… I follow that intuition all the way down and think that stuff in general shouldn’t be destroyed unnecessarily.
I’ve been reading your vegetarian comments with interest. Can you please explain how you don’t think stuff should be destroyed unnecessarily, yet would not care if an entire species vanished?
Is it that it’s somehow ok if something is destroyed as long as it’s not intentional? I.e., if a famous painting was about to fall into a fire or something accidentally, it seems to me (if I follow your logic) you would catch it if you could do so without undue danger to your person, even if you didn’t particularly like the painting. So how can you be ok with cows (or, let’s say pigs, since as far as I know they are not used for leather or milk) going extinct?
Can you please explain how you don’t think stuff should be destroyed unnecessarily, yet would not care if an entire species vanished?
I distinguish between taking action to destroy something, and ceasing to take measures to preserve it. The domestic cow species, as well as the domestic pig species, requires continual human support to keep it in existence. I would not have any problem with cows or pigs ceasing to exist if the following conditions were met:
No person anywhere just plain likes cows (pigs) and wants them around.
Cows (pigs) serve no purpose of any person, directly or indirectly, and are not reasonably expected to do so in the future.
The continued existence of the cow (pig) species takes up resources that could be diverted elsewhere, to more useful ends.
The extinction of the cow (pig) species does not require active destructive participation on the part of any person.
I would have problems of greater or lesser degree with the extinction of cows (pigs) if any of the above conditions were not fully met, as in fact they are not at this time.
Is it that it’s somehow ok if something is destroyed as long as it’s not intentional?
I’m usually careful to specify that I think an action can be unethical only if it was intentional or negligent.
In using words like “bad” or “okay”, instead of “unethical” or “right” or whatever, you might be latching onto useful concepts, but they’re not concepts I have clear definitions for or use when I think about this sort of problem. I’m not a consequentialist and theory of value isn’t a component of ethics that I find especially interesting; I’m concerned with right and wrong over good and bad. Since apparently you think I’ve changed something important by recasting your question in terms relevant to what I thought we were talking about, can you recast it yourself without making it about what’s “good”? I usually reserve that word for extremely casual use.
I guess I ascribe positive/negative value to states of the world. I.e., art exists, I think that is good (even the pieces I don’t get), cows exist, that is good, chinchillas exist, that is good (even though I don’t have a use for them, don’t find them cute, don’t use their leather or milk, etc), HIV exists, that is probably not good. Actions that make the world into a better state are good, those that make it worse are bad. An action that makes the world into a worse state before it makes it into a better one is generally not good. If there is a name for this position I’d love to hear it. :) And yes, I realize that what I’ve termed “good” is probably somewhat arbitrary.
I am thinking out loud here—maybe this will explain the disconnect.
I have to take serious issue with not finding chinchillas cute. What is wrong with you?
What is the qualitative difference in goodness between hypothetical useless, unloved, resource-draining, methane-farting future cows, and a species I assume it was fine and dandy to destroy: smallpox?
OK, I take back the bit about chinchillas. Google says they’re cuter than I remember them being. Substitute, uhhh, boa constrictors.
Smallpox was known to actively cause severe harm to those it infected, and there wasn’t really anything those people could have done to prevent infection. I think that outweighs any potential beneficial uses we might find for it in the future.
Smallpox harmed the people it infected; hypothetical useless unloved resource-draining methane-farting future cows (HUURDMFFC) harm the people who could benefit from the resources they divert and who want to live in a world with less methane. This seems like a quantitative difference to me, not a qualitative one.
I don’t know about you, but I like snakes and I would be sad if boa constrictors went extinct.
Elsewhere (http://lesswrong.com/lw/14r/unspeakable_morality/10jc) you said:
I’ve been reading your vegetarian comments with interest. Can you please explain how you don’t think stuff should be destroyed unnecessarily, yet would not care if an entire species vanished?
Is it that it’s somehow ok if something is destroyed as long as it’s not intentional? I.e., if a famous painting was about to fall into a fire or something accidentally, it seems to me (if I follow your logic) you would catch it if you could do so without undue danger to your person, even if you didn’t particularly like the painting. So how can you be ok with cows (or, let’s say pigs, since as far as I know they are not used for leather or milk) going extinct?
I distinguish between taking action to destroy something, and ceasing to take measures to preserve it. The domestic cow species, as well as the domestic pig species, requires continual human support to keep it in existence. I would not have any problem with cows or pigs ceasing to exist if the following conditions were met:
No person anywhere just plain likes cows (pigs) and wants them around.
Cows (pigs) serve no purpose of any person, directly or indirectly, and are not reasonably expected to do so in the future.
The continued existence of the cow (pig) species takes up resources that could be diverted elsewhere, to more useful ends.
The extinction of the cow (pig) species does not require active destructive participation on the part of any person.
I would have problems of greater or lesser degree with the extinction of cows (pigs) if any of the above conditions were not fully met, as in fact they are not at this time.
I’m usually careful to specify that I think an action can be unethical only if it was intentional or negligent.
...Which is why I didn’t use the world “ethical” :)
More to the point,
So I gather that it is the act of destruction you find bad, and not the loss of the thing destroyed?
(And my follow-up question if you answer in the affirmative: Why, then, is it bad to destroy things?)
(And don’t construe this line of questioning as disagreeing or agreeing with you; I’m just trying to understand your point of view)
In using words like “bad” or “okay”, instead of “unethical” or “right” or whatever, you might be latching onto useful concepts, but they’re not concepts I have clear definitions for or use when I think about this sort of problem. I’m not a consequentialist and theory of value isn’t a component of ethics that I find especially interesting; I’m concerned with right and wrong over good and bad. Since apparently you think I’ve changed something important by recasting your question in terms relevant to what I thought we were talking about, can you recast it yourself without making it about what’s “good”? I usually reserve that word for extremely casual use.
I see, I think.
I guess I ascribe positive/negative value to states of the world. I.e., art exists, I think that is good (even the pieces I don’t get), cows exist, that is good, chinchillas exist, that is good (even though I don’t have a use for them, don’t find them cute, don’t use their leather or milk, etc), HIV exists, that is probably not good. Actions that make the world into a better state are good, those that make it worse are bad. An action that makes the world into a worse state before it makes it into a better one is generally not good. If there is a name for this position I’d love to hear it. :) And yes, I realize that what I’ve termed “good” is probably somewhat arbitrary.
I am thinking out loud here—maybe this will explain the disconnect.
I have to take serious issue with not finding chinchillas cute. What is wrong with you?
What is the qualitative difference in goodness between hypothetical useless, unloved, resource-draining, methane-farting future cows, and a species I assume it was fine and dandy to destroy: smallpox?
OK, I take back the bit about chinchillas. Google says they’re cuter than I remember them being. Substitute, uhhh, boa constrictors.
Smallpox was known to actively cause severe harm to those it infected, and there wasn’t really anything those people could have done to prevent infection. I think that outweighs any potential beneficial uses we might find for it in the future.
Smallpox harmed the people it infected; hypothetical useless unloved resource-draining methane-farting future cows (HUURDMFFC) harm the people who could benefit from the resources they divert and who want to live in a world with less methane. This seems like a quantitative difference to me, not a qualitative one.
I don’t know about you, but I like snakes and I would be sad if boa constrictors went extinct.