I think you misdiagnosed the source of responsibility. In keeping with your Syria example, suppose you gave some Syrian advise on how to rebel. Then you’d probably feel responsibility for him even if you don’t identify with Syrians. I would argue that responsibility is more based on a (possibly implicit) contract (e.g., if you give advise thus you are responsible for its quality) then on identity.
I think that at the point where you give them advice, if you identify with your actions, that action becomes part of your identity, so the responsibility-is-a-hack-on-identity (or is it the other way) hypothesis also predicts feelings of responsibility.
Maybe you have other examples that might better distinguish them?
Maybe you have other examples that might better distinguish them?
For example, while I was a TA I felt much more responsible for helping students during office hours then at other times, even though I don’t think how much I identified with then changed during those times.
I think you misdiagnosed the source of responsibility. In keeping with your Syria example, suppose you gave some Syrian advise on how to rebel. Then you’d probably feel responsibility for him even if you don’t identify with Syrians. I would argue that responsibility is more based on a (possibly implicit) contract (e.g., if you give advise thus you are responsible for its quality) then on identity.
I think that at the point where you give them advice, if you identify with your actions, that action becomes part of your identity, so the responsibility-is-a-hack-on-identity (or is it the other way) hypothesis also predicts feelings of responsibility.
Maybe you have other examples that might better distinguish them?
For example, while I was a TA I felt much more responsible for helping students during office hours then at other times, even though I don’t think how much I identified with then changed during those times.
Hmm, that’s a good one. Your contract model seems reasonable enough. I’ll think about it some more.