My prior that the universe is not sufficiently uniformly described by typical reductionist reasoning like the kind found in Eliezer’s reductionism sequence is high enough that in order to make distinctions between such low probability hypotheses as the ones described I would need to be more sure that my model was meant to deal with the relationship between hypotheses and observed evidence on the extreme ends of a log odds probability scale. (I would also have to be less aware of emotionally available and biased-reasoning-causing fun-theoretic-like anthropic-like not-explicitly-reasoned-through alternative hypotheses.)
What are the alternative hypotheses? Magic? A simulation with interference from the simulator?
I’m not denying the possibility of alternatives, it’s just that they all seem less likely the two low probability hypotheses originally considered (chance and cheating).
My prior that the universe is not sufficiently uniformly described by typical reductionist reasoning like the kind found in Eliezer’s reductionism sequence is high enough that in order to make distinctions between such low probability hypotheses as the ones described I would need to be more sure that my model was meant to deal with the relationship between hypotheses and observed evidence on the extreme ends of a log odds probability scale. (I would also have to be less aware of emotionally available and biased-reasoning-causing fun-theoretic-like anthropic-like not-explicitly-reasoned-through alternative hypotheses.)
What are the alternative hypotheses? Magic? A simulation with interference from the simulator?
I’m not denying the possibility of alternatives, it’s just that they all seem less likely the two low probability hypotheses originally considered (chance and cheating).