Because they can be set at a level high enough to discourage the action somewhat, but low enough that clandestine abortions are not chosen instead.
For example, where I live cigarettes are taxed at punitive rates (to the right of the Laffer maximum) in order to discourage smoking. It is theoretically possible to evade these taxes, e.g. by growing your own tobacco or smuggling, but taxes are not so high that this is an appealing alternative, given the risks and penalties for breaking the law. So we get less smoking than otherwise, and revenue for the Exchequer, but we do not have smokers turning to dangerous contraband cigarettes instead. It is possible to mess this up; some years ago, cigarette taxes were too high, and we had a problem with smuggling. But I think the principle is clear.
The same logic applies to a tax on abortions. Suppose that the risks and dangers of an illegal abortion are worth -$5000 to the pregnant woman. Then if we forbid abortions, any woman who values an abortion at over $5000 will have one in a clandestine manner. But if instead we put a $3000 tax on abortions, then the pregnant woman who values the abortion at over $3000 will have one legally and safely, and the pregnant woman who values the abortion at less than $3000 will not have an abortion at all.
(Numbers are for illustrative purposes only).
Now, no-one is proposing a tax on abortions. I can see why you would oppose the tax if you are stringently pro-life, as you would see it as facilitating murder. I can see why you would oppose the tax if you are stringently pro-choice, as you might see it as an impermissible restriction on personal freedom. But consider the group who think that abortion is immoral, and thus presumably ought to be discouraged, but claim that their objection to a ban is that such a law would have bad practical effects. Surely then they should be searching high and low for ideas for other laws which would discourage abortion with better practical effects—like a tax. But instead people advance the argument that banning abortion would be counterproductive—and then leave it there.
My conclusion is that this argument an example of status quo bias, and fallacy of the excluded middle. I think it is popular because it allows the arguer to seem “onside” to both pro-life and pro-choice interlocutors.
But if instead we put a $3000 tax on abortions, then the pregnant woman who values the abortion at over $3000 will have one legally and safely, and the pregnant woman who values the abortion at less than $3000 will not have an abortion at all.
You assume that a woman unwilling or unable to pay $3000 would just not have an abortion. Why not assume that she would instead have a cheap, illegal, unsafe abortion—just like some women do when abortions are illegal outright?
Another argument against taxing abortion is that it’s discriminates against the poor, causing them to have fewer abortions, more unplanned children, which reinforces their families’ poverty. It is also an inducement to go into debt to afford an abortion.
However, the market will eventually adjust to your tax by providing abortion insurance, thus spreading out the cost of the tax to people who don’t actually have abortions.
However, the market will eventually adjust to your tax by providing abortion insurance, thus spreading out the cost of the tax to people who don’t actually have abortions.
Not sure about that—for an insurance company to offer such a policy would likely be very bad publicity for a certain part of the population. Given charities have refused donations to avoid bad publicity...
For a target market of roughly half of all women (going by age of fertility) - a quarter of a population—who might consider buying such an insurance policy, an insurance company could probably afford to ignore everyone else. New companies could be started with no affiliation with ones that sells other kinds of insurance if necessary.
Of course, someone who legislated a tax on abortion would probably also legislate forbidding to insure against abortion.
New companies could be started with no affiliation with ones that sells other kinds of insurance if necessary.
Yes, I hadn’t thought about that.
Of course, someone who legislated a tax on abortion would probably also legislate forbidding to insure against abortion.
Well, if they really wanted to they’d probably find a way around that. For example, they could call it an insurance on pregnancy (and claim they don’t require the pregnancy to be successful because a pregnancy ending in miscarriage also costs several months of your life, or stuff like that).
Wow, now that I think about this, such an insurance policy makes sense even if people aren’t going to abort. (Though being given $3000 una tantum doesn’t solve all the problems in the world for someone very poor who wants to raise a child.)
Wow, now that I think about this, such an insurance policy makes sense even if people aren’t going to abort.
I’m not sure I understand. Are you suggesting an insurance policy that pays out if you get pregnant or give birth?
Normally insurance policies are taken against unwanted events. If you have a policy that pays out in case of abortion, that makes sense to the insurance company because if you’re willing to abort, you probably tried to avoid the pregnancy by e.g. using contraceptives.
But if you have a policy that pays out in case of something that is generally wanted (ETA: by those doing it) - giving birth—then people would take out the policy only if they do want to give birth. Then the percentage of people with the policy who get paid would be near 100%, and the insurance company would make a loss on the policy, so they wouldn’t offer it.
Yes, I hadn’t thought about that. (And there’s no obvious way of proving that you’re using contraception to the insurance company, so you can’t even have a policy that pays only if you are.)
(Not sure about “generally wanted”, though: I guess that, among the people who are having sex today (in the developed world at least) the fraction who are trying to have a baby is much less than 1.)
EDIT: Maybe it could work if restricted to demographics who wouldn’t normally want a child (say, unmarried, below a certain age, and with income below a certain threshold) -- though the premiums mustn’t be so large that people would want to get pregnant only for the money.
Not sure about “generally wanted”, though: I guess that, among the people who are having sex today (in the developed world at least) the fraction who are trying to have a baby is much less than 1.)
Poor phrasing on my part, will fix. I meant that people who get pregnant and give birth (while having the options to use contraceptives and to abort) generally want to raise a child. Not that people in general want to raise one.
Maybe it could work if restricted to demographics who wouldn’t normally want a child
This depends on the availability, cost and effectiveness of preventatives and abortions: if they’re good enough, you don’t need to pay for pregnancy insurance, since they will prevent or abort the pregnancy.
In practice, since I haven’t heard of such insurance policies, I expect that they are indeed cheap and effective enough.
(Apart from the fact that taxing abortions would discourage poor people from aborting more than it would rich people, which is not exactly what most people would want—unless the tax scales with the woman’s income, but that would just give Yet Another incentive for people to underreport their incomes) maybe that just doesn’t occur to people? Seriously, some of these homo hypocritus discussions badly fail Hanlon’s Razor (i.e. forget that 84% of the population has IQs below 115, or forget the way people with IQs below 115 think). My grandpa complains if I keep too many lights on when I’m at his place, but he has incandescent bulbs rather than fluorescent ones; does this mean he’s lying about his concern about how much he spends on electricity? Maybe Hanson would say he is and could concoct some explanation of why he would he want do that, but I honestly can’t.
I agree that a tax doesn’t occur to most people. Nor does any other solution. That’s exactly what I’m saying is suspicious—it looks very much like motivated stopping. And more than that—if you do propose a tax on abortion, or public shaming for those who commit abortion, or any other intermediate step, these people concoct special pleading reasons to be against it.
If you claim to believe that something is immoral, but you are not interested in preventing it and react against any proposal that might, then I think the simplest conclusion is that you don’t really think it’s immoral.
I should point out, for the record, that I am not actually proposing a tax on abortions, or that people having abortions be publicly shamed, etc. I am merely pointing out that these are logical steps if you think it’s “immoral but shouldn’t be illegal.”
So does the fact that my grandpa hasn’t looked for ways to save on his electricity bill (at least, not hard enough for him to buy fluorescence lightbulbs) also look like motivated stopping? Motivated by what? (My model of people like him also says that telling him about fluorescence lightbulbs wouldn’t be enough to make him buy some.)
I imagine his stopping is motivated partly by laziness/habit. Yet I’m sure he’d switch if you were able to convince him that fluorescent lightbulbs would save him (say) $1000 a month. So it’s also a question of cost/benefit.
But while I don’t think he’s lying, I do imagine that there’s more to his reaction to leaving the lightbulb on than the mere cost. It is also the fact that it is wasteful. Leaving a lightbulb on in a room you’re not in feels profligate, and wrong, in a way that failing to buy the most energy-efficient lightbulb does not.
I imagine his stopping is motivated partly by laziness/habit.
Couldn’t the reason why people don’t think about ways to discourage abortions also be laziness? “Humans are cognitive misers” an’ all that. (Especially in the case of people who have never had an undesired pregnancy themselves.)
Why would punitive taxes have a result different in kind from outright prohibition?
Because they can be set at a level high enough to discourage the action somewhat, but low enough that clandestine abortions are not chosen instead.
For example, where I live cigarettes are taxed at punitive rates (to the right of the Laffer maximum) in order to discourage smoking. It is theoretically possible to evade these taxes, e.g. by growing your own tobacco or smuggling, but taxes are not so high that this is an appealing alternative, given the risks and penalties for breaking the law. So we get less smoking than otherwise, and revenue for the Exchequer, but we do not have smokers turning to dangerous contraband cigarettes instead. It is possible to mess this up; some years ago, cigarette taxes were too high, and we had a problem with smuggling. But I think the principle is clear.
The same logic applies to a tax on abortions. Suppose that the risks and dangers of an illegal abortion are worth -$5000 to the pregnant woman. Then if we forbid abortions, any woman who values an abortion at over $5000 will have one in a clandestine manner. But if instead we put a $3000 tax on abortions, then the pregnant woman who values the abortion at over $3000 will have one legally and safely, and the pregnant woman who values the abortion at less than $3000 will not have an abortion at all.
(Numbers are for illustrative purposes only).
Now, no-one is proposing a tax on abortions. I can see why you would oppose the tax if you are stringently pro-life, as you would see it as facilitating murder. I can see why you would oppose the tax if you are stringently pro-choice, as you might see it as an impermissible restriction on personal freedom. But consider the group who think that abortion is immoral, and thus presumably ought to be discouraged, but claim that their objection to a ban is that such a law would have bad practical effects. Surely then they should be searching high and low for ideas for other laws which would discourage abortion with better practical effects—like a tax. But instead people advance the argument that banning abortion would be counterproductive—and then leave it there.
My conclusion is that this argument an example of status quo bias, and fallacy of the excluded middle. I think it is popular because it allows the arguer to seem “onside” to both pro-life and pro-choice interlocutors.
You assume that a woman unwilling or unable to pay $3000 would just not have an abortion. Why not assume that she would instead have a cheap, illegal, unsafe abortion—just like some women do when abortions are illegal outright?
Another argument against taxing abortion is that it’s discriminates against the poor, causing them to have fewer abortions, more unplanned children, which reinforces their families’ poverty. It is also an inducement to go into debt to afford an abortion.
However, the market will eventually adjust to your tax by providing abortion insurance, thus spreading out the cost of the tax to people who don’t actually have abortions.
Not sure about that—for an insurance company to offer such a policy would likely be very bad publicity for a certain part of the population. Given charities have refused donations to avoid bad publicity...
For a target market of roughly half of all women (going by age of fertility) - a quarter of a population—who might consider buying such an insurance policy, an insurance company could probably afford to ignore everyone else. New companies could be started with no affiliation with ones that sells other kinds of insurance if necessary.
Of course, someone who legislated a tax on abortion would probably also legislate forbidding to insure against abortion.
Yes, I hadn’t thought about that.
Well, if they really wanted to they’d probably find a way around that. For example, they could call it an insurance on pregnancy (and claim they don’t require the pregnancy to be successful because a pregnancy ending in miscarriage also costs several months of your life, or stuff like that).
Wow, now that I think about this, such an insurance policy makes sense even if people aren’t going to abort. (Though being given $3000 una tantum doesn’t solve all the problems in the world for someone very poor who wants to raise a child.)
I’m not sure I understand. Are you suggesting an insurance policy that pays out if you get pregnant or give birth?
Normally insurance policies are taken against unwanted events. If you have a policy that pays out in case of abortion, that makes sense to the insurance company because if you’re willing to abort, you probably tried to avoid the pregnancy by e.g. using contraceptives.
But if you have a policy that pays out in case of something that is generally wanted (ETA: by those doing it) - giving birth—then people would take out the policy only if they do want to give birth. Then the percentage of people with the policy who get paid would be near 100%, and the insurance company would make a loss on the policy, so they wouldn’t offer it.
Yes, I hadn’t thought about that. (And there’s no obvious way of proving that you’re using contraception to the insurance company, so you can’t even have a policy that pays only if you are.)
(Not sure about “generally wanted”, though: I guess that, among the people who are having sex today (in the developed world at least) the fraction who are trying to have a baby is much less than 1.)
EDIT: Maybe it could work if restricted to demographics who wouldn’t normally want a child (say, unmarried, below a certain age, and with income below a certain threshold) -- though the premiums mustn’t be so large that people would want to get pregnant only for the money.
Poor phrasing on my part, will fix. I meant that people who get pregnant and give birth (while having the options to use contraceptives and to abort) generally want to raise a child. Not that people in general want to raise one.
This depends on the availability, cost and effectiveness of preventatives and abortions: if they’re good enough, you don’t need to pay for pregnancy insurance, since they will prevent or abort the pregnancy.
In practice, since I haven’t heard of such insurance policies, I expect that they are indeed cheap and effective enough.
(Apart from the fact that taxing abortions would discourage poor people from aborting more than it would rich people, which is not exactly what most people would want—unless the tax scales with the woman’s income, but that would just give Yet Another incentive for people to underreport their incomes) maybe that just doesn’t occur to people? Seriously, some of these homo hypocritus discussions badly fail Hanlon’s Razor (i.e. forget that 84% of the population has IQs below 115, or forget the way people with IQs below 115 think). My grandpa complains if I keep too many lights on when I’m at his place, but he has incandescent bulbs rather than fluorescent ones; does this mean he’s lying about his concern about how much he spends on electricity? Maybe Hanson would say he is and could concoct some explanation of why he would he want do that, but I honestly can’t.
I agree that a tax doesn’t occur to most people. Nor does any other solution. That’s exactly what I’m saying is suspicious—it looks very much like motivated stopping. And more than that—if you do propose a tax on abortion, or public shaming for those who commit abortion, or any other intermediate step, these people concoct special pleading reasons to be against it.
If you claim to believe that something is immoral, but you are not interested in preventing it and react against any proposal that might, then I think the simplest conclusion is that you don’t really think it’s immoral.
I should point out, for the record, that I am not actually proposing a tax on abortions, or that people having abortions be publicly shamed, etc. I am merely pointing out that these are logical steps if you think it’s “immoral but shouldn’t be illegal.”
So does the fact that my grandpa hasn’t looked for ways to save on his electricity bill (at least, not hard enough for him to buy fluorescence lightbulbs) also look like motivated stopping? Motivated by what? (My model of people like him also says that telling him about fluorescence lightbulbs wouldn’t be enough to make him buy some.)
I imagine his stopping is motivated partly by laziness/habit. Yet I’m sure he’d switch if you were able to convince him that fluorescent lightbulbs would save him (say) $1000 a month. So it’s also a question of cost/benefit.
But while I don’t think he’s lying, I do imagine that there’s more to his reaction to leaving the lightbulb on than the mere cost. It is also the fact that it is wasteful. Leaving a lightbulb on in a room you’re not in feels profligate, and wrong, in a way that failing to buy the most energy-efficient lightbulb does not.
Couldn’t the reason why people don’t think about ways to discourage abortions also be laziness? “Humans are cognitive misers” an’ all that. (Especially in the case of people who have never had an undesired pregnancy themselves.)