces inside each other my brain sometimes melts.)
I don’t think Eliezer (or Everett or Deutsch) thinks “worlds” are ontologically fundamental. You just have an amplitude distribution on your Hilbert space that changes with time. This can (and does) happen in a Lorentz invariant way.
The “worlds” are a phenomenon that appear at a higher level. If you take each blob (i.e. concentrated region) and call it a “world” then they split in the same way that a large raindrop might split into two smaller ones. In particular, two quantum coin flips occurring at spacelike separated points would look like a single blob splitting into four (if we look in a frame where the flips are not simultaneous then we would see it split into two, and then each small blob would again split).
I’m not sure if this is the same as what Luke_A_Somers says in the comment sibling to this one, that comment is trying to describe how splitting looks from the inside.
Neither is the wave function collapse, but it is much simpler a concept. The most common objection “how does it do that?” is now irrelevant, since the collapse is not “ontologically fundamental”.
And now you are talking about it like it is some real thing, not an emotional crutch.
How does collapse appear as a non-ontological phenomenon?
Well it was you who brought up “worlds” in the first place! I’m happy to just talk about a wave function on all of Hilbert space evolving through time.
(EDIT: I just noticed I used “Hilbert space” wrongly in this post and the grandparent. I meant to say something like “classical configuration space”. The Hilbert space is the space of complex functions on the configuration space.
I think. QM has so many vector spaces inside each other my brain sometimes melts.)
Bingo.