Instead, their disagreement lies elsewhere. They still disagree about what action has the highest expected value when an agent is faced with Newcomb’s dilemma.
I agree with Wei. There is no reason to talk about “highest expected value” specifically, that would be merely a less clear option on the same list as CDT and EDT recommendations. We need to find the correct decision instead, expected value or not.
Playing Eliezer-post-ping-pong, you are almost demanding “But what do you mean by truth?”. When an idea is unclear, there will be ways of stipulating a precise but even less accurate definition. Thus, you move away from the truth, even as you increase the clarity of discussion and defensibility of the arguments.
you are almost demanding “But what do you mean by truth?”. When an idea is unclear, there will be ways of stipulating a precise but even less accurate definition. Thus, you move away from the truth, even as you increase the clarity of discussion and defensibility of the arguments.
No, I agree there are important things to investigate for which we don’t have clear definitions. That’s why I keep talking about ‘empathic metaethics.’
Also, by ‘less accurate definition’ do you just mean that a stipulated definition can differ from the intuitive definition that we don’t have access to? Well of course. But why privilege the intuitive definition by saying a stipulated definition is ‘less accurate’ than it is? I suspect that intuitive definitions are often much less successful at capturing an empirical cluster than some stipulated definitions. Example: ‘planet’.
Also, by ‘less accurate definition’ do you just mean that a stipulated definition can differ from the intuitive definition that we don’t have access to?
Not “just”. Not every change is an improvement, but every improvement is a change. There can be better definitions of whatever the intuitions are talking about, and they will differ from the intuitive definitions. But when the purpose of discussion is referred by an unclear intuition with no other easy ways to reach it, stipulating a different definition would normally be a change that is not an improvement.
I suspect that intuitive definitions are often much less successful at capturing an empirical cluster than some stipulated definitions.
It’s not easy to find a more successful definition of the same thing. You can’t always just say “taboo” and pick the best thought that decades of careful research failed to rule out. Sometimes the intuitive definition is still better, or, more to the point, the precise explicit definition still misses the point.
I agree with Wei. There is no reason to talk about “highest expected value” specifically, that would be merely a less clear option on the same list as CDT and EDT recommendations. We need to find the correct decision instead, expected value or not.
Playing Eliezer-post-ping-pong, you are almost demanding “But what do you mean by truth?”. When an idea is unclear, there will be ways of stipulating a precise but even less accurate definition. Thus, you move away from the truth, even as you increase the clarity of discussion and defensibility of the arguments.
I updated the bit about expected value here.
No, I agree there are important things to investigate for which we don’t have clear definitions. That’s why I keep talking about ‘empathic metaethics.’
Also, by ‘less accurate definition’ do you just mean that a stipulated definition can differ from the intuitive definition that we don’t have access to? Well of course. But why privilege the intuitive definition by saying a stipulated definition is ‘less accurate’ than it is? I suspect that intuitive definitions are often much less successful at capturing an empirical cluster than some stipulated definitions. Example: ‘planet’.
Not “just”. Not every change is an improvement, but every improvement is a change. There can be better definitions of whatever the intuitions are talking about, and they will differ from the intuitive definitions. But when the purpose of discussion is referred by an unclear intuition with no other easy ways to reach it, stipulating a different definition would normally be a change that is not an improvement.
It’s not easy to find a more successful definition of the same thing. You can’t always just say “taboo” and pick the best thought that decades of careful research failed to rule out. Sometimes the intuitive definition is still better, or, more to the point, the precise explicit definition still misses the point.