If killing the children of suicide bombers deters future suicide attacks, then, by all means, let’s all go out and kill us some children! (Although I suspect that killing their parents might be more effective, as most suicide bombers are unmarried.)
I also endorse a general policy of shooting through human shields; hostages won’t be taken if they are of no value, and intermingling civilian and military facilities, as Hezbollah does whenever it builds a school on top of an ammo dump, is already recognized as a war crime under international law.
Crono: If it is ok to kill soldiers it is ok to kill civilians. And vice versa.
gjm: But wait there are important differences between soldiers and civilians. Soldiers kill and are often willing to be killed. We should consider these distinctions in evaluating this issue.
Crono: Civilians are part of the war effort too and are willing to help in killing. (Adding after my comment: Collective punishment is a good tactic!)
Me: Some people aren’t part of the war effort. Protesters, children.
Crono: If killing children prevents suicide bombers, do it. Also, look at these other cases where we should kill civilians.
You’ve given some arguments for why you think killing civilians is good strategy in some circumstances. But I don’t see how this answers the issue gjm brought up. Even if there are circumstances in which killing civilians in justified it doesn’t follow that reasons for killing soldiers are good enough reasons to kill civilians. It seems like the fact that soldiers are more willing to die and that they are likely to kill if they aren’t killed first are very good reasons for requiring weaker justifications for soldier killing than civilian killing. Why is gjm’s point wrong?
Also, as this is a discussion about international law the question is about setting norms for war fighting. As such, do you think collective punishment and killing the children of soldiers to deter them make sense as norms governing conduct during wars?
I would also note that while you’ve given evidence that breaking international rules regarding killing civilians can be useful, the question is whether or not the benefits outweigh the costs. How much shorter will the war be if you kill all the farmers? How many fewer men will die in total because you nuked that city? How much less will future generations value human life because rape and torture are considered acceptable means to an end?
My knee-jerk reaction is that having these standards may indeed reduce overall casualties and that they are important for international image and future cooperation. I am open to evidence to the contrary though.
My knee-jerk reaction is that having these standards may indeed reduce overall casualties
I think that’s the argument that by default requires proof, not the other way around. Intuitively, having external independent standards can only prevent me from best accomplishing my goal, whatever my goal may be. If my goal is to kill while also killing few civilians, I’ll go for that, but I’ll do it more efficiently in most cases than if I have to follow laws I don’t believe in.
My knee-jerk reaction is that having these standards may indeed reduce overall casualties
I think that’s the argument that by default requires proof, not the other way around.
I would say the opposite, out of conservatism, but I don’t expect to be able to argue the point as anything more than headbutting intuitions.
If my goal is to kill while also killing few civilians, I’ll go for that, but I’ll do it more efficiently in most cases than if I have to follow laws I don’t believe in.
I absolutely agree with you if my own actions are the only ones I am taking into account, however I expect that the actions of others will better align with my goals if the standards are in place.
Given the high cost of implementing these standards, some level of proof (or at least a calculation of expected future utility) should be given as justification for their existence. I can think of two ways of examining this:
1) Compare the casualties (or other desired metrics) of similar conflicts before and after the implementation of standards and in situations in which standards were adhered to or ignored.
2) Try to quantify metrics of interest in a hypothetical war with or without adherence to the standards. This of course is very difficult, but I’m not willing to say impossible.
(1) doesn’t really help us predict the effect of proposed new standards that have never been tried before, and that’s what we really want to do. I hope we can find a way to achieve (2) :-)
If killing the children of suicide bombers deters future suicide attacks, then, by all means, let’s all go out and kill us some children! (Although I suspect that killing their parents might be more effective, as most suicide bombers are unmarried.)
I also endorse a general policy of shooting through human shields; hostages won’t be taken if they are of no value, and intermingling civilian and military facilities, as Hezbollah does whenever it builds a school on top of an ammo dump, is already recognized as a war crime under international law.
Summary of the thread until now:
Crono: If it is ok to kill soldiers it is ok to kill civilians. And vice versa. gjm: But wait there are important differences between soldiers and civilians. Soldiers kill and are often willing to be killed. We should consider these distinctions in evaluating this issue. Crono: Civilians are part of the war effort too and are willing to help in killing. (Adding after my comment: Collective punishment is a good tactic!) Me: Some people aren’t part of the war effort. Protesters, children. Crono: If killing children prevents suicide bombers, do it. Also, look at these other cases where we should kill civilians.
You’ve given some arguments for why you think killing civilians is good strategy in some circumstances. But I don’t see how this answers the issue gjm brought up. Even if there are circumstances in which killing civilians in justified it doesn’t follow that reasons for killing soldiers are good enough reasons to kill civilians. It seems like the fact that soldiers are more willing to die and that they are likely to kill if they aren’t killed first are very good reasons for requiring weaker justifications for soldier killing than civilian killing. Why is gjm’s point wrong?
Also, as this is a discussion about international law the question is about setting norms for war fighting. As such, do you think collective punishment and killing the children of soldiers to deter them make sense as norms governing conduct during wars?
I would also note that while you’ve given evidence that breaking international rules regarding killing civilians can be useful, the question is whether or not the benefits outweigh the costs. How much shorter will the war be if you kill all the farmers? How many fewer men will die in total because you nuked that city? How much less will future generations value human life because rape and torture are considered acceptable means to an end?
My knee-jerk reaction is that having these standards may indeed reduce overall casualties and that they are important for international image and future cooperation. I am open to evidence to the contrary though.
If you happen to be the weaker side then potentially quite a lot longer.
I think that’s the argument that by default requires proof, not the other way around. Intuitively, having external independent standards can only prevent me from best accomplishing my goal, whatever my goal may be. If my goal is to kill while also killing few civilians, I’ll go for that, but I’ll do it more efficiently in most cases than if I have to follow laws I don’t believe in.
I would say the opposite, out of conservatism, but I don’t expect to be able to argue the point as anything more than headbutting intuitions.
True of normative reasoners, not of humans. See Ethical Inhibitions.
I absolutely agree with you if my own actions are the only ones I am taking into account, however I expect that the actions of others will better align with my goals if the standards are in place.
Given the high cost of implementing these standards, some level of proof (or at least a calculation of expected future utility) should be given as justification for their existence. I can think of two ways of examining this:
1) Compare the casualties (or other desired metrics) of similar conflicts before and after the implementation of standards and in situations in which standards were adhered to or ignored.
2) Try to quantify metrics of interest in a hypothetical war with or without adherence to the standards. This of course is very difficult, but I’m not willing to say impossible.
(1) doesn’t really help us predict the effect of proposed new standards that have never been tried before, and that’s what we really want to do. I hope we can find a way to achieve (2) :-)