Just read this article on the double life of chassidic atheists. While I’m aware of this sort of thing previously, an additional thought occurred to me; are we in general underestimating the current sanity water line because there are actually lots of professed irrational beliefs that people don’t actually believe?
This raises an interesting question: What is a population measure of sanity?
As you point out, stated beliefs might not be a great measurement. And even if a less-than-sane belief is genuine, the belief may be so compartmentalized that it isn’t a leading cause of irrational behavior.
A while back, I found this study: pdf which tried to correlate performance on a test of cognitive biases with the likelihood of reporting a bunch of different real-world “bad decisions”, like having been in jail or default on a loan. They found some modest correlations after adjusting for SES and an IQ-proxy.
What do you mean by “the quality of the society”? I worry that this will end up being a circular definition or something very like one.
(Some plausible definitions clearly don’t work. Imagine two societies with the exact same people, but in countries with very different natural resources. One may be much richer than the other as a result, leading to e.g. better healthcare, better education, less poverty, etc. So if those are part of what “the quality of the society” means then you’re basically declaring richer populations as more sane even if they’re composed of the same people.)
I do not propose my comment as a definition, I propose it as a finger pointing in the general direction of where you want to look.
Note that the original question (“What is a population measure of sanity?”) critically depends on the definition of “sanity” which is not at all obvious to start with.
I took the original question to be partly asking for a definition of “sanity”.
Specifically, the sanity of a social group which is a bit different from the sanity of an individual.
One obvious approach is to measure it by the matching of the map and the territory, but that will make “sanity” very highly correlated with scientific and technological progress which probably not what we want.
But I also think you may be overestimating the “sanity water line” because there are lots of professed “rational” beliefs that people don’t actually believe.
I don’t know whether, on net, that will raise or lower the line.
But I also think you may be overestimating the “sanity water line” because there are lots of professed “rational” beliefs that people don’t actually believe.
Some economists tell me, “Yes, all our models, data, and analysis and experience for the last 40 years say fiscal stimulus doesn’t work, but don’t you really believe it anyway?” This is an astonishing attitude. How can a scientist “believe” something different than what he or she spends a career writing and teaching?
I think a lot of people don’t really believe the scientific statements they profess. They know they are supposed to say that “F = ma”, for example, but then when you ask them to predict the movement of an object in space, they’ll do so based on their intuitive notion that objects slow down unless you keep pushing them. They know very well what the science says, but they don’t think it applies to reality. Or to give an example that frustrated me for many years, my father was a neuroscientist, whose day-to-day work relied in part on knowing the shapes of molecules, which of course relies on quantum physics. Yet he said, privately to me, said that quantum physics was all nonsense. He would never have said such a thing publicly, because it would have hurt his career.
Broadly speaking, I think the attitude in the quote is very widespread. The models, data, analysis and experience (‘Science’) say one thing, so they know they have to profess it. But people secretly believe the opposite, and will look to act on their true beliefs if given the chance. It’s not just science, religion too, but I don’t want to get into that.
I wonder how many of those “some economists” there really are. I know that, e.g., Paul Krugman, one of Cochrane’s leading ideological opponents, vigorously denies that all models, data and experience say fiscal stimulus doesn’t work. Cochrane’s response is to suggest, inter alia, that Krugman doesn’t really believe it either. I suppose he might be correct, but it seems more plausible to me that ideological differences are getting in the way of Cochrane having a good mental model of Krugman and other stimulus proponents. (In a similar way, many theists think, or say they think, that atheists really know that God is real and just don’t want to admit it, and many atheists think, or say they think, that theists really know that there are no gods and just don’t want to admit it.)
(Note: first link is to an NYT article; may be behind a paywall; if so, you can probably find it by searching for “Few economists saw our current crisis coming” and following the first link.)
I wonder how many of those “some economists” there really are. I know that, e.g., Paul Krugman, one of Cochrane’s leading ideological opponents, vigorously denies that all models, data and experience say fiscal stimulus doesn’t work.
My point was not to argue about fiscal stimulus. Indeed, if you deny that the models, data, etc, say that, then that is an intellectually respectable position, same as with any scientific dispute. But what is definitely not respectable, what is below the sanity waterline, is the attitude in the quote—that science says X, but I don’t believe it anyway.
I understand that your point wasn’t to argue about fiscal stimulus (and you will notice that no part of what I wrote was was arguing about fiscal stimulus, as opposed to about opinions about fiscal stimulus). I’m calling into question how often Cochrane has really heard people say what he describes, as opposed to less transparently irrational things that he interprets that way because he can’t or won’t believe that his ideological opponents really think as they say they do.
My mental model of Krugman is that he used to be smart scientist and then (I think consciously) decided that agitprop is really really important and that he will do more good by being a frontline fighter in ideological wars rather than a chief alchemist of an ivory tower. Unfortunately Krugman’s assumed role is not compatible with being a smart scientist...
In the case of economists there is also ideology and social signaling in play. You cannot be a member in good standing of the Blue Tribe if you don’t profess that more government spending solves problems :-/
Just read this article on the double life of chassidic atheists. While I’m aware of this sort of thing previously, an additional thought occurred to me; are we in general underestimating the current sanity water line because there are actually lots of professed irrational beliefs that people don’t actually believe?
This raises an interesting question: What is a population measure of sanity?
As you point out, stated beliefs might not be a great measurement. And even if a less-than-sane belief is genuine, the belief may be so compartmentalized that it isn’t a leading cause of irrational behavior.
A while back, I found this study: pdf which tried to correlate performance on a test of cognitive biases with the likelihood of reporting a bunch of different real-world “bad decisions”, like having been in jail or default on a loan. They found some modest correlations after adjusting for SES and an IQ-proxy.
The quality of the society and the government.
“Every nation gets the government it deserves.”—Joseph de Maistre
What do you mean by “the quality of the society”? I worry that this will end up being a circular definition or something very like one.
(Some plausible definitions clearly don’t work. Imagine two societies with the exact same people, but in countries with very different natural resources. One may be much richer than the other as a result, leading to e.g. better healthcare, better education, less poverty, etc. So if those are part of what “the quality of the society” means then you’re basically declaring richer populations as more sane even if they’re composed of the same people.)
I do not propose my comment as a definition, I propose it as a finger pointing in the general direction of where you want to look.
Note that the original question (“What is a population measure of sanity?”) critically depends on the definition of “sanity” which is not at all obvious to start with.
I know; that’s why I said “I worry that this will end up being a circular definition [...]” rather than “I worry that this is”.
I took the original question to be partly asking for a definition of “sanity”.
Specifically, the sanity of a social group which is a bit different from the sanity of an individual.
One obvious approach is to measure it by the matching of the map and the territory, but that will make “sanity” very highly correlated with scientific and technological progress which probably not what we want.
I think this is likely.
But I also think you may be overestimating the “sanity water line” because there are lots of professed “rational” beliefs that people don’t actually believe.
I don’t know whether, on net, that will raise or lower the line.
Example?
Source.
I think a lot of people don’t really believe the scientific statements they profess. They know they are supposed to say that “F = ma”, for example, but then when you ask them to predict the movement of an object in space, they’ll do so based on their intuitive notion that objects slow down unless you keep pushing them. They know very well what the science says, but they don’t think it applies to reality. Or to give an example that frustrated me for many years, my father was a neuroscientist, whose day-to-day work relied in part on knowing the shapes of molecules, which of course relies on quantum physics. Yet he said, privately to me, said that quantum physics was all nonsense. He would never have said such a thing publicly, because it would have hurt his career.
Broadly speaking, I think the attitude in the quote is very widespread. The models, data, analysis and experience (‘Science’) say one thing, so they know they have to profess it. But people secretly believe the opposite, and will look to act on their true beliefs if given the chance. It’s not just science, religion too, but I don’t want to get into that.
I wonder how many of those “some economists” there really are. I know that, e.g., Paul Krugman, one of Cochrane’s leading ideological opponents, vigorously denies that all models, data and experience say fiscal stimulus doesn’t work. Cochrane’s response is to suggest, inter alia, that Krugman doesn’t really believe it either. I suppose he might be correct, but it seems more plausible to me that ideological differences are getting in the way of Cochrane having a good mental model of Krugman and other stimulus proponents. (In a similar way, many theists think, or say they think, that atheists really know that God is real and just don’t want to admit it, and many atheists think, or say they think, that theists really know that there are no gods and just don’t want to admit it.)
(Note: first link is to an NYT article; may be behind a paywall; if so, you can probably find it by searching for “Few economists saw our current crisis coming” and following the first link.)
My point was not to argue about fiscal stimulus. Indeed, if you deny that the models, data, etc, say that, then that is an intellectually respectable position, same as with any scientific dispute. But what is definitely not respectable, what is below the sanity waterline, is the attitude in the quote—that science says X, but I don’t believe it anyway.
And that is very widespread, in my experience.
I understand that your point wasn’t to argue about fiscal stimulus (and you will notice that no part of what I wrote was was arguing about fiscal stimulus, as opposed to about opinions about fiscal stimulus). I’m calling into question how often Cochrane has really heard people say what he describes, as opposed to less transparently irrational things that he interprets that way because he can’t or won’t believe that his ideological opponents really think as they say they do.
My mental model of Krugman is that he used to be smart scientist and then (I think consciously) decided that agitprop is really really important and that he will do more good by being a frontline fighter in ideological wars rather than a chief alchemist of an ivory tower. Unfortunately Krugman’s assumed role is not compatible with being a smart scientist...
In the case of economists there is also ideology and social signaling in play. You cannot be a member in good standing of the Blue Tribe if you don’t profess that more government spending solves problems :-/