But the idea that a human being is a state machine running on a distributed neural computation is just a hypothesis, and I would argue that it is a hypothesis in contradiction with so much of the phenomenological data, that we really ought to look for a more sophisticated refinement of the idea.
I’m not aware of any “phenomenological data” that contradicts computationalism.
You have to factor in the idea that human brains have evolved to believe themselves to be mega-special and valuable. Once you have accounted for this, no phenomenological data contradicts computationalism.
I’m not aware of any “phenomenological data” that contradicts computationalism.
You have to factor in the idea that human brains have evolved to believe themselves to be mega-special and valuable. Once you have accounted for this, no phenomenological data contradicts computationalism.
If you want to downvote this comment, I think you should provide some kind of rebuttal...