I guess my beef is that when it’s framed as “But why does XYZ system entail qualia?” I infer that even if in the far future I had a SUPER detailed understanding of “tweak this and you get X more units of experience, if you don’t have ABC any experience is impossible, LMN architecture is really helpful, but not necessary” that Chalmers would still be unimpressed and got “But why does any of this lead to qualia?”
How do you argue that no physical explanation, even an unknown future one, could explain qualia?
Chalmers has an argument of that sort. He is not just knee jerking. He characterises all physical explanations as being about structure and function. He thinks qualia are not susceptible to structural and funcitonal explanation (not “isolated” or “separate”).
How do you argue that no physical explanation, even an unknown future one, could explain qualia?
Chalmers has an argument of that sort. He is not just knee jerking. He characterises all physical explanations as being about structure and function. He thinks qualia are not susceptible to structural and funcitonal explanation (not “isolated” or “separate”).