To be is to be something, something in particular. Vaguely defined entities are not particular enough. Every perception that ever occurs is an actual thing that briefly exists.
A thing doesn’t have to be fundamental in order to be exact. If individual electrons are fundamental, an “entity” consisting of one electron in a definite location, and the other electron in another definite location, is not a vague entity.
The problem is not reduction per se. The problem discussed here is the attempt to identify definitely existing entities with vaguely defined entities.
In other words, ontologically fundamental mental entities. Could we move on please?
A thing doesn’t have to be fundamental in order to be exact. If individual electrons are fundamental, an “entity” consisting of one electron in a definite location, and the other electron in another definite location, is not a vague entity.
The problem is not reduction per se. The problem discussed here is the attempt to identify definitely existing entities with vaguely defined entities.