I used to be quite partial to the Epiphenomenal theory of consciousness (consciousness observes but doesn’t interact). But I actually think the Zombie Argument is rather soundly defeated by the fact that humans frequently act as though consciousness has side-effects. I wouldn’t expect zombies to make nearly as many arguments about whether we “really see red” as people do. I still thing zombies are maybe philosophically possible, but they’re not terribly parsimonious.
I used to be quite partial to the Epiphenomenal theory of consciousness (consciousness observes but doesn’t interact). But I actually think the Zombie Argument is rather soundly defeated by the fact that humans frequently act as though consciousness has side-effects. I wouldn’t expect zombies to make nearly as many arguments about whether we “really see red” as people do. I still thing zombies are maybe philosophically possible, but they’re not terribly parsimonious.