By the way, I disagree with the assumption that Aumann’s theorem vindicates any such “standpoint epistemology”.
That also stood out to me as a bit of a leap. It seems to me that for Aumann’s theorem to apply to standpoint epistemology, everyone would have to share all their experiences and believe everyone else about their own experiences.
Those convenient conditions are trust. The point I’m trying to get at is that while “common knowledge of each other’s rationality, honesty and beliefs” is an excessively strong condition for it to commonly occur, sufficiently strong knowledge of rationality/honesty to obtain trust and sufficiently strong knowledge of beliefs to obtain information is a common occurence.
It doesn’t literally appear constantly, because there are many situations where it doesn’t, and where it doesn’t the boiler plate does matter. You have a half-truth that you have stated as a truth.
I mean yes, people regularly interact with untrustworthy (crazy/liar) people, and it is a condition for Aumann’s theorem that the people in question are neither crazy nor liars. I was interpreting Stephen Bennett to point at the stronger aspects of the condition (common knowledge technically being a very strong condition), but maybe that wasn’t his intent.
That also stood out to me as a bit of a leap. It seems to me that for Aumann’s theorem to apply to standpoint epistemology, everyone would have to share all their experiences and believe everyone else about their own experiences.
My take on Aumann’s Agreement Theorem is Don’t Get Distracted By The Boilerplate. Yes, it’s usually phrased with certain technical conditions that might not fully apply in the real world, but the basic implications of the theorem constantly appear in everyday interactions, for spiritually similar reasons to the technical conditions required by the theorem, even if those technical conditions don’t literally hold.
The argument you are linking to only shows that Aumann’s theorem.works under convenient conditions.
Those convenient conditions are trust. The point I’m trying to get at is that while “common knowledge of each other’s rationality, honesty and beliefs” is an excessively strong condition for it to commonly occur, sufficiently strong knowledge of rationality/honesty to obtain trust and sufficiently strong knowledge of beliefs to obtain information is a common occurence.
It doesn’t literally appear constantly, because there are many situations where it doesn’t, and where it doesn’t the boiler plate does matter. You have a half-truth that you have stated as a truth.
I mean yes, people regularly interact with untrustworthy (crazy/liar) people, and it is a condition for Aumann’s theorem that the people in question are neither crazy nor liars. I was interpreting Stephen Bennett to point at the stronger aspects of the condition (common knowledge technically being a very strong condition), but maybe that wasn’t his intent.