This reminds me of B. F. Skinner’s criticism of William James
A long time ago William James corrected a prevailing view of the relation between feelings and action by asserting, for example, that we do not run away because we are afraid but are afraid becase we run away. In other words, what we feel when we feel afraid is our behaviour—the very behaviour which in the traditional view expresses the feeling and is explained by it. But how many of those who have considered James’s argument have noted that no antecedent event has in fact been pointed out? Neither ‘because’ should be taken seriously. No explanation has been given as to why we run away and feel afraid.
Before he can add something of substance to the discussion of the epistemological problems of economics, Ludwig von Mises must look back in time, to previous events, and offer them as the explanation of why we want or desire things and why we also call those things agreeable or good.
I think Mises’s point is rather that concepts like “good,” “bad,” “evil,” “right,” “wrong,” “ought to” and “rights” all reduce back down to variations on “I desire it”/”It brings me pleasure” and the opposite. In other words, all ethical systems are dressed up (subjective) consequentialism and they only appear otherwise due to semantic confusion.
The response to that would be that you only do things that give others pleasure because the feeling of helping others is pleasurable to you or because you expect something in return, and that if neither of those were the case, you wouldn’t do it. (I don’t necessarily agree with that — I’m pretty sure I don’t — but I do believe that’s how they’d reduce it.)
-- Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics
This reminds me of B. F. Skinner’s criticism of William James
Before he can add something of substance to the discussion of the epistemological problems of economics, Ludwig von Mises must look back in time, to previous events, and offer them as the explanation of why we want or desire things and why we also call those things agreeable or good.
I think Mises’s point is rather that concepts like “good,” “bad,” “evil,” “right,” “wrong,” “ought to” and “rights” all reduce back down to variations on “I desire it”/”It brings me pleasure” and the opposite. In other words, all ethical systems are dressed up (subjective) consequentialism and they only appear otherwise due to semantic confusion.
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Imagine that you got no satisfaction at all from bringing pleasure to others, but you did it anyway. What would be the reason?
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The response to that would be that you only do things that give others pleasure because the feeling of helping others is pleasurable to you or because you expect something in return, and that if neither of those were the case, you wouldn’t do it. (I don’t necessarily agree with that — I’m pretty sure I don’t — but I do believe that’s how they’d reduce it.)