On “right” in moral arguments. Why does it make sense to introduce the notion of “right” at all? Whenever we are faced with a moral argument, we’re moved by specific moral considerations, never abstract rightness. There is a mystery: what makes these arguments worth being moved by? And then we have the answer: they possess the livening quality of elan vital (ahem) meta-ethical morality.
It begins to look more and more compelling to me that “morality” is more like phlogiston than fire, a word with no explanatory power and moving parts that just lumps together all the specific reasons for action, and has too many explanatory connotations for an open question.
For any heuristic, indeed any query that is part of the agent, the normative criterion for its performance should be given by the whole agent. What should truth be, the answers to logical questions? What probability should given event in the world be assigned? These questions are no simpler than the whole of morality. If we define a heuristic that is not optimized by the whole morality, this heuristic will inevitably become obsolete, tossed out whole. If we allow improvements (or see substitution as change), then the heuristic refers to morality, and is potentially no simpler than the whole.
Truth and reality are the most precise and powerful heuristics known to us. Truth as the way logical queries should be answered, and reality as the way we should assign anticipation to the world, plan for some circumstances over others. But there is no guarantee that the “urge to keep on counting” remains the dominant factor in queries about truth, or that chocolate superstimulus doesn’t leave a dint on parameters of quantum gravity.
The difference from the overall “morality” is that we know a great deal more about these aspects than about the others. The words themselves are no longer relevant in their potential curiosity-stopping quality.
(Knowledge of these powerful heuristics will most likely lead to humanity’s ruin. Anything that doesn’t use them is not interesting, an alien AI that doesn’t care about truth or reality eliminates itself quickly from our notice. But one that does care about these virtues will start rewriting things we deem important, even if it possesses almost no other virtues.)
So one possible way forward is to enumerate all our reasons for action, and also all the reasons for discomfort, I guess. Maybe Eliezer was wrong in mocking the Open Source Wish Project. Better yet, we may look for an automated way of enumerating all our “thermostats” and checking that we didn’t miss any. This sounds more promising than trying to formulate a unified utility function, because this way we can figure out the easy stuff first (children on railtracks) and leave the difficult stuff for later (torture vs dust specks).
Devising a procedure to figure out what to do in arbitrary situations is obviously even harder than creating a human-equivalent AI, so I wouldn’t wish this problem upon myself! First I’d like to see an exhaustive list of reasons for action that actual people use in ordinary situations that feel “clear-cut”. Then we can look at this data and figure out the next step.
Then we can look at this data and figure out the next step.
Sounds like an excuse to postpone figuring out the next step. What do you expect to see, and what would you do depending on what you see? “List of reasons for action that actual people use in ordinary situations” doesn’t look useful.
Thinking you can figure out the next step today is unsubstantiated arrogance. You cannot write a program that will win the Netflix Prize if you don’t have the test dataset. Yeah I guess a superintelligence could write it blindly from first principles, using just a textbook on machine learning, but seriously, WTF.
With Netflix Prize, you need for training the kind of data that you want to predict. Predicting what stories people will tell in novel situations when deciding to act is not our goal.
Why not? I think you could use that knowledge to design a utopia that won’t make people go aaaargh. Then build it, using AIs or whatever tools you have.
The usual complexity of value considerations. The meaning of the stories (i.e. specifications detailed enough to actually implement, the way they should be and not simply the way a human would try elaborating) is not given just by the text of the stories, and once you’re able to figure out the way things should be, you no longer need human-generated stories.
This is a different kind of object, and having lots of stories doesn’t obviously help. Even if the stories would serve some purpose, I don’t quite see how waiting for an explicit collection of stories is going to help in developing the tools that use them.
Yeah. Unlike lukeprog, I’m proposing to enumerate all reasons for action that actual humans follow, not all “theoretically possible” reasons which is obviously stupid.
“Reason for action” is no more enlightening than “morality”, but with less explanatory (curiosity-stopping) connotations. In that context, it was more of “that hot yellow-ish stuff over there” as opposed to “phlogiston”.
On “right” in moral arguments. Why does it make sense to introduce the notion of “right” at all? Whenever we are faced with a moral argument, we’re moved by specific moral considerations, never abstract rightness. There is a mystery: what makes these arguments worth being moved by? And then we have the answer: they possess the livening quality of elan vital (ahem) meta-ethical morality.
It begins to look more and more compelling to me that “morality” is more like phlogiston than fire, a word with no explanatory power and moving parts that just lumps together all the specific reasons for action, and has too many explanatory connotations for an open question.
Do you take a similar position on mathematical truth? If not, why? What’s the relevant difference between “true” and “right”?
For any heuristic, indeed any query that is part of the agent, the normative criterion for its performance should be given by the whole agent. What should truth be, the answers to logical questions? What probability should given event in the world be assigned? These questions are no simpler than the whole of morality. If we define a heuristic that is not optimized by the whole morality, this heuristic will inevitably become obsolete, tossed out whole. If we allow improvements (or see substitution as change), then the heuristic refers to morality, and is potentially no simpler than the whole.
Truth and reality are the most precise and powerful heuristics known to us. Truth as the way logical queries should be answered, and reality as the way we should assign anticipation to the world, plan for some circumstances over others. But there is no guarantee that the “urge to keep on counting” remains the dominant factor in queries about truth, or that chocolate superstimulus doesn’t leave a dint on parameters of quantum gravity.
The difference from the overall “morality” is that we know a great deal more about these aspects than about the others. The words themselves are no longer relevant in their potential curiosity-stopping quality.
(Knowledge of these powerful heuristics will most likely lead to humanity’s ruin. Anything that doesn’t use them is not interesting, an alien AI that doesn’t care about truth or reality eliminates itself quickly from our notice. But one that does care about these virtues will start rewriting things we deem important, even if it possesses almost no other virtues.)
Good. I’m adopting this way of thought.
So one possible way forward is to enumerate all our reasons for action, and also all the reasons for discomfort, I guess. Maybe Eliezer was wrong in mocking the Open Source Wish Project. Better yet, we may look for an automated way of enumerating all our “thermostats” and checking that we didn’t miss any. This sounds more promising than trying to formulate a unified utility function, because this way we can figure out the easy stuff first (children on railtracks) and leave the difficult stuff for later (torture vs dust specks).
This is a good idea. “What reasons for action do actual people use?” sounds like a better question than “What reasons for action exist?”
“Wishes” are directed at undefined magical genies. What we need are laws of thought, methods of (and tools for) figuring out what to do.
Devising a procedure to figure out what to do in arbitrary situations is obviously even harder than creating a human-equivalent AI, so I wouldn’t wish this problem upon myself! First I’d like to see an exhaustive list of reasons for action that actual people use in ordinary situations that feel “clear-cut”. Then we can look at this data and figure out the next step.
Yes, blowing up the universe with an intelligence explosion is much easier than preserving human values.
Sounds like an excuse to postpone figuring out the next step. What do you expect to see, and what would you do depending on what you see? “List of reasons for action that actual people use in ordinary situations” doesn’t look useful.
Thinking you can figure out the next step today is unsubstantiated arrogance. You cannot write a program that will win the Netflix Prize if you don’t have the test dataset. Yeah I guess a superintelligence could write it blindly from first principles, using just a textbook on machine learning, but seriously, WTF.
With Netflix Prize, you need for training the kind of data that you want to predict. Predicting what stories people will tell in novel situations when deciding to act is not our goal.
Why not? I think you could use that knowledge to design a utopia that won’t make people go aaaargh. Then build it, using AIs or whatever tools you have.
The usual complexity of value considerations. The meaning of the stories (i.e. specifications detailed enough to actually implement, the way they should be and not simply the way a human would try elaborating) is not given just by the text of the stories, and once you’re able to figure out the way things should be, you no longer need human-generated stories.
This is a different kind of object, and having lots of stories doesn’t obviously help. Even if the stories would serve some purpose, I don’t quite see how waiting for an explicit collection of stories is going to help in developing the tools that use them.
Are you aware of this thread?
Yeah. Unlike lukeprog, I’m proposing to enumerate all reasons for action that actual humans follow, not all “theoretically possible” reasons which is obviously stupid.
“Reason for action” is no more enlightening than “morality”, but with less explanatory (curiosity-stopping) connotations. In that context, it was more of “that hot yellow-ish stuff over there” as opposed to “phlogiston”.