So when I hear a claim that “subjective experience” and “qualia” are divorced from any and all behavior or functionality in the mind
I don’t think that Chalmers would claim that they are. He’s only saying that there doesn’t seem to be any obvious logical reason for why someone would need to have subjective experience, and that it needs to be explained why we seem to have subjective experience anyway.
When you say:
The more I think about qualia, the more I feel like the only meaning I can find in any of my subjective experiences is in how they relate to everything else in my head.
Then one could answer “but why couldn’t a computer system just have this enum-like system that had all the properties which match your subjective experience, without having that subjective experience?”
Note that this is not claiming that your subjective experiences wouldn’t be related to the behavior and functionality of your mind. They obviously are! But that doesn’t explain why they are.
Hmm, you did notice a point where I sorta simplified Chalmers to get the post done.
Then one could answer “but why couldn’t a computer system just have this enum-like system that had all the properties which match your subjective experience, without having that subjective experience?”
This is near a question I do think is interesting. I’m starting to think there’s a sliding scale of “amount of subjective experience” a thing can have. And I am very curious about “what sorts of things will and won’t have X amount of subjective experience”.
I guess my beef is that when it’s framed as “But why does XYZ system entail qualia?” I infer that even if in the far future I had a SUPER detailed understanding of “tweak this and you get X more units of experience, if you don’t have ABC any experience is impossible, LMN architecture is really helpful, but not necessary” that Chalmers would still be unimpressed and got “But why does any of this lead to qualia?”
Well, I don’t actually think he’d say that. If I had that sorta detailed outline I think his mind would be blown and he’d be super excited.
But when I imagine the person who is still going “But why”, I’m imagining that they must be thinking of qualia is this isolated, other, and separate thing.
I guess my beef is that when it’s framed as “But why does XYZ system entail qualia?” I infer that even if in the far future I had a SUPER detailed understanding of “tweak this and you get X more units of experience, if you don’t have ABC any experience is impossible, LMN architecture is really helpful, but not necessary” that Chalmers would still be unimpressed and got “But why does any of this lead to qualia?”
How do you argue that no physical explanation, even an unknown future one, could explain qualia?
Chalmers has an argument of that sort. He is not just knee jerking. He characterises all physical explanations as being about structure and function. He thinks qualia are not susceptible to structural and funcitonal explanation (not “isolated” or “separate”).
I guess my beef is that when it’s framed as “But why does XYZ system entail qualia?” I infer that even if in the far future I had a SUPER detailed understanding of “tweak this and you get X more units of experience, if you don’t have ABC any experience is impossible, LMN architecture is really helpful, but not necessary” that Chalmers would still be unimpressed and got “But why does any of this lead to qualia?”
Well, I don’t actually think he’d say that. If I had that sorta detailed outline I think his mind would be blown and he’d be super excited.
But when I imagine the person who is still going “But why”, I’m imagining that they must be thinking of qualia is this isolated, other, and separate thing.
It’s a little unclear from this description whether that understanding would actually solve the hard problem or not? Like, if we have a solution for it, then it would obviously be silly for someone to still say “but why”; but if that understanding actually doesn’t solve the problem, then it doesn’t seem particularly silly to continue asking the question. Whether or not asking it in that situation implies believing that qualia must be divorced from everything else—I couldn’t tell without actually seeing an explanation of that understanding.
I don’t think that Chalmers would claim that they are. He’s only saying that there doesn’t seem to be any obvious logical reason for why someone would need to have subjective experience, and that it needs to be explained why we seem to have subjective experience anyway.
When you say:
Then one could answer “but why couldn’t a computer system just have this enum-like system that had all the properties which match your subjective experience, without having that subjective experience?”
Note that this is not claiming that your subjective experiences wouldn’t be related to the behavior and functionality of your mind. They obviously are! But that doesn’t explain why they are.
Hmm, you did notice a point where I sorta simplified Chalmers to get the post done.
This is near a question I do think is interesting. I’m starting to think there’s a sliding scale of “amount of subjective experience” a thing can have. And I am very curious about “what sorts of things will and won’t have X amount of subjective experience”.
I guess my beef is that when it’s framed as “But why does XYZ system entail qualia?” I infer that even if in the far future I had a SUPER detailed understanding of “tweak this and you get X more units of experience, if you don’t have ABC any experience is impossible, LMN architecture is really helpful, but not necessary” that Chalmers would still be unimpressed and got “But why does any of this lead to qualia?”
Well, I don’t actually think he’d say that. If I had that sorta detailed outline I think his mind would be blown and he’d be super excited.
But when I imagine the person who is still going “But why”, I’m imagining that they must be thinking of qualia is this isolated, other, and separate thing.
How do you argue that no physical explanation, even an unknown future one, could explain qualia?
Chalmers has an argument of that sort. He is not just knee jerking. He characterises all physical explanations as being about structure and function. He thinks qualia are not susceptible to structural and funcitonal explanation (not “isolated” or “separate”).
It’s a little unclear from this description whether that understanding would actually solve the hard problem or not? Like, if we have a solution for it, then it would obviously be silly for someone to still say “but why”; but if that understanding actually doesn’t solve the problem, then it doesn’t seem particularly silly to continue asking the question. Whether or not asking it in that situation implies believing that qualia must be divorced from everything else—I couldn’t tell without actually seeing an explanation of that understanding.