Unless you’re living in a weird alternative history where Ukraine still controls Mariupol.
You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don’t you? To restate—the siege of Mariupol didn’t stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine.
because there are alternatives that are worse than Putin
We’re afraid he may start a nuclear war. That’s pretty bad already. And he clearly gets worse with time. Yet you want to give him an opportunity to build a bigger army. To eventually give it to a successor who you think will be even worse.
the old lie: dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
Actions speak. I know Ukrainians who were hiding from military enlistment officers for years in relatively peaceful years. I tried to give them advice how to hide from mobilization during the invasion. But they just stopped hiding.
You’ve made a number of very questionable claims in your comment
I shared both strong and weak evidence. I didn’t initially think that it’s gonna be a debate… If I treated this like a debate I could say something like: “Putin never said that he’s gonna use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. On the contrary, he said he’s not going to use nukes in Ukraine. Therefore there’s nothing to worry about.” But I’m not saying it.
Look, the point is Putin lied so many times about not being involved in Ukraine. He lied about not intending to start a full scale invasion. Any proposed solution that relies on him promising to not invade again has very low probability of working.
You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don’t you? To restate—the siege of Mariupol didn’t stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine.
I don’t see what’s offensive, and I’m not twisting your words but pointing out something that’s almost obvious: IF you have no chance of winning THEN you should stop fighting. This was true in Mariupol, and is true for the rest of Ukraine also. The siege of Mariupol absolutely stopped Ukraine from defending Mariupol. The important question is whether the IF applies. But once it does, throwing away human life just to make a point strikes me as somewhat nihilistic.
We’re afraid he may start a nuclear war. That’s pretty bad already.
Yes, is there anyone who could lead Russia of whom you would not be afraid that they’d start a nuclear war?
Yet you want to give him an opportunity to build a bigger army. To eventually give it to a successor who you think will be even worse.
No I don’t “want” to “give” him anything, I’m just recognizing the realities of the situation, and noticing that what you’re describing could happen with or without Putin.
Any proposed solution that relies on him promising to not invade again has very low probability of working.
I agree. But this doesn’t mean that compromises can’t be worked out, see e.g. the Black sea grain deal.
Your if clause is somewhat of a false dichotomy. There are other reasons to keep fighting:
you might be fighting a rear action that you know you won’t win, but will allow the rest to escape
you might be bogging down an enemies strength to keep them from going somewhere else
you might be able to inflict enough damage on them to cause them to be ineffective in later battles
you might want to inspire others
you might care about glory
you might have nowhere else to go
you might just be nihilistic
you might have someone pointing a gun at your back to stop you from retreating
Most of these boil down to iterated games, rather than just a one off prisoner’s dilemma.
Mariupol is a tragedy. But it really didn’t stop Ukrainians from continuing the fight as long as they could. The reason they stopped was because they ran out of supplies. They also inflicted massive damage on their enemy. There is a lesson here.
Stories of last stands are powerful. A large bunch of inspiring stories are about doomed last stands—Thermopylae, Beowulf, Roland’s song, Westerplatte etc. We can argue about whether they were worth the suffering of the protagonists, whether it’s morally good, etc., but they work.
Yes, I agree, and my argument was an oversimplification. That said, I don’t think you’re properly considering its context. The context here is that if Ukraine were to be in a situation where it had no chance of winning the war (e.g. due to nuclear weapons being in play). Here is what I’m replying to:
As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they’re much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945. Anecdotes first. I asked a Ukrainian yesterday what should Ukraine do if nuked. She said obviously keep fighting.
Many of your examples (1-3, arguably 4) apply to individual local events/battles, or are hard to apply as-is to this context (6, 8).
There is a lesson here.
The lesson is that even the defenders of Mariupol eventually decided to stop fighting rather than to die. And those defenders were highly motivated, patriotic/nationalistic soldiers. I would expect and hope that the threshold for “normal” citizens is lower.
whether it’s morally good, etc., but they work.
Define “work”. They may “work” for an individual battle, but they tautologically don’t win the war. It’s telling that almost all of your examples are fictional or have unreliable (ancient) sources. I’ve never heard of a last-stand involving an entire army, and even completely crazy countries (WW2 Japan, Germany) capitulate eventually when faced with overwhelming firepower. And nuclear weapons are overwhelming firepower.
I’m not entirely convinced nukes are a “I win” button in this war. What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population? In that case, even full counter-value targeting of Ukraine with the full Russian atomic stockpile probably kills under a million people. I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren’t as cost-effective as precision weapons. That, in fact, NATO is entirely capable of supplying so much precision weaponry to Ukraine that it does more damage to combat units than the entire Russian tactical nuclear stockpile combined. My best-guess scenario for Russia using all their tactical nuclear weapons is that, between poor target info and poor maintanance of the Russia atomic stockpile, they at most render the Ukrainian Army 50% combat ineffective. That still isn’t enough to knock them out of the fight, and an influx of NATO weapons afterwards will stabilize the front.
I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren’t as cost-effective as precision weapons.
We still live in a world where all use of nuclear weapons is strategic.
What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population?
So what? the point of Russia using nukes is to signal that it will do whatever it takes to defeat Ukraine. The tactical effects are beside the point. It’s hard to predict what will happen exactly, but if a nuke gets used anywhere, there will be panic in every European city worse than the covid panic of 2020. The knock-on effects are debatable, but the ones that primarily affect this conflict will be the effects on the population in the West, who after all elect their leaders and therefore constrain them. I do not think there is an appetite for unlimited support of Ukraine, and I think the use of any nuke fundamentally changes the equation in a way that is very hard to predict. This is especially true if the nuke is used e.g. in the context of a nuclear test on Crimea.
But your discussion on tactical nukes misses an important point: Russia is so far not trying to exterminate Ukraine and its people. If it were willing to do so and use nukes, it could wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership in a way that goes for beyond “50% combat ineffective”. Armies needs supplies, working logistics, etc. If someone is reckless enough to start using nuclear weapons, I don’t think it’s safe to assume they will be prudent enough only to use them on military targets.
Biden’s statement was that using a tactical nuke would just result in increased weapons deliveries and expanding the range of delivered weapons and not doing other retaliation.
That was an available move because the tactical utility of the weapons is very low. India in particular and likely also China, do care about no nukes getting detonated and Russia could lose their support for donating tactical nukes.
I do not think there is an appetite for unlimited support of Ukraine, and I think the use of any nuke fundamentally changes the equation in a way that is very hard to predict.
While there’s no appetite for unlimited support, I think currently the biggest limit for support is cost. The Republicans who question support for Ukraine do it based on arguments about the cost of that support. If Russia detonates a tactical nuke, it becomes very hard for anyone to argue about cost, and the current opposition of part of the Republicans to support for Ukraine is essentially destroyed.
I’m saying that Russia can’t, in fact, “wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership” with nuclear weapons, at least not for long. Rails are made of hardened steel. Roads are made of asphalt. Neither can really be “knocked out” without being inside the fireball of a nuclear weapon. Russia can use its entire nuclear stockpile to seriously damage Ukrainian logistics for a while, but I don’t think their command structure can really take advantage of that, based off their recent performance. And trucks can still drive off-road. With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud, if that’s what it takes to get supplies to the front. As for leadership, they can disperse as well. With Starlink, they are entirely capable of directing operations from a corn field in either Poland or Ukraine. The Ukrainian command structure is also specifically built to survive decapitation strikes and interdiction of communication. Both NATO and PACT forces had detailed plans for fighting a total war after a strategic nuclear exchange. On the battlefield, nuclear weapons aren’t eschalogical, they’re just another weapon.
Also, Russia can’t exterminate the Ukrainian people with nuclear weapons, even if it uses its entire strategic stockpile there, especially if Ukraine disperses their population. It’s a matter of math, not will. If the people aren’t in cities, what is Russia going to target? A villiage of a few hundred with a strategic nuclear weapon? It’ll run out long before making a big dent on Ukrainian demographics.
So let’s say it’s mid 2023, Ukraine is pushing the Russians, and Russia conducts a nuclear test in Crimea. Ukraine responds by pausing operations for a week and dispersing its population. Then continues to drive into Crimea. What does Russia do then? Tactical nukes might slow things down, but only until they run out. Strategic weapons may result in conventional NATO retalliation and again can only do so much. Nuclear weapons can’t stop a dominant Ukrainian military if the political and military leadership stands firm, and based on what I’ve seen so far I think they will.
Something that sounds simple—“dispersing” your population—really comes with a huge cost. You can’t just send your population into the fields and expect them to live there.
And trucks can still drive off-road.
For which they require gasoline.
With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud
I don’t think this is accurate, Nato doesn’t just have a million trucks a month lying around somewhere to send.
If the people aren’t in cities, what is Russia going to target?
I don’t particularly enjoy playing this morbid game of guessing what Russia could do, but targeting things like dams, bridges, power-plants, and other infrastructure would do far more damage than you seem to acknowledge.
Then continues to drive into Crimea.
Do they drive through the water, or how does this work? I feel like your arguments prove to much. If Ukraine had it that easy, why haven’t they taken even Kherson yet?
Ukraine is recieving ~70% of its pre-war GDP in military aid alone. They’ve already sent much of their civilian population to the EU. If there’s a serious nuclear threat, population dispersal is simply a continuation of existing policies. The Germans can pick up the tab if nothing happens.
There are millions of civilian trucks in Europe. Yes, attrition rate will be high if they are used in a military context, but if nukes get dropped there are bigger things to worry about.
Russia knocking out dams, bridges, and power-plants doesn’t do much in the long-run. Sure, Ukrainian civilians won’t be operating with power, and hospitals won’t work, but those are small things in the context of nuclear war. The only major river in Ukraine is the Dnepier, and Russia is currently running a significant part of its supply lines through pontoons there right now. Nuking hospitals might kill a lot of people, but it doesn’t do much for the war effort.
As for Crimea, we’re talking about the context of Russia using nuclear weapons, which pre-supposes Ukraine being able to take Crimea. And I think they will, in time. Russia is currently only spending ~5% of its GDP on its military. Ukraine, when taking into account foreign military aid, is spending 90%+.
The Germans can pick up the tab if nothing happens.
We are at the point where German mainstream media is willing to write stories about how the people in Crimea are standing behind Putin. If you want to know where that media outlet is located on the political spectrum Wikipedia points out that it’s partly owned by the SPD which is the main party in Germany’s governing coalition.
Germany was never really willing to support Ukraine to retake Crimea. That’s why Ukraine got so little German support pre-2022 invasion.
The idea that Germany is willing to just spend tens of billions to support Ukraine seems very unrealistic to me.
You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don’t you? To restate—the siege of Mariupol didn’t stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine.
We’re afraid he may start a nuclear war. That’s pretty bad already. And he clearly gets worse with time. Yet you want to give him an opportunity to build a bigger army. To eventually give it to a successor who you think will be even worse.
Actions speak. I know Ukrainians who were hiding from military enlistment officers for years in relatively peaceful years. I tried to give them advice how to hide from mobilization during the invasion. But they just stopped hiding.
I shared both strong and weak evidence. I didn’t initially think that it’s gonna be a debate… If I treated this like a debate I could say something like: “Putin never said that he’s gonna use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. On the contrary, he said he’s not going to use nukes in Ukraine. Therefore there’s nothing to worry about.” But I’m not saying it.
Look, the point is Putin lied so many times about not being involved in Ukraine. He lied about not intending to start a full scale invasion. Any proposed solution that relies on him promising to not invade again has very low probability of working.
I don’t see what’s offensive, and I’m not twisting your words but pointing out something that’s almost obvious: IF you have no chance of winning THEN you should stop fighting. This was true in Mariupol, and is true for the rest of Ukraine also. The siege of Mariupol absolutely stopped Ukraine from defending Mariupol. The important question is whether the IF applies. But once it does, throwing away human life just to make a point strikes me as somewhat nihilistic.
Yes, is there anyone who could lead Russia of whom you would not be afraid that they’d start a nuclear war?
No I don’t “want” to “give” him anything, I’m just recognizing the realities of the situation, and noticing that what you’re describing could happen with or without Putin.
I agree. But this doesn’t mean that compromises can’t be worked out, see e.g. the Black sea grain deal.
Your if clause is somewhat of a false dichotomy. There are other reasons to keep fighting:
you might be fighting a rear action that you know you won’t win, but will allow the rest to escape
you might be bogging down an enemies strength to keep them from going somewhere else
you might be able to inflict enough damage on them to cause them to be ineffective in later battles
you might want to inspire others
you might care about glory
you might have nowhere else to go
you might just be nihilistic
you might have someone pointing a gun at your back to stop you from retreating
Most of these boil down to iterated games, rather than just a one off prisoner’s dilemma.
Mariupol is a tragedy. But it really didn’t stop Ukrainians from continuing the fight as long as they could. The reason they stopped was because they ran out of supplies. They also inflicted massive damage on their enemy. There is a lesson here.
Stories of last stands are powerful. A large bunch of inspiring stories are about doomed last stands—Thermopylae, Beowulf, Roland’s song, Westerplatte etc. We can argue about whether they were worth the suffering of the protagonists, whether it’s morally good, etc., but they work.
Yes, I agree, and my argument was an oversimplification. That said, I don’t think you’re properly considering its context. The context here is that if Ukraine were to be in a situation where it had no chance of winning the war (e.g. due to nuclear weapons being in play). Here is what I’m replying to:
Many of your examples (1-3, arguably 4) apply to individual local events/battles, or are hard to apply as-is to this context (6, 8).
The lesson is that even the defenders of Mariupol eventually decided to stop fighting rather than to die. And those defenders were highly motivated, patriotic/nationalistic soldiers. I would expect and hope that the threshold for “normal” citizens is lower.
Define “work”. They may “work” for an individual battle, but they tautologically don’t win the war. It’s telling that almost all of your examples are fictional or have unreliable (ancient) sources. I’ve never heard of a last-stand involving an entire army, and even completely crazy countries (WW2 Japan, Germany) capitulate eventually when faced with overwhelming firepower. And nuclear weapons are overwhelming firepower.
I’m not entirely convinced nukes are a “I win” button in this war. What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population? In that case, even full counter-value targeting of Ukraine with the full Russian atomic stockpile probably kills under a million people. I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren’t as cost-effective as precision weapons. That, in fact, NATO is entirely capable of supplying so much precision weaponry to Ukraine that it does more damage to combat units than the entire Russian tactical nuclear stockpile combined. My best-guess scenario for Russia using all their tactical nuclear weapons is that, between poor target info and poor maintanance of the Russia atomic stockpile, they at most render the Ukrainian Army 50% combat ineffective. That still isn’t enough to knock them out of the fight, and an influx of NATO weapons afterwards will stabilize the front.
We still live in a world where all use of nuclear weapons is strategic.
So what? the point of Russia using nukes is to signal that it will do whatever it takes to defeat Ukraine. The tactical effects are beside the point. It’s hard to predict what will happen exactly, but if a nuke gets used anywhere, there will be panic in every European city worse than the covid panic of 2020. The knock-on effects are debatable, but the ones that primarily affect this conflict will be the effects on the population in the West, who after all elect their leaders and therefore constrain them. I do not think there is an appetite for unlimited support of Ukraine, and I think the use of any nuke fundamentally changes the equation in a way that is very hard to predict. This is especially true if the nuke is used e.g. in the context of a nuclear test on Crimea.
But your discussion on tactical nukes misses an important point: Russia is so far not trying to exterminate Ukraine and its people. If it were willing to do so and use nukes, it could wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership in a way that goes for beyond “50% combat ineffective”. Armies needs supplies, working logistics, etc. If someone is reckless enough to start using nuclear weapons, I don’t think it’s safe to assume they will be prudent enough only to use them on military targets.
Biden’s statement was that using a tactical nuke would just result in increased weapons deliveries and expanding the range of delivered weapons and not doing other retaliation.
That was an available move because the tactical utility of the weapons is very low. India in particular and likely also China, do care about no nukes getting detonated and Russia could lose their support for donating tactical nukes.
While there’s no appetite for unlimited support, I think currently the biggest limit for support is cost. The Republicans who question support for Ukraine do it based on arguments about the cost of that support. If Russia detonates a tactical nuke, it becomes very hard for anyone to argue about cost, and the current opposition of part of the Republicans to support for Ukraine is essentially destroyed.
I’m saying that Russia can’t, in fact, “wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership” with nuclear weapons, at least not for long. Rails are made of hardened steel. Roads are made of asphalt. Neither can really be “knocked out” without being inside the fireball of a nuclear weapon. Russia can use its entire nuclear stockpile to seriously damage Ukrainian logistics for a while, but I don’t think their command structure can really take advantage of that, based off their recent performance. And trucks can still drive off-road. With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud, if that’s what it takes to get supplies to the front. As for leadership, they can disperse as well. With Starlink, they are entirely capable of directing operations from a corn field in either Poland or Ukraine. The Ukrainian command structure is also specifically built to survive decapitation strikes and interdiction of communication. Both NATO and PACT forces had detailed plans for fighting a total war after a strategic nuclear exchange. On the battlefield, nuclear weapons aren’t eschalogical, they’re just another weapon.
Also, Russia can’t exterminate the Ukrainian people with nuclear weapons, even if it uses its entire strategic stockpile there, especially if Ukraine disperses their population. It’s a matter of math, not will. If the people aren’t in cities, what is Russia going to target? A villiage of a few hundred with a strategic nuclear weapon? It’ll run out long before making a big dent on Ukrainian demographics.
So let’s say it’s mid 2023, Ukraine is pushing the Russians, and Russia conducts a nuclear test in Crimea. Ukraine responds by pausing operations for a week and dispersing its population. Then continues to drive into Crimea. What does Russia do then? Tactical nukes might slow things down, but only until they run out. Strategic weapons may result in conventional NATO retalliation and again can only do so much. Nuclear weapons can’t stop a dominant Ukrainian military if the political and military leadership stands firm, and based on what I’ve seen so far I think they will.
Something that sounds simple—“dispersing” your population—really comes with a huge cost. You can’t just send your population into the fields and expect them to live there.
For which they require gasoline.
I don’t think this is accurate, Nato doesn’t just have a million trucks a month lying around somewhere to send.
I don’t particularly enjoy playing this morbid game of guessing what Russia could do, but targeting things like dams, bridges, power-plants, and other infrastructure would do far more damage than you seem to acknowledge.
Do they drive through the water, or how does this work? I feel like your arguments prove to much. If Ukraine had it that easy, why haven’t they taken even Kherson yet?
Ukraine is recieving ~70% of its pre-war GDP in military aid alone. They’ve already sent much of their civilian population to the EU. If there’s a serious nuclear threat, population dispersal is simply a continuation of existing policies. The Germans can pick up the tab if nothing happens.
There are millions of civilian trucks in Europe. Yes, attrition rate will be high if they are used in a military context, but if nukes get dropped there are bigger things to worry about.
Russia knocking out dams, bridges, and power-plants doesn’t do much in the long-run. Sure, Ukrainian civilians won’t be operating with power, and hospitals won’t work, but those are small things in the context of nuclear war. The only major river in Ukraine is the Dnepier, and Russia is currently running a significant part of its supply lines through pontoons there right now. Nuking hospitals might kill a lot of people, but it doesn’t do much for the war effort.
As for Crimea, we’re talking about the context of Russia using nuclear weapons, which pre-supposes Ukraine being able to take Crimea. And I think they will, in time. Russia is currently only spending ~5% of its GDP on its military. Ukraine, when taking into account foreign military aid, is spending 90%+.
We are at the point where German mainstream media is willing to write stories about how the people in Crimea are standing behind Putin. If you want to know where that media outlet is located on the political spectrum Wikipedia points out that it’s partly owned by the SPD which is the main party in Germany’s governing coalition.
Germany was never really willing to support Ukraine to retake Crimea. That’s why Ukraine got so little German support pre-2022 invasion.
The idea that Germany is willing to just spend tens of billions to support Ukraine seems very unrealistic to me.
If you look at German politics, I don’t think it’s that easy to just spend tens of billions in foreign aid.