Some things you can’t define exactly, only refer to them with some measure of accuracy. Physical facts are like this. Morality is like this. Rational agents don’t define morality, they respond to it, they are imperfect detectors of moral facts who would use their moral expertise to improve own ability to detect moral facts or build other tools capable of that. There is nothing circular here, just constant aspiration for referencing the unreachable ideal through changeable means.
But there aren’t causal arrows pointing from morality to rational agents, are there? Just acausal/timeless arrows.
You do have to define “morality” as meaning “that thing that we’re trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy”, whereas “red” is not defined to refer to the same thing.
But there aren’t causal arrows pointing from morality to rational agents, are there? Just acausal/timeless arrows.
I think the idea of acausal/logical control captures what causality was meant to capture in more detail, and is a proper generalization of it. So I’d say that there are indeed “causal” arrows from morality to decisions of agents, to the extent the idea of “causal” dependence is used correctly and not restricted to the way we define physical laws on a certain level of detail.
You do have to define “morality” as meaning “that thing that we’re trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy”
Why would I define it so? It’s indeed what we are trying to refer to, but what it is exactly we cannot know.
whereas “red” is not defined to refer to the same thing.
Lost me here. We know enough about morality to say that it’s not the same thing as “red”, yes.
I think the idea of acausal/logical control captures what causality was meant to capture in more detail, and is a proper generation of it. So I’d say that there are indeed “causal” arrows from morality to decisions of agents, to the extent the idea of “causal” dependence is used correctly and not restricted to the way we define physical laws on a certain level of detail.
Sure.
Why would I define it so? It’s indeed what we are trying to refer to, but what it is exactly we cannot know.
Let me rephrase a bit.
“That thing, over there (which we’re trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy), point point”.
I’m defining it extensionally, except for the fact that it doesn’t physically exist.
There has to be some kind of definition or else we wouldn’t know what we were talking about, even if it’s extensional and hard to put into words.
Lost me here. We know enough about morality to say that it’s not the same thing as “red”, yes.
“red” and “right” have different extensional definitions.
This is true, but my claim that words have to have a (possibly extensional) definition for us to use them, and that “right” has an extensional definition, stands.
Does “whatever’s written in that book” work as the appropriate kind of “extensional definition” for this purpose? If so, I agree, that’s what I mean by “using without knowing”. (As I understand it, it’s not the right way of using the term “extensional definition”, since you are not giving examples, you are describing a procedure for interacting with the fact in question.)
Some things you can’t define exactly, only refer to them with some measure of accuracy. Physical facts are like this. Morality is like this. Rational agents don’t define morality, they respond to it, they are imperfect detectors of moral facts who would use their moral expertise to improve own ability to detect moral facts or build other tools capable of that. There is nothing circular here, just constant aspiration for referencing the unreachable ideal through changeable means.
But there aren’t causal arrows pointing from morality to rational agents, are there? Just acausal/timeless arrows.
You do have to define “morality” as meaning “that thing that we’re trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy”, whereas “red” is not defined to refer to the same thing.
If you agree, I think we’re on the same page.
I think the idea of acausal/logical control captures what causality was meant to capture in more detail, and is a proper generalization of it. So I’d say that there are indeed “causal” arrows from morality to decisions of agents, to the extent the idea of “causal” dependence is used correctly and not restricted to the way we define physical laws on a certain level of detail.
Why would I define it so? It’s indeed what we are trying to refer to, but what it is exactly we cannot know.
Lost me here. We know enough about morality to say that it’s not the same thing as “red”, yes.
Sure.
Let me rephrase a bit.
“That thing, over there (which we’re trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy), point point”.
I’m defining it extensionally, except for the fact that it doesn’t physically exist.
There has to be some kind of definition or else we wouldn’t know what we were talking about, even if it’s extensional and hard to put into words.
“red” and “right” have different extensional definitions.
I suspect there is a difference between knowing things and being able to use them, neither generally implying the other.
This is true, but my claim that words have to have a (possibly extensional) definition for us to use them, and that “right” has an extensional definition, stands.
Does “whatever’s written in that book” work as the appropriate kind of “extensional definition” for this purpose? If so, I agree, that’s what I mean by “using without knowing”. (As I understand it, it’s not the right way of using the term “extensional definition”, since you are not giving examples, you are describing a procedure for interacting with the fact in question.)
It’s sort of subtle.
“Whatever’s written in the book at the location given by this formula: ”
defines a word totally in terms of other words, which I would call intensional.
“Whatever’s written in THAT book, point point”
points at the meaning, what I would call extensional.