Just want to flag that it’s not entirely obvious that we need to settle questions in meta-ethics in order to get the normative and applied ethics right. Why not just call for more work directly in the latter fields?
Yes, that’s a claim that in my experience, most philosophers disagree with. It’s one I’ll need to argue for. But I do think one’s meta-ethical views have large implications for one’s normative views that are often missed.
Even if we grant that one’s meta-ethical position will determine one’s normative theory (which is very contentious), one would like some evidence that it would be easier to find the correct meta-ethical view than it would be to find the correct (or appropriate, or whatever) normative ethical view. Otherwise, why not just do normative ethics?
My own thought is that doing meta-ethics may illuminate normative theory, but I could be wrong about that. For example, I think doing meta-ethics right seals the deal for consequentialism, but not utilitarianism.
My own thought is that doing meta-ethics may illuminate normative theory, but I could be wrong about that.
Since nobody understands these topics with enough clarity, and they seem related, I don’t see how anyone can claim with confidence that they actually aren’t related. So you saying that you “could be wrong about that” doesn’t communicate anything about your understanding.
Many attempts to map out normative ethics wander substantially into meta-ethics, and vice versa. Especially the better ones. So I doubt it matters all that much where one starts—the whole kit and caboodle soon will figure into the discussion.
Just want to flag that it’s not entirely obvious that we need to settle questions in meta-ethics in order to get the normative and applied ethics right. Why not just call for more work directly in the latter fields?
Yes, that’s a claim that in my experience, most philosophers disagree with. It’s one I’ll need to argue for. But I do think one’s meta-ethical views have large implications for one’s normative views that are often missed.
Even if we grant that one’s meta-ethical position will determine one’s normative theory (which is very contentious), one would like some evidence that it would be easier to find the correct meta-ethical view than it would be to find the correct (or appropriate, or whatever) normative ethical view. Otherwise, why not just do normative ethics?
My own thought is that doing meta-ethics may illuminate normative theory, but I could be wrong about that. For example, I think doing meta-ethics right seals the deal for consequentialism, but not utilitarianism.
Since nobody understands these topics with enough clarity, and they seem related, I don’t see how anyone can claim with confidence that they actually aren’t related. So you saying that you “could be wrong about that” doesn’t communicate anything about your understanding.
Many attempts to map out normative ethics wander substantially into meta-ethics, and vice versa. Especially the better ones. So I doubt it matters all that much where one starts—the whole kit and caboodle soon will figure into the discussion.
What exactly does normative ethics mean?