This counterargument was suggested before by Danila Medvedev and it doesn’t’ work. The reasons are following: if we are in a simulation, we can’t say anything about the outside world—but we are still in simulation and this is what was needed to be proved.
“This is what was needed to be proved”—yeah, but we’ve undermined the proof. That’s why I backed up and reformulated the argument in the second paragraph.
One more way to prove simulation argument is a general observation that explanations which have lower computational cost are dominating my experience (that is, a variant of Occam Razor). If I see a nuclear explosion, it is more likely to be a dream, a movie or a photo. Thus cheap simulations should be more numerous than real worlds and we are likely to be in it.
This counterargument was suggested before by Danila Medvedev and it doesn’t’ work. The reasons are following: if we are in a simulation, we can’t say anything about the outside world—but we are still in simulation and this is what was needed to be proved.
“This is what was needed to be proved”—yeah, but we’ve undermined the proof. That’s why I backed up and reformulated the argument in the second paragraph.
One more way to prove simulation argument is a general observation that explanations which have lower computational cost are dominating my experience (that is, a variant of Occam Razor). If I see a nuclear explosion, it is more likely to be a dream, a movie or a photo. Thus cheap simulations should be more numerous than real worlds and we are likely to be in it.