For convenience, I am using the abbreviation “woec” for “wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures”.
I agree that if I asked a pebblesorter “What action would best enhance woec”, assuming we could work out a shared definition of “eudaemonic”, we would agree about quite a lot.
If a pebblesorter asked me “What action would maximize prime-numbered heaps?” we would also agree about quite a lot.
If we were to both answer the question “What action would optimize for my values?” our answers would be almost completely unrelated.
I am willing to stop using the phrase “moral judgments” in this discussion to refer to judgments about what best implements the judger’s values. This is entirely because disagreements about lexical usage are rarely productive when what we’re really interested in is the referents. That said, I also prefer in that case to avoid using the phrase “moral judgments” to refer to judgments about what best achieves woec, since I don’t actually use the phrase to mean that, which will get confusing. In fact, it’s perhaps best to avoid the phrase altogether.
I agree that a lot of disagreements about what action would best enhance woec, among creatures who value woec, is a blind men and the elephant problem.
I agree that humans often want to do things that would not best enhance woec, even when we are aware that the thing we want to do would not best enhance woec.
I agree that even among creatures who care about woec, there may not be agreement about values.
I agree that when creatures whose values matter to me don’t share values, I do well to embrace value pluralism.
That said, I also prefer in that case to avoid using the phrase “moral judgments” to refer to judgments about what best achieves woec, since I don’t actually use the phrase to mean that, which will get confusing. In fact, it’s perhaps best to avoid the phrase altogether.
If you really think that the phrase “moral judgements” is a useless and ambiguous phrase and that we shouldn’t use it, I can respect that. But if enhancing weoc isn’t what we should use the phrase “morality” to describe then what is? You also seem to nominate “optimizing for my values” as an alternative referent, but that doesn’t seem right to me. Sociopaths are generally regarded as gravely immoral, even if they efficiently implement their values, because they don’t care about the wellbeing of others. Should we really just jettison the word “morality” altogether?
I suppose that could work. Since I’ve read Eliezer’s work I’ve found that I can make the same points by substituting naturalistic statements for ones that use the word “moral.” For instance, saying “The world would be a happier place if X didn’t exist” is technically a naturalistic statement containing no value judgements, I use that a lot. But it seems like a shame to stop using such a powerful and effective word.
It’s not that I think the phrase is useless; it has many uses.
It’s that I think we use it to mean such different things I think this conversation is not well-served by introducing it. (You use it to refer to judgments related to weoc, I use it to refer to judgments related to the judger’s values.)
Yes, I would say that sociopaths make moral judgments, although their moral judgments differ from mine. I realize you would not say this, not because we disagree about sociopaths, but because we disagree about whether what sociopaths make can properly be labelled “moral judgment”.
I don’t think the labeling question is terribly important or interesting. As you say, “moral” can usefully be cashed out in other terms.
For convenience, I am using the abbreviation “woec” for “wellbeing of eudaemonic creatures”.
I agree that if I asked a pebblesorter “What action would best enhance woec”, assuming we could work out a shared definition of “eudaemonic”, we would agree about quite a lot.
If a pebblesorter asked me “What action would maximize prime-numbered heaps?” we would also agree about quite a lot.
If we were to both answer the question “What action would optimize for my values?” our answers would be almost completely unrelated.
I am willing to stop using the phrase “moral judgments” in this discussion to refer to judgments about what best implements the judger’s values. This is entirely because disagreements about lexical usage are rarely productive when what we’re really interested in is the referents. That said, I also prefer in that case to avoid using the phrase “moral judgments” to refer to judgments about what best achieves woec, since I don’t actually use the phrase to mean that, which will get confusing. In fact, it’s perhaps best to avoid the phrase altogether.
I agree that a lot of disagreements about what action would best enhance woec, among creatures who value woec, is a blind men and the elephant problem.
I agree that humans often want to do things that would not best enhance woec, even when we are aware that the thing we want to do would not best enhance woec.
I agree that even among creatures who care about woec, there may not be agreement about values.
I agree that when creatures whose values matter to me don’t share values, I do well to embrace value pluralism.
I am happy we are on the same page.
If you really think that the phrase “moral judgements” is a useless and ambiguous phrase and that we shouldn’t use it, I can respect that. But if enhancing weoc isn’t what we should use the phrase “morality” to describe then what is? You also seem to nominate “optimizing for my values” as an alternative referent, but that doesn’t seem right to me. Sociopaths are generally regarded as gravely immoral, even if they efficiently implement their values, because they don’t care about the wellbeing of others. Should we really just jettison the word “morality” altogether?
I suppose that could work. Since I’ve read Eliezer’s work I’ve found that I can make the same points by substituting naturalistic statements for ones that use the word “moral.” For instance, saying “The world would be a happier place if X didn’t exist” is technically a naturalistic statement containing no value judgements, I use that a lot. But it seems like a shame to stop using such a powerful and effective word.
It’s not that I think the phrase is useless; it has many uses.
It’s that I think we use it to mean such different things I think this conversation is not well-served by introducing it. (You use it to refer to judgments related to weoc, I use it to refer to judgments related to the judger’s values.)
Yes, I would say that sociopaths make moral judgments, although their moral judgments differ from mine. I realize you would not say this, not because we disagree about sociopaths, but because we disagree about whether what sociopaths make can properly be labelled “moral judgment”.
I don’t think the labeling question is terribly important or interesting. As you say, “moral” can usefully be cashed out in other terms.