If Putin “doesn’t care that much” about sanctions, isn’t it pretty stupid that the West is shooting themselves in the foot, and the developing world in the face, by still applying heavy sanctions?
Sanctions turned out to be pretty underwhelming. And surely, one can easily see that the portfolio of sanctions could be much more effective. Personally I think some sanctions are needed but much better thought through.
Maybe not, but better than not trying at all.
If you mean something like we tell Putin “If you do the referendum with the UN supervision and allow pro-Ukrainian people in Crimea to freely and publicly debate with pro-Russian people, then we would recognize Crimea as Russian if and only if after long debates people in Crimea still decide to be in Russia”. Then yeah, sure. Everybody would laugh themselves to death. But at least there’s no downside. On the other hand, if you mean something like stopping fighting after Putin promises to do a fair referendum you would just significantly increase chances of Ukraine ceasing to exist.
Even a long dragged out war doesn’t stop Russia from showing up again, with more firepower, in the future.
But that’s the whole point. A dragged out war steadily destroys Russian firepower and manpower. At the same time every Ukrainian child hit by a rocket makes the US send more firepower to Ukraine. Which acts as a counterbalance to the fundamental asymmetry between Russia and Ukraine. If you stop the fighting Russia will stop losing its army and Ukraine will get much less military aid.
But saying “I hope everything keeps going like it is going” is magical thinking—the war will end, and I think it makes more sense to reason about the end-state than to pretend it can keep going like this forever.
Let’s consider some strategies the US can use.
Just support Ukraine. At some point Ukraine probably goes “too far” and nukes may be used in Ukraine. At this point the US can either engage directly, continue support Ukraine or negotiate some kind of a deal for Ukraine. The first may start WW3. A deal would mean Putin wins. Continuing to support Ukraine would mean millions more dead. But it would be contained to Ukraine and Russia. And let’s say Putin would have payed his cost for invading Ukraine. If Ukraine doesn’t accept defeat after being nuked it would be the best deterrent to future uses of nuclear weapons since they don’t achieve the desired outcome of quick victory.
Calibrate military aid to make sure neither Ukraine nor Russia win. In theory you can prolong the war until either Putin dies or internal politics in Russia destabilizes after a couple million coffins are sent back from Ukraine. The obvious problem is that you can’t control how the war works precisely. Maybe you can ask Ukrainians to slow down a bit from time to time.
Make a peace deal. Putin repeats after a couple of years and wins.
As I said before if Putin wins chances of WW3 become too high.
Optimal strategies are either steady support no matter what (including nukes) or calibrated aid. I’m really anxious because I think the current policy is steady support but with direct engagement in case of nukes. I’m also afraid that fans of a peace deal prevail and we’ll still get a WW3, just a bit later.
I mean we can talk about unrealistic scenarios. You could easily solve the whole crisis by admitting Ukraine to NATO overnight with a condition that it recognizes 5 already annexed regions as Russian. But then again, unrealistic.
Then yeah, sure. Everybody would laugh themselves to death.
It’s not that simple. Nobody in the West is even in principle open to Crimea becoming Russian (and for good reason). So this wouldn’t be as ridiculous as you make it sound, especially given Putin’s rhetoric over the years and how salty he is about Kosovo.
But that’s the whole point. A dragged out war steadily destroys Russian firepower and manpower.
That’s one way of seeing it, but neither Russian firepower nor manpower should be thought of as a fixed finite resource. If Russia’s current strategy does not work, it would be idiotic for it to keep its current strategy, so it will adapt. We know that it is capable of doing so, see e.g. the withdrawal at Kiev. If Russia were fighting an existential war for survival and had already pulled all the stops, steadily destroying Russia would be a viable strategy. But Russia has no interest in being steadily destroyed, and still has plenty of ways it could escalate, especially when it comes to actions that hurt the West.
At some point Ukraine probably goes “too far” and nukes may be used in Ukraine. At this point the US can either engage directly, continue support Ukraine or negotiate some kind of a deal for Ukraine. The first may start WW3. A deal would mean Putin wins. Continuing to support Ukraine would mean millions more dead. But it would be contained to Ukraine and Russia.
I’m so confused. So the endgame you would like is that Russia nukes Ukraine, but Ukraine keeps fighting Russia (who has nukes, and is willing to use them). Does this keep going until there is no Ukranian left to fight, at which point the US just sends drones to Ukraine to keep fighting? Are Ukranians more willing to die for their country than Japan was in 1945?
But it would be contained to Ukraine and Russia.
It’s already not contained to Ukraine and Russia (see: the shattered remains of NS1 and NS2 on the sea floor), so even more magical thinking here. If Russia detonates a nuke in Ukraine, the best case is that absolute chaos breaks out in European cities.
Make a peace deal. Putin repeats after a couple of years and wins.
Why would he win in a few years if he cannot win now?
As I said before if Putin wins chances of WW3 become too high.
You really haven’t explained this reasoning? So Putin “wins”, and therefore decides to nuke Europe to celebrate?
You could easily solve the whole crisis by admitting Ukraine to NATO overnight with a condition that it recognizes 5 already annexed regions as Russian. But then again, unrealistic.
Russia would call that bluff the moment it was made.
If Russia’s current strategy does not work, it would be idiotic for it to keep its current strategy, so it will adapt.
This gave me an interesting thought. Either Putin thinks retreating is deadly for him or not. If he does he will keep sending more forces to be steadily destroyed. If he doesn’t retaking Crimea wouldn’t trigger nuclear response by default as he will hope to conquer it again later.
I’m so confused. So the endgame you would like is that Russia nukes Ukraine, but Ukraine keeps fighting Russia (who has nukes, and is willing to use them). Does this keep going until there is no Ukranian left to fight, at which point the US just sends drones to Ukraine to keep fighting? Are Ukranians more willing to die for their country than Japan was in 1945?
As I said in the comment above the perfect endgame is Putin no longer in power. But the price is artificially prolonging the conflict or increased nuclear risk in Ukraine. Which is why I said prolonging the conflict looks like a better option.
As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they’re much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945. Anecdotes first. I asked a Ukrainian yesterday what should Ukraine do if nuked. She said obviously keep fighting. I know more than one person who donated significant amounts of money to the army. A vibe I’m getting from many is victory at any cost. Ironically once I had difficulty convincing one Ukrainian why NATO can’t be more involved.
Polls say that only around 10% of Ukrainians think that Ukraine should hold peace talks with Russia. Even after conventional rocket showers 80+% say that Ukraine should keep fighting. Also Ukraine would in a different situation than Japan. If Putin orders a nuclear strike it would mean Ukraine is otherwise winning. So morale would be super-high among Ukrainians. Unlike losing Japan in 1945.
Another thing to consider is that the first use of nuclear weapons was a shock to everyone. Many Ukrainians understand the fact that they can be nuked. Though about 2⁄3 (according to another poll) still don’t believe Russia is capable of actually ordering a nuclear strike.
If you think about it Mariupol could be even worse than a nuclear explosion. Tens of thousands dead but waiting for their fate for many weeks without much water and food, hiding from bombs, seeing familiar faces lying dead on the streets, constantly being in terror. This didn’t stop Ukrainians.
There is a lesswrong post that describes a subtle way Russia destroys lives of its own people. Ukrainians understand it too well now and some are just plainly saying that they would rather die than live under Russian rule.
Seeing a mushroom cloud can easily change public opinion but it’s far from obvious that Ukraine would just give up.
So Putin “wins”, and therefore decides to nuke Europe to celebrate?
Well, the obvious historical analogy is there. And if you plot size (by some appropriate metric) of the wars Putin was involved in so far my guess is there would be something resembling an exponential curve.
In December 2021 Putin openly demanded that NATO returns all former Soviet republics to Russia. The legalese was very thinly veiled (removing all NATO forces from those countries). The implied threat was “or else I invade Ukraine”. NATO hadn’t budged. Putin went on to invade Ukraine. If one takes Putin’s words seriously one should treat this as an open declaration of his plans to get all former Soviet republics under his rule.
As I said in the comment above the perfect endgame is Putin no longer in power.
Not it isn’t, because there are alternatives that are worse than Putin. I hope there are alternatives to Putin that are both realistic and also better, but I haven’t seen much evidence for this coming out of Russia.
As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they’re much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945
Are you familiar with Japan pre 1945 at all? You have heard of kamikaze pilots at the very least, right? I will quote the Wikipedia article on them: “The tradition of death instead of defeat, capture, and shame was deeply entrenched in Japanese military culture; one of the primary values in the samurai life and the Bushido code was loyalty and honor until death”. Unless your argument is “Ukraine and its leaders are a death cult”, I’m going to respectfully ignore this point as “throwaway62… has no idea what they’re talking about”.
This didn’t stop Ukrainians.
Yes it did. Unless you’re living in a weird alternative history where Ukraine still controls Mariupol. Sure, Ukrainians in the West will wax poetic about how they will rather die than submit, but when push comes to shove one hopes that this kind of idiotic WWI-style nationalism will give way to cooler heads.
Ukrainians understand it too well now and some are just plainly saying that they would rather die than live under Russian rule.
the old lie: dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
The legalese was very thinly veiled (removing all NATO forces from those countries).
You’ve made a number of very questionable claims in your comment, so I think I’ll start winding down this conversation. Removing NATO forces from post-soviet countries is not “thinly veiled” legalese for returning Soviet republics to Russia, it’s not even close.
one should treat this as an open declaration of his plans
Words have meanings: is it “thinly veiled”, or is it “open”?
Unless you’re living in a weird alternative history where Ukraine still controls Mariupol.
You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don’t you? To restate—the siege of Mariupol didn’t stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine.
because there are alternatives that are worse than Putin
We’re afraid he may start a nuclear war. That’s pretty bad already. And he clearly gets worse with time. Yet you want to give him an opportunity to build a bigger army. To eventually give it to a successor who you think will be even worse.
the old lie: dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
Actions speak. I know Ukrainians who were hiding from military enlistment officers for years in relatively peaceful years. I tried to give them advice how to hide from mobilization during the invasion. But they just stopped hiding.
You’ve made a number of very questionable claims in your comment
I shared both strong and weak evidence. I didn’t initially think that it’s gonna be a debate… If I treated this like a debate I could say something like: “Putin never said that he’s gonna use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. On the contrary, he said he’s not going to use nukes in Ukraine. Therefore there’s nothing to worry about.” But I’m not saying it.
Look, the point is Putin lied so many times about not being involved in Ukraine. He lied about not intending to start a full scale invasion. Any proposed solution that relies on him promising to not invade again has very low probability of working.
You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don’t you? To restate—the siege of Mariupol didn’t stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine.
I don’t see what’s offensive, and I’m not twisting your words but pointing out something that’s almost obvious: IF you have no chance of winning THEN you should stop fighting. This was true in Mariupol, and is true for the rest of Ukraine also. The siege of Mariupol absolutely stopped Ukraine from defending Mariupol. The important question is whether the IF applies. But once it does, throwing away human life just to make a point strikes me as somewhat nihilistic.
We’re afraid he may start a nuclear war. That’s pretty bad already.
Yes, is there anyone who could lead Russia of whom you would not be afraid that they’d start a nuclear war?
Yet you want to give him an opportunity to build a bigger army. To eventually give it to a successor who you think will be even worse.
No I don’t “want” to “give” him anything, I’m just recognizing the realities of the situation, and noticing that what you’re describing could happen with or without Putin.
Any proposed solution that relies on him promising to not invade again has very low probability of working.
I agree. But this doesn’t mean that compromises can’t be worked out, see e.g. the Black sea grain deal.
Your if clause is somewhat of a false dichotomy. There are other reasons to keep fighting:
you might be fighting a rear action that you know you won’t win, but will allow the rest to escape
you might be bogging down an enemies strength to keep them from going somewhere else
you might be able to inflict enough damage on them to cause them to be ineffective in later battles
you might want to inspire others
you might care about glory
you might have nowhere else to go
you might just be nihilistic
you might have someone pointing a gun at your back to stop you from retreating
Most of these boil down to iterated games, rather than just a one off prisoner’s dilemma.
Mariupol is a tragedy. But it really didn’t stop Ukrainians from continuing the fight as long as they could. The reason they stopped was because they ran out of supplies. They also inflicted massive damage on their enemy. There is a lesson here.
Stories of last stands are powerful. A large bunch of inspiring stories are about doomed last stands—Thermopylae, Beowulf, Roland’s song, Westerplatte etc. We can argue about whether they were worth the suffering of the protagonists, whether it’s morally good, etc., but they work.
Yes, I agree, and my argument was an oversimplification. That said, I don’t think you’re properly considering its context. The context here is that if Ukraine were to be in a situation where it had no chance of winning the war (e.g. due to nuclear weapons being in play). Here is what I’m replying to:
As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they’re much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945. Anecdotes first. I asked a Ukrainian yesterday what should Ukraine do if nuked. She said obviously keep fighting.
Many of your examples (1-3, arguably 4) apply to individual local events/battles, or are hard to apply as-is to this context (6, 8).
There is a lesson here.
The lesson is that even the defenders of Mariupol eventually decided to stop fighting rather than to die. And those defenders were highly motivated, patriotic/nationalistic soldiers. I would expect and hope that the threshold for “normal” citizens is lower.
whether it’s morally good, etc., but they work.
Define “work”. They may “work” for an individual battle, but they tautologically don’t win the war. It’s telling that almost all of your examples are fictional or have unreliable (ancient) sources. I’ve never heard of a last-stand involving an entire army, and even completely crazy countries (WW2 Japan, Germany) capitulate eventually when faced with overwhelming firepower. And nuclear weapons are overwhelming firepower.
I’m not entirely convinced nukes are a “I win” button in this war. What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population? In that case, even full counter-value targeting of Ukraine with the full Russian atomic stockpile probably kills under a million people. I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren’t as cost-effective as precision weapons. That, in fact, NATO is entirely capable of supplying so much precision weaponry to Ukraine that it does more damage to combat units than the entire Russian tactical nuclear stockpile combined. My best-guess scenario for Russia using all their tactical nuclear weapons is that, between poor target info and poor maintanance of the Russia atomic stockpile, they at most render the Ukrainian Army 50% combat ineffective. That still isn’t enough to knock them out of the fight, and an influx of NATO weapons afterwards will stabilize the front.
I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren’t as cost-effective as precision weapons.
We still live in a world where all use of nuclear weapons is strategic.
What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population?
So what? the point of Russia using nukes is to signal that it will do whatever it takes to defeat Ukraine. The tactical effects are beside the point. It’s hard to predict what will happen exactly, but if a nuke gets used anywhere, there will be panic in every European city worse than the covid panic of 2020. The knock-on effects are debatable, but the ones that primarily affect this conflict will be the effects on the population in the West, who after all elect their leaders and therefore constrain them. I do not think there is an appetite for unlimited support of Ukraine, and I think the use of any nuke fundamentally changes the equation in a way that is very hard to predict. This is especially true if the nuke is used e.g. in the context of a nuclear test on Crimea.
But your discussion on tactical nukes misses an important point: Russia is so far not trying to exterminate Ukraine and its people. If it were willing to do so and use nukes, it could wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership in a way that goes for beyond “50% combat ineffective”. Armies needs supplies, working logistics, etc. If someone is reckless enough to start using nuclear weapons, I don’t think it’s safe to assume they will be prudent enough only to use them on military targets.
Biden’s statement was that using a tactical nuke would just result in increased weapons deliveries and expanding the range of delivered weapons and not doing other retaliation.
That was an available move because the tactical utility of the weapons is very low. India in particular and likely also China, do care about no nukes getting detonated and Russia could lose their support for donating tactical nukes.
I do not think there is an appetite for unlimited support of Ukraine, and I think the use of any nuke fundamentally changes the equation in a way that is very hard to predict.
While there’s no appetite for unlimited support, I think currently the biggest limit for support is cost. The Republicans who question support for Ukraine do it based on arguments about the cost of that support. If Russia detonates a tactical nuke, it becomes very hard for anyone to argue about cost, and the current opposition of part of the Republicans to support for Ukraine is essentially destroyed.
I’m saying that Russia can’t, in fact, “wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership” with nuclear weapons, at least not for long. Rails are made of hardened steel. Roads are made of asphalt. Neither can really be “knocked out” without being inside the fireball of a nuclear weapon. Russia can use its entire nuclear stockpile to seriously damage Ukrainian logistics for a while, but I don’t think their command structure can really take advantage of that, based off their recent performance. And trucks can still drive off-road. With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud, if that’s what it takes to get supplies to the front. As for leadership, they can disperse as well. With Starlink, they are entirely capable of directing operations from a corn field in either Poland or Ukraine. The Ukrainian command structure is also specifically built to survive decapitation strikes and interdiction of communication. Both NATO and PACT forces had detailed plans for fighting a total war after a strategic nuclear exchange. On the battlefield, nuclear weapons aren’t eschalogical, they’re just another weapon.
Also, Russia can’t exterminate the Ukrainian people with nuclear weapons, even if it uses its entire strategic stockpile there, especially if Ukraine disperses their population. It’s a matter of math, not will. If the people aren’t in cities, what is Russia going to target? A villiage of a few hundred with a strategic nuclear weapon? It’ll run out long before making a big dent on Ukrainian demographics.
So let’s say it’s mid 2023, Ukraine is pushing the Russians, and Russia conducts a nuclear test in Crimea. Ukraine responds by pausing operations for a week and dispersing its population. Then continues to drive into Crimea. What does Russia do then? Tactical nukes might slow things down, but only until they run out. Strategic weapons may result in conventional NATO retalliation and again can only do so much. Nuclear weapons can’t stop a dominant Ukrainian military if the political and military leadership stands firm, and based on what I’ve seen so far I think they will.
Something that sounds simple—“dispersing” your population—really comes with a huge cost. You can’t just send your population into the fields and expect them to live there.
And trucks can still drive off-road.
For which they require gasoline.
With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud
I don’t think this is accurate, Nato doesn’t just have a million trucks a month lying around somewhere to send.
If the people aren’t in cities, what is Russia going to target?
I don’t particularly enjoy playing this morbid game of guessing what Russia could do, but targeting things like dams, bridges, power-plants, and other infrastructure would do far more damage than you seem to acknowledge.
Then continues to drive into Crimea.
Do they drive through the water, or how does this work? I feel like your arguments prove to much. If Ukraine had it that easy, why haven’t they taken even Kherson yet?
Ukraine is recieving ~70% of its pre-war GDP in military aid alone. They’ve already sent much of their civilian population to the EU. If there’s a serious nuclear threat, population dispersal is simply a continuation of existing policies. The Germans can pick up the tab if nothing happens.
There are millions of civilian trucks in Europe. Yes, attrition rate will be high if they are used in a military context, but if nukes get dropped there are bigger things to worry about.
Russia knocking out dams, bridges, and power-plants doesn’t do much in the long-run. Sure, Ukrainian civilians won’t be operating with power, and hospitals won’t work, but those are small things in the context of nuclear war. The only major river in Ukraine is the Dnepier, and Russia is currently running a significant part of its supply lines through pontoons there right now. Nuking hospitals might kill a lot of people, but it doesn’t do much for the war effort.
As for Crimea, we’re talking about the context of Russia using nuclear weapons, which pre-supposes Ukraine being able to take Crimea. And I think they will, in time. Russia is currently only spending ~5% of its GDP on its military. Ukraine, when taking into account foreign military aid, is spending 90%+.
The Germans can pick up the tab if nothing happens.
We are at the point where German mainstream media is willing to write stories about how the people in Crimea are standing behind Putin. If you want to know where that media outlet is located on the political spectrum Wikipedia points out that it’s partly owned by the SPD which is the main party in Germany’s governing coalition.
Germany was never really willing to support Ukraine to retake Crimea. That’s why Ukraine got so little German support pre-2022 invasion.
The idea that Germany is willing to just spend tens of billions to support Ukraine seems very unrealistic to me.
Sanctions turned out to be pretty underwhelming. And surely, one can easily see that the portfolio of sanctions could be much more effective. Personally I think some sanctions are needed but much better thought through.
If you mean something like we tell Putin “If you do the referendum with the UN supervision and allow pro-Ukrainian people in Crimea to freely and publicly debate with pro-Russian people, then we would recognize Crimea as Russian if and only if after long debates people in Crimea still decide to be in Russia”. Then yeah, sure. Everybody would laugh themselves to death. But at least there’s no downside. On the other hand, if you mean something like stopping fighting after Putin promises to do a fair referendum you would just significantly increase chances of Ukraine ceasing to exist.
But that’s the whole point. A dragged out war steadily destroys Russian firepower and manpower. At the same time every Ukrainian child hit by a rocket makes the US send more firepower to Ukraine. Which acts as a counterbalance to the fundamental asymmetry between Russia and Ukraine. If you stop the fighting Russia will stop losing its army and Ukraine will get much less military aid.
Let’s consider some strategies the US can use.
Just support Ukraine. At some point Ukraine probably goes “too far” and nukes may be used in Ukraine. At this point the US can either engage directly, continue support Ukraine or negotiate some kind of a deal for Ukraine. The first may start WW3. A deal would mean Putin wins. Continuing to support Ukraine would mean millions more dead. But it would be contained to Ukraine and Russia. And let’s say Putin would have payed his cost for invading Ukraine. If Ukraine doesn’t accept defeat after being nuked it would be the best deterrent to future uses of nuclear weapons since they don’t achieve the desired outcome of quick victory.
Calibrate military aid to make sure neither Ukraine nor Russia win. In theory you can prolong the war until either Putin dies or internal politics in Russia destabilizes after a couple million coffins are sent back from Ukraine. The obvious problem is that you can’t control how the war works precisely. Maybe you can ask Ukrainians to slow down a bit from time to time.
Make a peace deal. Putin repeats after a couple of years and wins.
As I said before if Putin wins chances of WW3 become too high.
Optimal strategies are either steady support no matter what (including nukes) or calibrated aid. I’m really anxious because I think the current policy is steady support but with direct engagement in case of nukes. I’m also afraid that fans of a peace deal prevail and we’ll still get a WW3, just a bit later.
I mean we can talk about unrealistic scenarios. You could easily solve the whole crisis by admitting Ukraine to NATO overnight with a condition that it recognizes 5 already annexed regions as Russian. But then again, unrealistic.
It’s not that simple. Nobody in the West is even in principle open to Crimea becoming Russian (and for good reason). So this wouldn’t be as ridiculous as you make it sound, especially given Putin’s rhetoric over the years and how salty he is about Kosovo.
That’s one way of seeing it, but neither Russian firepower nor manpower should be thought of as a fixed finite resource. If Russia’s current strategy does not work, it would be idiotic for it to keep its current strategy, so it will adapt. We know that it is capable of doing so, see e.g. the withdrawal at Kiev. If Russia were fighting an existential war for survival and had already pulled all the stops, steadily destroying Russia would be a viable strategy. But Russia has no interest in being steadily destroyed, and still has plenty of ways it could escalate, especially when it comes to actions that hurt the West.
I’m so confused. So the endgame you would like is that Russia nukes Ukraine, but Ukraine keeps fighting Russia (who has nukes, and is willing to use them). Does this keep going until there is no Ukranian left to fight, at which point the US just sends drones to Ukraine to keep fighting? Are Ukranians more willing to die for their country than Japan was in 1945?
It’s already not contained to Ukraine and Russia (see: the shattered remains of NS1 and NS2 on the sea floor), so even more magical thinking here. If Russia detonates a nuke in Ukraine, the best case is that absolute chaos breaks out in European cities.
Why would he win in a few years if he cannot win now?
You really haven’t explained this reasoning? So Putin “wins”, and therefore decides to nuke Europe to celebrate?
Russia would call that bluff the moment it was made.
This gave me an interesting thought. Either Putin thinks retreating is deadly for him or not. If he does he will keep sending more forces to be steadily destroyed. If he doesn’t retaking Crimea wouldn’t trigger nuclear response by default as he will hope to conquer it again later.
As I said in the comment above the perfect endgame is Putin no longer in power. But the price is artificially prolonging the conflict or increased nuclear risk in Ukraine. Which is why I said prolonging the conflict looks like a better option.
As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they’re much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945. Anecdotes first. I asked a Ukrainian yesterday what should Ukraine do if nuked. She said obviously keep fighting. I know more than one person who donated significant amounts of money to the army. A vibe I’m getting from many is victory at any cost. Ironically once I had difficulty convincing one Ukrainian why NATO can’t be more involved.
Polls say that only around 10% of Ukrainians think that Ukraine should hold peace talks with Russia. Even after conventional rocket showers 80+% say that Ukraine should keep fighting. Also Ukraine would in a different situation than Japan. If Putin orders a nuclear strike it would mean Ukraine is otherwise winning. So morale would be super-high among Ukrainians. Unlike losing Japan in 1945.
Another thing to consider is that the first use of nuclear weapons was a shock to everyone. Many Ukrainians understand the fact that they can be nuked. Though about 2⁄3 (according to another poll) still don’t believe Russia is capable of actually ordering a nuclear strike.
If you think about it Mariupol could be even worse than a nuclear explosion. Tens of thousands dead but waiting for their fate for many weeks without much water and food, hiding from bombs, seeing familiar faces lying dead on the streets, constantly being in terror. This didn’t stop Ukrainians.
There is a lesswrong post that describes a subtle way Russia destroys lives of its own people. Ukrainians understand it too well now and some are just plainly saying that they would rather die than live under Russian rule.
Seeing a mushroom cloud can easily change public opinion but it’s far from obvious that Ukraine would just give up.
Well, the obvious historical analogy is there. And if you plot size (by some appropriate metric) of the wars Putin was involved in so far my guess is there would be something resembling an exponential curve.
In December 2021 Putin openly demanded that NATO returns all former Soviet republics to Russia. The legalese was very thinly veiled (removing all NATO forces from those countries). The implied threat was “or else I invade Ukraine”. NATO hadn’t budged. Putin went on to invade Ukraine. If one takes Putin’s words seriously one should treat this as an open declaration of his plans to get all former Soviet republics under his rule.
Not it isn’t, because there are alternatives that are worse than Putin. I hope there are alternatives to Putin that are both realistic and also better, but I haven’t seen much evidence for this coming out of Russia.
Are you familiar with Japan pre 1945 at all? You have heard of kamikaze pilots at the very least, right? I will quote the Wikipedia article on them: “The tradition of death instead of defeat, capture, and shame was deeply entrenched in Japanese military culture; one of the primary values in the samurai life and the Bushido code was loyalty and honor until death”. Unless your argument is “Ukraine and its leaders are a death cult”, I’m going to respectfully ignore this point as “throwaway62… has no idea what they’re talking about”.
Yes it did. Unless you’re living in a weird alternative history where Ukraine still controls Mariupol. Sure, Ukrainians in the West will wax poetic about how they will rather die than submit, but when push comes to shove one hopes that this kind of idiotic WWI-style nationalism will give way to cooler heads.
the old lie: dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
You’ve made a number of very questionable claims in your comment, so I think I’ll start winding down this conversation. Removing NATO forces from post-soviet countries is not “thinly veiled” legalese for returning Soviet republics to Russia, it’s not even close.
Words have meanings: is it “thinly veiled”, or is it “open”?
You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don’t you? To restate—the siege of Mariupol didn’t stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine.
We’re afraid he may start a nuclear war. That’s pretty bad already. And he clearly gets worse with time. Yet you want to give him an opportunity to build a bigger army. To eventually give it to a successor who you think will be even worse.
Actions speak. I know Ukrainians who were hiding from military enlistment officers for years in relatively peaceful years. I tried to give them advice how to hide from mobilization during the invasion. But they just stopped hiding.
I shared both strong and weak evidence. I didn’t initially think that it’s gonna be a debate… If I treated this like a debate I could say something like: “Putin never said that he’s gonna use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. On the contrary, he said he’s not going to use nukes in Ukraine. Therefore there’s nothing to worry about.” But I’m not saying it.
Look, the point is Putin lied so many times about not being involved in Ukraine. He lied about not intending to start a full scale invasion. Any proposed solution that relies on him promising to not invade again has very low probability of working.
I don’t see what’s offensive, and I’m not twisting your words but pointing out something that’s almost obvious: IF you have no chance of winning THEN you should stop fighting. This was true in Mariupol, and is true for the rest of Ukraine also. The siege of Mariupol absolutely stopped Ukraine from defending Mariupol. The important question is whether the IF applies. But once it does, throwing away human life just to make a point strikes me as somewhat nihilistic.
Yes, is there anyone who could lead Russia of whom you would not be afraid that they’d start a nuclear war?
No I don’t “want” to “give” him anything, I’m just recognizing the realities of the situation, and noticing that what you’re describing could happen with or without Putin.
I agree. But this doesn’t mean that compromises can’t be worked out, see e.g. the Black sea grain deal.
Your if clause is somewhat of a false dichotomy. There are other reasons to keep fighting:
you might be fighting a rear action that you know you won’t win, but will allow the rest to escape
you might be bogging down an enemies strength to keep them from going somewhere else
you might be able to inflict enough damage on them to cause them to be ineffective in later battles
you might want to inspire others
you might care about glory
you might have nowhere else to go
you might just be nihilistic
you might have someone pointing a gun at your back to stop you from retreating
Most of these boil down to iterated games, rather than just a one off prisoner’s dilemma.
Mariupol is a tragedy. But it really didn’t stop Ukrainians from continuing the fight as long as they could. The reason they stopped was because they ran out of supplies. They also inflicted massive damage on their enemy. There is a lesson here.
Stories of last stands are powerful. A large bunch of inspiring stories are about doomed last stands—Thermopylae, Beowulf, Roland’s song, Westerplatte etc. We can argue about whether they were worth the suffering of the protagonists, whether it’s morally good, etc., but they work.
Yes, I agree, and my argument was an oversimplification. That said, I don’t think you’re properly considering its context. The context here is that if Ukraine were to be in a situation where it had no chance of winning the war (e.g. due to nuclear weapons being in play). Here is what I’m replying to:
Many of your examples (1-3, arguably 4) apply to individual local events/battles, or are hard to apply as-is to this context (6, 8).
The lesson is that even the defenders of Mariupol eventually decided to stop fighting rather than to die. And those defenders were highly motivated, patriotic/nationalistic soldiers. I would expect and hope that the threshold for “normal” citizens is lower.
Define “work”. They may “work” for an individual battle, but they tautologically don’t win the war. It’s telling that almost all of your examples are fictional or have unreliable (ancient) sources. I’ve never heard of a last-stand involving an entire army, and even completely crazy countries (WW2 Japan, Germany) capitulate eventually when faced with overwhelming firepower. And nuclear weapons are overwhelming firepower.
I’m not entirely convinced nukes are a “I win” button in this war. What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population? In that case, even full counter-value targeting of Ukraine with the full Russian atomic stockpile probably kills under a million people. I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren’t as cost-effective as precision weapons. That, in fact, NATO is entirely capable of supplying so much precision weaponry to Ukraine that it does more damage to combat units than the entire Russian tactical nuclear stockpile combined. My best-guess scenario for Russia using all their tactical nuclear weapons is that, between poor target info and poor maintanance of the Russia atomic stockpile, they at most render the Ukrainian Army 50% combat ineffective. That still isn’t enough to knock them out of the fight, and an influx of NATO weapons afterwards will stabilize the front.
We still live in a world where all use of nuclear weapons is strategic.
So what? the point of Russia using nukes is to signal that it will do whatever it takes to defeat Ukraine. The tactical effects are beside the point. It’s hard to predict what will happen exactly, but if a nuke gets used anywhere, there will be panic in every European city worse than the covid panic of 2020. The knock-on effects are debatable, but the ones that primarily affect this conflict will be the effects on the population in the West, who after all elect their leaders and therefore constrain them. I do not think there is an appetite for unlimited support of Ukraine, and I think the use of any nuke fundamentally changes the equation in a way that is very hard to predict. This is especially true if the nuke is used e.g. in the context of a nuclear test on Crimea.
But your discussion on tactical nukes misses an important point: Russia is so far not trying to exterminate Ukraine and its people. If it were willing to do so and use nukes, it could wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership in a way that goes for beyond “50% combat ineffective”. Armies needs supplies, working logistics, etc. If someone is reckless enough to start using nuclear weapons, I don’t think it’s safe to assume they will be prudent enough only to use them on military targets.
Biden’s statement was that using a tactical nuke would just result in increased weapons deliveries and expanding the range of delivered weapons and not doing other retaliation.
That was an available move because the tactical utility of the weapons is very low. India in particular and likely also China, do care about no nukes getting detonated and Russia could lose their support for donating tactical nukes.
While there’s no appetite for unlimited support, I think currently the biggest limit for support is cost. The Republicans who question support for Ukraine do it based on arguments about the cost of that support. If Russia detonates a tactical nuke, it becomes very hard for anyone to argue about cost, and the current opposition of part of the Republicans to support for Ukraine is essentially destroyed.
I’m saying that Russia can’t, in fact, “wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership” with nuclear weapons, at least not for long. Rails are made of hardened steel. Roads are made of asphalt. Neither can really be “knocked out” without being inside the fireball of a nuclear weapon. Russia can use its entire nuclear stockpile to seriously damage Ukrainian logistics for a while, but I don’t think their command structure can really take advantage of that, based off their recent performance. And trucks can still drive off-road. With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud, if that’s what it takes to get supplies to the front. As for leadership, they can disperse as well. With Starlink, they are entirely capable of directing operations from a corn field in either Poland or Ukraine. The Ukrainian command structure is also specifically built to survive decapitation strikes and interdiction of communication. Both NATO and PACT forces had detailed plans for fighting a total war after a strategic nuclear exchange. On the battlefield, nuclear weapons aren’t eschalogical, they’re just another weapon.
Also, Russia can’t exterminate the Ukrainian people with nuclear weapons, even if it uses its entire strategic stockpile there, especially if Ukraine disperses their population. It’s a matter of math, not will. If the people aren’t in cities, what is Russia going to target? A villiage of a few hundred with a strategic nuclear weapon? It’ll run out long before making a big dent on Ukrainian demographics.
So let’s say it’s mid 2023, Ukraine is pushing the Russians, and Russia conducts a nuclear test in Crimea. Ukraine responds by pausing operations for a week and dispersing its population. Then continues to drive into Crimea. What does Russia do then? Tactical nukes might slow things down, but only until they run out. Strategic weapons may result in conventional NATO retalliation and again can only do so much. Nuclear weapons can’t stop a dominant Ukrainian military if the political and military leadership stands firm, and based on what I’ve seen so far I think they will.
Something that sounds simple—“dispersing” your population—really comes with a huge cost. You can’t just send your population into the fields and expect them to live there.
For which they require gasoline.
I don’t think this is accurate, Nato doesn’t just have a million trucks a month lying around somewhere to send.
I don’t particularly enjoy playing this morbid game of guessing what Russia could do, but targeting things like dams, bridges, power-plants, and other infrastructure would do far more damage than you seem to acknowledge.
Do they drive through the water, or how does this work? I feel like your arguments prove to much. If Ukraine had it that easy, why haven’t they taken even Kherson yet?
Ukraine is recieving ~70% of its pre-war GDP in military aid alone. They’ve already sent much of their civilian population to the EU. If there’s a serious nuclear threat, population dispersal is simply a continuation of existing policies. The Germans can pick up the tab if nothing happens.
There are millions of civilian trucks in Europe. Yes, attrition rate will be high if they are used in a military context, but if nukes get dropped there are bigger things to worry about.
Russia knocking out dams, bridges, and power-plants doesn’t do much in the long-run. Sure, Ukrainian civilians won’t be operating with power, and hospitals won’t work, but those are small things in the context of nuclear war. The only major river in Ukraine is the Dnepier, and Russia is currently running a significant part of its supply lines through pontoons there right now. Nuking hospitals might kill a lot of people, but it doesn’t do much for the war effort.
As for Crimea, we’re talking about the context of Russia using nuclear weapons, which pre-supposes Ukraine being able to take Crimea. And I think they will, in time. Russia is currently only spending ~5% of its GDP on its military. Ukraine, when taking into account foreign military aid, is spending 90%+.
We are at the point where German mainstream media is willing to write stories about how the people in Crimea are standing behind Putin. If you want to know where that media outlet is located on the political spectrum Wikipedia points out that it’s partly owned by the SPD which is the main party in Germany’s governing coalition.
Germany was never really willing to support Ukraine to retake Crimea. That’s why Ukraine got so little German support pre-2022 invasion.
The idea that Germany is willing to just spend tens of billions to support Ukraine seems very unrealistic to me.
If you look at German politics, I don’t think it’s that easy to just spend tens of billions in foreign aid.
And it would be a strong signal that NATO promises are worth nothing, which is bad for the Baltic states.