Preference of a given human is defined by their brain, and can be somewhat different from person to person, but not too much. There is nothing “objective” about this preference, but for each person there is one true preference that is their own, and same could be said for humanity as a whole, with the whole planet defining its preference, instead of just one brain. The focus on the brain isn’t very accurate though, since environment plays its part as well.
I can’t do justice to the centuries-old problem with a few words, but the idea is more or less this. Whatever the concept of “preference” means, when the human philosophers talk about it, their words are caused by something in the world: “preference” must be either a mechanism in their brain, a name of their confusion, or something else. It’s not epiphenomenal. Searching for the “ought” in the world outside human minds is more or less a guaranteed failure, especially if the answer is expected to be found explicitly, as an exemplar of perfection rather than evidence about what perfection is, to be interpreted in nontrivial way. The history of failure to find an answer while looking in the wrong place doesn’t prove that the answer is nowhere to be found, that there is now positive knowledge about the absence of the answer is the world.
Okay, so I’ll ask again: why couldn’t the humans real preference be to not sacrifice the children? Remember, you said:
You can’t decide your preference, preference is not what you actually do, it is what you should do
You haven’t really elucidated this. You’re either pulling an ought out of nowhere, or you’re saying “preference is what you should do if you want to win”. In the latter case, you still haven’t explained why giving up the children is winning, and not doing so is not winning.
And the link you gave doesn’t help at all, since, if we’re going to be looking at moral impulses common to all cultures and humans, I’m pretty sure not sacrificing children is one of them. See: Jonathan Haidt
Okay, so I’ll ask again: why couldn’t the humans real preference be to not sacrifice the children? [...] In the latter case, you still haven’t explained why giving up the children is winning, and not doing so is not winning.
It seems like you are seeing my replies as soldier-arguments for the object-level question about the sacrifice of children, stumped on a particular conclusion that sacrificing children is right, while I’m merely giving opinion-neutral meta-comments about the semantics of such opinions. (I’m not sure I’m reading this right.)
You can’t decide your preference, preference is not what you actually do, it is what you should do.
You haven’t really elucidated this. You’re either pulling an ought out of nowhere, or you’re saying “preference is what you should do if you want to win”.
Preference defines what constitutes winning, your actions rank high in the preference order if they determine the world high in preference order. Preference can’t be reduced to winning or actions, as these all are the sides of the same structure.
It seems like you are seeing my replies as soldier-arguments for the object-level question about the sacrifice of children, stumped on a particular conclusion that sacrificing children is right, while I’m merely giving opinion-neutral meta-comments about the semantics of such opinions. (I’m not sure I’m reading this right.)
...so you’re NOT attempting to respond to my original question? My original question was “what’s irrational about not sacrificing the children?”
There is nothing intrinsically irrational about any action, rationality or irrationality depends on preference, which is the point I was trying to communicate. Any question about “rationality” of a decision is a question about correctness of preference-optimization. So, my reply to your original question is that the question is ill-posed, and the content of the reply was explanation as to why.
Okay, that’s fine. So you’ll agree that the various people—who were saying that the decision made in the show was the rational route—these people were speaking (at least somewhat) improperly?
Preference of a given human is defined by their brain, and can be somewhat different from person to person, but not too much. There is nothing “objective” about this preference, but for each person there is one true preference that is their own, and same could be said for humanity as a whole, with the whole planet defining its preference, instead of just one brain. The focus on the brain isn’t very accurate though, since environment plays its part as well.
I can’t do justice to the centuries-old problem with a few words, but the idea is more or less this. Whatever the concept of “preference” means, when the human philosophers talk about it, their words are caused by something in the world: “preference” must be either a mechanism in their brain, a name of their confusion, or something else. It’s not epiphenomenal. Searching for the “ought” in the world outside human minds is more or less a guaranteed failure, especially if the answer is expected to be found explicitly, as an exemplar of perfection rather than evidence about what perfection is, to be interpreted in nontrivial way. The history of failure to find an answer while looking in the wrong place doesn’t prove that the answer is nowhere to be found, that there is now positive knowledge about the absence of the answer is the world.
Okay, so I’ll ask again: why couldn’t the humans real preference be to not sacrifice the children? Remember, you said:
You haven’t really elucidated this. You’re either pulling an ought out of nowhere, or you’re saying “preference is what you should do if you want to win”. In the latter case, you still haven’t explained why giving up the children is winning, and not doing so is not winning.
And the link you gave doesn’t help at all, since, if we’re going to be looking at moral impulses common to all cultures and humans, I’m pretty sure not sacrificing children is one of them. See: Jonathan Haidt
It seems like you are seeing my replies as soldier-arguments for the object-level question about the sacrifice of children, stumped on a particular conclusion that sacrificing children is right, while I’m merely giving opinion-neutral meta-comments about the semantics of such opinions. (I’m not sure I’m reading this right.)
Preference defines what constitutes winning, your actions rank high in the preference order if they determine the world high in preference order. Preference can’t be reduced to winning or actions, as these all are the sides of the same structure.
...so you’re NOT attempting to respond to my original question? My original question was “what’s irrational about not sacrificing the children?”
There is nothing intrinsically irrational about any action, rationality or irrationality depends on preference, which is the point I was trying to communicate. Any question about “rationality” of a decision is a question about correctness of preference-optimization. So, my reply to your original question is that the question is ill-posed, and the content of the reply was explanation as to why.
Okay, that’s fine. So you’ll agree that the various people—who were saying that the decision made in the show was the rational route—these people were speaking (at least somewhat) improperly?