Thank you for pointing this out. I did not do my background check far enough back in time. This substantially weakens my case.
I am still inclined to be skeptical, and I have found another red flag. As far as I can tell, E. T. Jaynes is generally very highly regarded, and the only person who is critical of his book is David Chapman. This is just from doing a couple of searches on the Internet.
There are many people studying logic and probability. I would expect some of them would find it worthwhile to comment on this topic if they agreed with David Chapman.
As far as I can tell, E. T. Jaynes is generally very highly regarded, and the only person who is critical of his book is David Chapman.
I don’t think it’s a good sign for a book if there isn’t anybody to be found that criticizes it.
ksvanhorn’s response that defends Jaynes still grants:
I agree with Chapman that probability theory does not extend the predicate
calculus. I had thought this too obvious to mention, but perhaps it needs emphasizing
for people who haven’t studied mathematical logic. Jaynes, in particular,
was not versed in mathematical logic, so when he wrote about “probability
theory as extended logic” he failed to properly identify which logic it extended.
[...]
My view is that the role of the predicate calculus in rationality is in model
building. It gives us the tools to create mathematical models of various aspects
of our world, and to reason about the properties of these models. The predicate
calculus is indispensable for doing mathematics.
I think the view that Eliezer argues is that you can basically do all relevant reasoning with Bayes and not that you can’t to reason well about the properties of mathematical models with Bayes.
Could you post a link to a criticism similar to David Chapman?
The primary criticism I could find was the errata. From the Outside View, the errata looks like a number of mathematically minded people found it to be worth their time to submit corrections. If they had thought that E. T. Jaynes was hopelessly confused, they would not have submitted corrections of this kind.
I can’t link to a criticism that makes the same points as Chapman, but my favourite criticism of Jaynes is the paper “Jaynes’s maximum entropy prescription and probability theory” by Friedman and Shimony, criticising the MAXENT rule. It’s behind a paywall, but there’s an (actually much better) description of the same result in Section 5 of “The constraint rule of the maximum entropy principle” by Uffink. (It actually came out before PT:TLOS was published, but Jaynes’ description of MAXENT doesn’t change so the criticism still applies).
Yes! From the Outside View, this is exactly what I would expect substantial, well-researched criticism to look like. Appears very scientific, contains plenty of references, is peer-reviewed and published in “Journal of Statistical Physics” and has 29 citations.
Friedman and Shimonys criticism of MAXENT is in stark contrast to David Chapmans criticism of “Probability Theory”.
FWIW I think that Davud Chapman’s criticism is correct as far as it goes, but I don’t think that it’s very damning. Propositional logic is indeed a “logic” and it’s worthwhile enough for probability theory to extend it. Trying to look at predicate logic probabilisticly would be interesting but it’s not necessary.
I should clarify that I am referring to the section David Chapman calls: “Historical appendix: Where did the confusion come from?”. I read it as a criticism of both Jaynes and his book.
Thank you for pointing this out. I did not do my background check far enough back in time. This substantially weakens my case.
I am still inclined to be skeptical, and I have found another red flag. As far as I can tell, E. T. Jaynes is generally very highly regarded, and the only person who is critical of his book is David Chapman. This is just from doing a couple of searches on the Internet.
There are many people studying logic and probability. I would expect some of them would find it worthwhile to comment on this topic if they agreed with David Chapman.
I don’t think it’s a good sign for a book if there isn’t anybody to be found that criticizes it.
ksvanhorn’s response that defends Jaynes still grants:
I think the view that Eliezer argues is that you can basically do all relevant reasoning with Bayes and not that you can’t to reason well about the properties of mathematical models with Bayes.
FWIW Loads of people criticise Jaynes’ book all the time.
It’s still a bad argument to judge a book based on the fact that one is unable to find criticism.
Could you post a link to a criticism similar to David Chapman?
The primary criticism I could find was the errata. From the Outside View, the errata looks like a number of mathematically minded people found it to be worth their time to submit corrections. If they had thought that E. T. Jaynes was hopelessly confused, they would not have submitted corrections of this kind.
I can’t link to a criticism that makes the same points as Chapman, but my favourite criticism of Jaynes is the paper “Jaynes’s maximum entropy prescription and probability theory” by Friedman and Shimony, criticising the MAXENT rule. It’s behind a paywall, but there’s an (actually much better) description of the same result in Section 5 of “The constraint rule of the maximum entropy principle” by Uffink. (It actually came out before PT:TLOS was published, but Jaynes’ description of MAXENT doesn’t change so the criticism still applies).
Yes! From the Outside View, this is exactly what I would expect substantial, well-researched criticism to look like. Appears very scientific, contains plenty of references, is peer-reviewed and published in “Journal of Statistical Physics” and has 29 citations.
Friedman and Shimonys criticism of MAXENT is in stark contrast to David Chapmans criticism of “Probability Theory”.
FWIW I think that Davud Chapman’s criticism is correct as far as it goes, but I don’t think that it’s very damning. Propositional logic is indeed a “logic” and it’s worthwhile enough for probability theory to extend it. Trying to look at predicate logic probabilisticly would be interesting but it’s not necessary.
Chapman wasn’t even attempting to write an original paper, and in fact points out early on that he is repeating well known (outside LW) facts.
I think it is a good sign for a Mathematics book that there isn’t anybody to be found that criticizes it except people with far inferior credentials.
Chapman doesn’t criticise Jaynes directly, he criticises what he calls Pop Bayesianism.
I should clarify that I am referring to the section David Chapman calls: “Historical appendix: Where did the confusion come from?”. I read it as a criticism of both Jaynes and his book.