I agree that we should expect significant (though not complete) overlap within the set of moral judgments made by all humans.
I would expect even more overlap among those made by non-pathological humans, and even more overlap among those made by non-pathological humans who share a cultural heritage.
I would expect less overlap (though not zero) among the set of moral judgments made by non-humans.
I agree that if statement X (e.g. “murder is wrong”) is endorsed by all the moral judgments in a particular set, then the agents making those judgments will all agree that X is right, although perhaps to different degrees depending on peripheral particulars. Similarly, if statement Y is not endorsed by all the moral judgments in a particular set, then the agents making those judgments will not all agree that X is right.
It’s clear in the first case that right action is to abide by the implications of X. In the second case, it’s less clear what right action is.
I would expect even more overlap among those made by non-pathological humans, and even more overlap among those made by non-pathological humans who share a cultural heritage.
I would expect less overlap (though not zero) among the set of moral judgments made by non-humans.
I think the point I am trying to get across, and one of the major points made by Eliezer in this sequence is that some of the things you are referring to as moral judgements aren’t really moral judgements. Eliezer is basically saying that when you make a moral judgement you are making computations about various aspects of the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures. A judgement that refers to the huge and complex concept “the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures” is a moral judgement. A judgement that refers to some other concept is not a moral judgement, even if we use the same word to describe each.
When a sociopath says “It is good for me to kill people” he is not making a moral judgement. That is, he is not making computations related to the wellbeing of people. Quite the contrary, he is completely ignoring the wellbeing of everyone but himself. Calling what he does a moral judgement obscures the issue.
Similarly, when the pebblesorter says “It is good for pebbles to be sorted into prime numbered heaps” it is not making a moral judgement. It isn’t doing computations about the wellbeing of people, it’s doing computations about the numbers of pebbles.
You, the sociopath, and the pebblesorter are not referring to the same concepts. You are referring to the wellbeing of people, the sociopath is referring to the gratification of his impulse, the pebblesorter is referring to the primality of pebble heaps. The phrase “moral judgement” should probably not be used to refer to all these different types of judgements, as they are not judgements about the same concepts at all.
I would submit that if you removed the word “moral” and asked a pebblesorter “What action would best enhance the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures” you and the pebblesorter would agree about quite a lot. The pebblesorter would then go back to sorting pebbles because it doesn’t care about the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures. (obviously this thought experiment would not work for a sociopath because sociopaths evolved to impersonate moral people, so they would never give an honest answer).
I think most moral disagreement among creatures who care about the wellbeing of others is a case of the blind men and the elephant. People disagree because wellbeing is a complex concept and it is possible to focus on one aspect of it at the expense of others (see scope insensitivity). Another source is self deception, people want to do immoral things, but still think of themselves as moral, so they fool themselves. A final source is that, some people may genuinely care more about some aspects of wellbeing more than other people even if you remove scope insensitivity. It is only that last kind of disagreement that is irresolvable, and as I said before, it is a case for moral pluralism, not moral relativism.
For convenience, I am using the abbreviation “woec” for “wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures”.
I agree that if I asked a pebblesorter “What action would best enhance woec”, assuming we could work out a shared definition of “eudaemonic”, we would agree about quite a lot.
If a pebblesorter asked me “What action would maximize prime-numbered heaps?” we would also agree about quite a lot.
If we were to both answer the question “What action would optimize for my values?” our answers would be almost completely unrelated.
I am willing to stop using the phrase “moral judgments” in this discussion to refer to judgments about what best implements the judger’s values. This is entirely because disagreements about lexical usage are rarely productive when what we’re really interested in is the referents. That said, I also prefer in that case to avoid using the phrase “moral judgments” to refer to judgments about what best achieves woec, since I don’t actually use the phrase to mean that, which will get confusing. In fact, it’s perhaps best to avoid the phrase altogether.
I agree that a lot of disagreements about what action would best enhance woec, among creatures who value woec, is a blind men and the elephant problem.
I agree that humans often want to do things that would not best enhance woec, even when we are aware that the thing we want to do would not best enhance woec.
I agree that even among creatures who care about woec, there may not be agreement about values.
I agree that when creatures whose values matter to me don’t share values, I do well to embrace value pluralism.
That said, I also prefer in that case to avoid using the phrase “moral judgments” to refer to judgments about what best achieves woec, since I don’t actually use the phrase to mean that, which will get confusing. In fact, it’s perhaps best to avoid the phrase altogether.
If you really think that the phrase “moral judgements” is a useless and ambiguous phrase and that we shouldn’t use it, I can respect that. But if enhancing weoc isn’t what we should use the phrase “morality” to describe then what is? You also seem to nominate “optimizing for my values” as an alternative referent, but that doesn’t seem right to me. Sociopaths are generally regarded as gravely immoral, even if they efficiently implement their values, because they don’t care about the wellbeing of others. Should we really just jettison the word “morality” altogether?
I suppose that could work. Since I’ve read Eliezer’s work I’ve found that I can make the same points by substituting naturalistic statements for ones that use the word “moral.” For instance, saying “The world would be a happier place if X didn’t exist” is technically a naturalistic statement containing no value judgements, I use that a lot. But it seems like a shame to stop using such a powerful and effective word.
It’s not that I think the phrase is useless; it has many uses.
It’s that I think we use it to mean such different things I think this conversation is not well-served by introducing it. (You use it to refer to judgments related to weoc, I use it to refer to judgments related to the judger’s values.)
Yes, I would say that sociopaths make moral judgments, although their moral judgments differ from mine. I realize you would not say this, not because we disagree about sociopaths, but because we disagree about whether what sociopaths make can properly be labelled “moral judgment”.
I don’t think the labeling question is terribly important or interesting. As you say, “moral” can usefully be cashed out in other terms.
I agree that we should expect significant (though not complete) overlap within the set of moral judgments made by all humans.
I would expect even more overlap among those made by non-pathological humans, and even more overlap among those made by non-pathological humans who share a cultural heritage.
I would expect less overlap (though not zero) among the set of moral judgments made by non-humans.
I agree that if statement X (e.g. “murder is wrong”) is endorsed by all the moral judgments in a particular set, then the agents making those judgments will all agree that X is right, although perhaps to different degrees depending on peripheral particulars.
Similarly, if statement Y is not endorsed by all the moral judgments in a particular set, then the agents making those judgments will not all agree that X is right.
It’s clear in the first case that right action is to abide by the implications of X.
In the second case, it’s less clear what right action is.
I think the point I am trying to get across, and one of the major points made by Eliezer in this sequence is that some of the things you are referring to as moral judgements aren’t really moral judgements. Eliezer is basically saying that when you make a moral judgement you are making computations about various aspects of the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures. A judgement that refers to the huge and complex concept “the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures” is a moral judgement. A judgement that refers to some other concept is not a moral judgement, even if we use the same word to describe each.
When a sociopath says “It is good for me to kill people” he is not making a moral judgement. That is, he is not making computations related to the wellbeing of people. Quite the contrary, he is completely ignoring the wellbeing of everyone but himself. Calling what he does a moral judgement obscures the issue.
Similarly, when the pebblesorter says “It is good for pebbles to be sorted into prime numbered heaps” it is not making a moral judgement. It isn’t doing computations about the wellbeing of people, it’s doing computations about the numbers of pebbles.
You, the sociopath, and the pebblesorter are not referring to the same concepts. You are referring to the wellbeing of people, the sociopath is referring to the gratification of his impulse, the pebblesorter is referring to the primality of pebble heaps. The phrase “moral judgement” should probably not be used to refer to all these different types of judgements, as they are not judgements about the same concepts at all.
I would submit that if you removed the word “moral” and asked a pebblesorter “What action would best enhance the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures” you and the pebblesorter would agree about quite a lot. The pebblesorter would then go back to sorting pebbles because it doesn’t care about the wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures. (obviously this thought experiment would not work for a sociopath because sociopaths evolved to impersonate moral people, so they would never give an honest answer).
I think most moral disagreement among creatures who care about the wellbeing of others is a case of the blind men and the elephant. People disagree because wellbeing is a complex concept and it is possible to focus on one aspect of it at the expense of others (see scope insensitivity). Another source is self deception, people want to do immoral things, but still think of themselves as moral, so they fool themselves. A final source is that, some people may genuinely care more about some aspects of wellbeing more than other people even if you remove scope insensitivity. It is only that last kind of disagreement that is irresolvable, and as I said before, it is a case for moral pluralism, not moral relativism.
For convenience, I am using the abbreviation “woec” for “wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures”.
I agree that if I asked a pebblesorter “What action would best enhance woec”, assuming we could work out a shared definition of “eudaemonic”, we would agree about quite a lot.
If a pebblesorter asked me “What action would maximize prime-numbered heaps?” we would also agree about quite a lot.
If we were to both answer the question “What action would optimize for my values?” our answers would be almost completely unrelated.
I am willing to stop using the phrase “moral judgments” in this discussion to refer to judgments about what best implements the judger’s values. This is entirely because disagreements about lexical usage are rarely productive when what we’re really interested in is the referents. That said, I also prefer in that case to avoid using the phrase “moral judgments” to refer to judgments about what best achieves woec, since I don’t actually use the phrase to mean that, which will get confusing. In fact, it’s perhaps best to avoid the phrase altogether.
I agree that a lot of disagreements about what action would best enhance woec, among creatures who value woec, is a blind men and the elephant problem.
I agree that humans often want to do things that would not best enhance woec, even when we are aware that the thing we want to do would not best enhance woec.
I agree that even among creatures who care about woec, there may not be agreement about values.
I agree that when creatures whose values matter to me don’t share values, I do well to embrace value pluralism.
I am happy we are on the same page.
If you really think that the phrase “moral judgements” is a useless and ambiguous phrase and that we shouldn’t use it, I can respect that. But if enhancing weoc isn’t what we should use the phrase “morality” to describe then what is? You also seem to nominate “optimizing for my values” as an alternative referent, but that doesn’t seem right to me. Sociopaths are generally regarded as gravely immoral, even if they efficiently implement their values, because they don’t care about the wellbeing of others. Should we really just jettison the word “morality” altogether?
I suppose that could work. Since I’ve read Eliezer’s work I’ve found that I can make the same points by substituting naturalistic statements for ones that use the word “moral.” For instance, saying “The world would be a happier place if X didn’t exist” is technically a naturalistic statement containing no value judgements, I use that a lot. But it seems like a shame to stop using such a powerful and effective word.
It’s not that I think the phrase is useless; it has many uses.
It’s that I think we use it to mean such different things I think this conversation is not well-served by introducing it. (You use it to refer to judgments related to weoc, I use it to refer to judgments related to the judger’s values.)
Yes, I would say that sociopaths make moral judgments, although their moral judgments differ from mine. I realize you would not say this, not because we disagree about sociopaths, but because we disagree about whether what sociopaths make can properly be labelled “moral judgment”.
I don’t think the labeling question is terribly important or interesting. As you say, “moral” can usefully be cashed out in other terms.