I think creating uncertainty in your adversary applies a bit more than you give it credit for, and assuring a second strike is an exception.
It has been crucial to Russia’s strategy in Ukraine to exploit NATO’s fear of escalation by making various counter-threats whenever NATO proposes expanding aid to Ukraine somehow. This has bought them 2 years without ATACMS missiles attacking targets inside Russia, and that hasn’t require anyone to be irrational, just incapable of perfectly modeling the Kremlin.
Even when responding to a nuclear strike, you can essentially have a mixed strategy. I think China does not have enough missiles to assure a second strike, but builds extra decoy silos so they can’t all be destroyed. They didn’t have to roll a die, just be unpredictable.
I think creating uncertainty in your adversary applies a bit more than you give it credit for, and assuring a second strike is an exception.
It has been crucial to Russia’s strategy in Ukraine to exploit NATO’s fear of escalation by making various counter-threats whenever NATO proposes expanding aid to Ukraine somehow. This has bought them 2 years without ATACMS missiles attacking targets inside Russia, and that hasn’t require anyone to be irrational, just incapable of perfectly modeling the Kremlin.
Even when responding to a nuclear strike, you can essentially have a mixed strategy. I think China does not have enough missiles to assure a second strike, but builds extra decoy silos so they can’t all be destroyed. They didn’t have to roll a die, just be unpredictable.
Very funny that we had this conversation a couple of weeks prior to transparently deciding that we should retaliate with p=.7!