I don’t want to propose a solution without some idea of how common a problem this is, because that affects which one is optimal.
How many beliefs (If drawing lines between separate beliefs is an issue, call them separate if you have separate reasons for disagreeing with the perceived popular opinion on LessWrong on them) do you hold but claim not to hold for the purpose of signaling epistemic credibility on LessWrong? (Don’t rationalize “I only agreed under pressure that one time.” If most of the time you have been asked what you believe, you lied, include that belief in this count)
[pollid:554]
How many beliefs do you hold, and not lie about, but also avoid discussing on LessWrong for the same purpose? (Beliefs you do not discuss because they are rude is a separate issue)
[pollid:555]
Make sure you don’t accidentally uncheck the anonymity thing.
I try to never truly lie, but I do sometimes not say all what I think, or abstain from discussion, or say a watered-down version of what I believe, because I hold a belief that will cost me reputation in a given community, and that applies on LW too.
But it’s hard to quantify that as a number, because belief are interconnected. Usually in a given community, most of the belief I don’t expose too openly are linked together to a set of entangled core belief. Like transhumanism in my family circle. Obviously I won’t say on LW ;)
I’m glad you said “a watered-down version of what I believe.” I’ve used that strategy on LW to avoid having my arguments dismissed on account of guilt-by-association with some pet peeve of my audience. I will go out of my way to avoid sounding like a postmodernist, say, even on a particular issue whereupon what some postmodernist has said is dead right and exactly to the point.
I think the data from this poll will be biased towards showing that belief signaling is not an issue, because I think a lot of it is subconscious. People think they actually believe the beliefs they use as signals. I think this is the primary problem of religion.
Using “Karma” as a stand in for Epistemic credibility, I definitely have thoughts/beliefs which I then avoided discussing on Less Wrong, but the way I viewed that was that I simply didn’t have time to properly research/structure my comments on them to seem good enough to gain points or stay neutral.
(As a side note, I had other thoughts/beliefs about this post that I felt I didn’t have time to properly research/structure: Edit: And I ended up posting them below this line.)
But I suppose another way of thinking about this is “I’m afraid this belief might be wrong AND seem over confident, and other people will judge me for that. Let me try to make sure this post is more solid and has all necessary caveats before saying anything.” I don’t think that’s the same thing. But I guess it is possible that I’m lying to myself about that somehow?
For instance, here is a belief I would have ordinarily censored in regards to this, If I weren’t already kind of being Meta:
“This hurts me. I tend to incorrectly interpret this as being worried about being wrong at all times and I’m continually on the lookout for harsh reprimands or worse when none should be reasonably expected (or they should be expected but should be brushed off), to the point where I recently had to get my doctor to boost my dose of anti-anxiety pills.”
But NOW I’m afraid that I’m making that more true by acknowledging it out loud, where as, if I DIDN’T post that, my thoughts on the matter would be slightly different?
And honestly, at this point I would ordinarily think “I’m lost in my own head. I should discard most of this as gibberish and move on.”
Except that the entire point of this was trying to honestly consider my own thought processes, so I probably should post this even if it seems stream of conciousnessy.
...So when my thoughts are like that, it’s really hard to boil them down to a number.
There are beliefs that I generally don’t talk about on Less Wrong, but only because the contexts in which it would be relevant to bring them up are rare.
I can’t think of any beliefs which I avoid talking about here because holding them would violate LW norms or signal low status in this context. However, I can think of several beliefs which I avoid talking about because they belong to domains that are considered harmful or disruptive to bring up.
Typically, those domains hold that status because we’ve tried talking about them and it hasn’t ended well.
Beliefs where the transgression that reduces status is saying them, not believing them. (Distinct from saying them being used as evidence of the transgression of believing them). If someone read your mind and discovered them, you would not have committed the transgression with a rude belief, but you would with a stupid belief.
A third category (which I think you might think the belief you’re trying to classify fits into) is where it’s believing it that is the transgression, not because it’s believed to be wrong, losing you epistemic credibility, but because the belief is repulsive, losing you another kind of status. If losing status besides epistemic credibility is your motivation for avoiding discussing this belief, do not include it. However, if you believe that people’s disgust for your belief will cause you to lose epistemic credibility in their eyes as a side effect, and that is your motivation (by this I mean it’s a necessary condition) for not discussing it, include it.
I don’t want to propose a solution without some idea of how common a problem this is, because that affects which one is optimal.
How many beliefs (If drawing lines between separate beliefs is an issue, call them separate if you have separate reasons for disagreeing with the perceived popular opinion on LessWrong on them) do you hold but claim not to hold for the purpose of signaling epistemic credibility on LessWrong? (Don’t rationalize “I only agreed under pressure that one time.” If most of the time you have been asked what you believe, you lied, include that belief in this count) [pollid:554]
How many beliefs do you hold, and not lie about, but also avoid discussing on LessWrong for the same purpose? (Beliefs you do not discuss because they are rude is a separate issue) [pollid:555]
Make sure you don’t accidentally uncheck the anonymity thing.
I try to never truly lie, but I do sometimes not say all what I think, or abstain from discussion, or say a watered-down version of what I believe, because I hold a belief that will cost me reputation in a given community, and that applies on LW too.
But it’s hard to quantify that as a number, because belief are interconnected. Usually in a given community, most of the belief I don’t expose too openly are linked together to a set of entangled core belief. Like transhumanism in my family circle. Obviously I won’t say on LW ;)
I’m glad you said “a watered-down version of what I believe.” I’ve used that strategy on LW to avoid having my arguments dismissed on account of guilt-by-association with some pet peeve of my audience. I will go out of my way to avoid sounding like a postmodernist, say, even on a particular issue whereupon what some postmodernist has said is dead right and exactly to the point.
Upvoted for giving a specific example of an issue where these problems occur.
I think the data from this poll will be biased towards showing that belief signaling is not an issue, because I think a lot of it is subconscious. People think they actually believe the beliefs they use as signals. I think this is the primary problem of religion.
Using “Karma” as a stand in for Epistemic credibility, I definitely have thoughts/beliefs which I then avoided discussing on Less Wrong, but the way I viewed that was that I simply didn’t have time to properly research/structure my comments on them to seem good enough to gain points or stay neutral.
(As a side note, I had other thoughts/beliefs about this post that I felt I didn’t have time to properly research/structure: Edit: And I ended up posting them below this line.)
But I suppose another way of thinking about this is “I’m afraid this belief might be wrong AND seem over confident, and other people will judge me for that. Let me try to make sure this post is more solid and has all necessary caveats before saying anything.” I don’t think that’s the same thing. But I guess it is possible that I’m lying to myself about that somehow?
For instance, here is a belief I would have ordinarily censored in regards to this, If I weren’t already kind of being Meta:
“This hurts me. I tend to incorrectly interpret this as being worried about being wrong at all times and I’m continually on the lookout for harsh reprimands or worse when none should be reasonably expected (or they should be expected but should be brushed off), to the point where I recently had to get my doctor to boost my dose of anti-anxiety pills.”
But NOW I’m afraid that I’m making that more true by acknowledging it out loud, where as, if I DIDN’T post that, my thoughts on the matter would be slightly different?
And honestly, at this point I would ordinarily think “I’m lost in my own head. I should discard most of this as gibberish and move on.”
Except that the entire point of this was trying to honestly consider my own thought processes, so I probably should post this even if it seems stream of conciousnessy.
...So when my thoughts are like that, it’s really hard to boil them down to a number.
There are beliefs that I generally don’t talk about on Less Wrong, but only because the contexts in which it would be relevant to bring them up are rare.
I can’t think of any beliefs which I avoid talking about here because holding them would violate LW norms or signal low status in this context. However, I can think of several beliefs which I avoid talking about because they belong to domains that are considered harmful or disruptive to bring up.
Typically, those domains hold that status because we’ve tried talking about them and it hasn’t ended well.
What do you mean by rude?
Beliefs where the transgression that reduces status is saying them, not believing them. (Distinct from saying them being used as evidence of the transgression of believing them). If someone read your mind and discovered them, you would not have committed the transgression with a rude belief, but you would with a stupid belief.
A third category (which I think you might think the belief you’re trying to classify fits into) is where it’s believing it that is the transgression, not because it’s believed to be wrong, losing you epistemic credibility, but because the belief is repulsive, losing you another kind of status. If losing status besides epistemic credibility is your motivation for avoiding discussing this belief, do not include it. However, if you believe that people’s disgust for your belief will cause you to lose epistemic credibility in their eyes as a side effect, and that is your motivation (by this I mean it’s a necessary condition) for not discussing it, include it.