I don’t claim to have a perfect nonperson predicate, I’m attacking yours as excluding entities that are clearly conscious.
In other words, the matrix lord IS the laws of physics.
Well, they can manipulate them. I’ll specify that they are roughly equivalent to a sim of a human at the same level, if that helps.
They exist beyond judgement from this layer.
Could you just go down the list and answer the questions?
Actual things are made out of something besides information; there is a sense in which concrete things exist and abstract things (like simulations) don’t exist.
Is there? Really? A sim isn’t floating in platonic space, you know.
Because that position requires that either a set of numbers or every universal Turing machine is conscious and capable of experiencing harm.
A set of numbers can’t be conscious. A set of numbers interpreted as computer code and run can be. Or, for that matter, interpreted as genetic code and cloned.
Plus if a simulation can be conscious you need to describe a difference between a conscious sim and a dorf.
As noted above, I don’t claim to have a perfect nonperson predicate. However, since you ask, a sim is doing everything the origional (who I believe was probably as conscious as I am based on their actions and brainscans) was—when they see a red ball, virtual neurons light up in the same patterns the real one did; when they talk about experiencing qualia of a red ball, the same thoughts run through their mind and if I was smart enough to decode them from real neurons I could decode them from virtual ones too.
Both of them are mathematical constructs, so your original objection is invalid.
And both humans and rocks (or insects) are physical constructs. My objection is not that it is a mathematical construct, but that it is one too simple to support the complexity of conscious thought.
Dorfs have souls, noted as such in the code; how are the souls of sims qualitatively different?
Eh? Writing “soul” on something does not a person make. Writing “hot” on something does not a fire make, either.
The laws of physics copies you. Both copies are next to you. Is the copy a person? Is it you?
It is a person, and it is as much me as I am- it has a descendent one tick later which is as much me` as the descendent of the other copy. Here we hit the ship problem.
The laws of physics copies your friend, Bob. The copy is next to Bob Is the copy still Bob?
The descendant of the copy is as much Bob as the descendent of the original.
The laws of physics copies you. The copy exists in a universe with different rules. Is the copy a person? Is it you?
That depends on the rules of the simulation in which the copy exists; assuming it is only the starting condition which differs, the two are indistinguishable.
Duplicate
Duplicate
You meet a robot. As far as you can tell, it is as sentient as your friend Bob. Is the robot a person?
If ‘person’ is understood to mean ‘sentient’, then I conclude that the robot is a person. If ‘person’ is understood to mean ‘human’, then I conclude that the robot is a robot.
The laws of physics scans your brain, simplifies it down to pure math (as complex as required to avoid changing how anything behaves) and programs this into the brain of a robot. Is this robot a person? Is it you?
Assuming that the premise is possible; assuming that life-support is also maintained identically (the brain of the robot has identical blood flow through it, which requires that the robot brain have a physically identical structure); the robot is as sentient as I am and it’s decisions are defined to be identical to mine. It is not as much me as the direct descendent of me is.
The laws of physicscauses to appear a simulating machine with a copy of your brainThey connect a robot to the simulation. Is the result a person? Is it you?
Assuming that the robot uses a perfect simulation of a brain instead of a real one, it is as sentient as if it were using a brain. It is not identical with the previous robot nor with me.
The laws of physics tortures you for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
Undesirable. Since the matrix lord does not make decisions in any context I am aware of, it can’t be wrong.
The laws of physics tortures your friend Bob for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
Ditto
The laws of physics tortures you for a thousand years, then the universe returns to a state identical to the state prior to the torture. Is the result the same person who was tortured? Is the result the same person as before the torture?
‘Same’ has lost meaning in this context.
The laws of physics tortures you for a thousand years, then the universe returns to a state identical to the state prior to the torture. Is this wrong in your estimation?
I can’t tell the difference between this case and any contrary case; either way, I observe a universe in which I have not yet been tortured.
It is not always meaningful to refer to ‘human’ when referencing a different level. What is a matrix lord, and how do I tell the difference between a matrix lord and physics?
Well, a matrix lord can talk, assume a human shape, respond to verbal requests etc. as well as modify the current laws of physics (including stuff like conjuring a seat out of thin air, which is more like using physical law that was clearly engineered for their benefit.
However, the questions are meant to be considered in the abstract; please assume you know with certainty that this occurred, for simplicity.
A matrix lord copies you. Both copies are in the same layer of simulation you currently occupy. Is the copy a person? Is it you?
A matrix lord copies your friend, Bob. Is the copy still Bob?
A matrix lord copies you. The copy is in another simulation, but one no “deeper” than this one. Is the copy a person? Is it you?
A matrix lord copies you. The copy is one layer “deeper” than this one. Is the copy a person? Is it you?
A matrix lord copies your friend Bob. Is the copy a person? Is it Bob?
A matrix lord copied you, without your knowledge. You are one layer deeper than the original. Are you a person? Are you still “you”?
You meet a robot. As far as you can tell, it is as sentient as your friend Bob. Is the robot a person?
A matrix lord scans your brain, simplifies it down to pure math (as complex as required to avoid changing how anything behaves) and programs this into the brain of a robot. Is this robot a person? Is it you?
A matrix lord copies your brain. The copy is one layer deeper than the original. They connect a robot in your original layer to the simulation. Is the result a person? Is it you?
A matrix lord tortures you for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
A matrix lord tortures your friend Bob for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
A matrix lord tortures you for a thousand years, then resets the program to before the torture began. Is the result the same person who was tortured? Is the result the same person as before the torture?
A matrix lord tortures you for a thousand years, then resets the program. Is this wrong in your estimation?
The matrix lord can cause a person to poof into (or out of) existence, but the person so created is not a matrix lord. If the matrix lord is communicating to me (for example, by editing the air density in the room to cause me to hear spoken words, or by editing my brain so that I hear the words, or editing my brain so that I believe, the edits used by the lord are different from him.
I don’t see what the distinction is between “Objects have now accelerated toward each other by an amount proportional to the product of their masses divided by the cube of the distance between them” and “There is now a chair here.” Both are equally meaningful as ‘physical law’.
Fair enough. Your evidence that the Matrix Lord exists is probably laws of physics being changed in ways that appear to be the work of intelligence, and conveying information claiming to be from a Matrix Lord.
Or they could have edited your brain to think so; the point is that you are reasonably certain that the events described in the question actually happened.
How about if it’s Omega, and you’re real as far as you can tell:
Omega duplicates you. Is the copy a person? Is it you?
Omega duplicates your friend, Bob. Is the copy still Bob?
Omega simulates you. Is this sim a person? Is it you?
Omega duplicates your friend Bob. Is the copy a person? Is it Bob?
Omegacopied you, without your knowledge. You are actually in a simulation. Are you a person? Are you still “you”?
You meet a robot. As far as you can tell, it is as sentient as your friend Bob. Is the robot a person?
Omega scans your brain, simplifies it down to pure math (as complex as required to avoid changing how anything behaves) and programs this into the brain of a robot. Is this robot a person? Is it you?
Omega scans your brain. He then simulates it. Then he connects a (real) robot to the simulation. Is the result a person? Is it you?
Omega tortures you for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
Omega tortures your friend Bob for a thousand years. Is this wrong, in your estimation?
Omega tortures you for a thousand years, then “resets” you with nanotech to before the torture began. Is the result the same person who was tortured? Is the result the same person as before the torture?
Omega tortures you for a thousand years, then “resets” you with nanotech. Is this wrong in your estimation?
And a new one, to balance out the question that required you to be in a sim:
Omega scans you and simulates you. The simulation tells you that it’s still conscious, experiences qualia etc. and admits this seems to contradict it’s position on the ethics of simulations. Do you change your mind on anything?
Define “duplicates”, “original”, and “same” well enough to answer the Ship of Theseus problem.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
If not, what additional aspects need be included? If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious? Because I assumed that’s what you meant by
So, I am reasonably certain that I am (part of?) a number which is being processed by an algorithm.
That breaks all of my moral values, and I have to start again from scratch.
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
So, it passes the Turing test, as I adjudicate it? It’s a simulation of me which sits at a computer and engages with me over the internet?
When I tell you that you are the copy of me, and prove it without significantly changing the conditions of the simulation or breaking the laws of physics, I predict that you will change your position. Promptly remove the nearest deck of cards from the pack, and throw it against the ceiling fairly hard. Only all of the black cards will land face up.
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious?
When I recognize that numbers in general are conscious entities which experience all things simultaneously, (proof: Consider the set of all universal turing machines. Select a UTM which takes this number as input and simulates a world with some set of arbitrary conditions.) I stop caring about conscious entities and reevaluate what is and is not an agent.
I don’t claim to have a perfect nonperson predicate, I’m attacking yours as excluding entities that are clearly conscious.
Well, they can manipulate them. I’ll specify that they are roughly equivalent to a sim of a human at the same level, if that helps.
Could you just go down the list and answer the questions?
Is there? Really? A sim isn’t floating in platonic space, you know.
A set of numbers can’t be conscious. A set of numbers interpreted as computer code and run can be. Or, for that matter, interpreted as genetic code and cloned.
As noted above, I don’t claim to have a perfect nonperson predicate. However, since you ask, a sim is doing everything the origional (who I believe was probably as conscious as I am based on their actions and brainscans) was—when they see a red ball, virtual neurons light up in the same patterns the real one did; when they talk about experiencing qualia of a red ball, the same thoughts run through their mind and if I was smart enough to decode them from real neurons I could decode them from virtual ones too.
And both humans and rocks (or insects) are physical constructs. My objection is not that it is a mathematical construct, but that it is one too simple to support the complexity of conscious thought.
Eh? Writing “soul” on something does not a person make. Writing “hot” on something does not a fire make, either.
Now that I have the time and capability:
It is a person, and it is as much me as I am- it has a descendent one tick later which is as much me` as the descendent of the other copy. Here we hit the ship problem.
The descendant of the copy is as much Bob as the descendent of the original.
That depends on the rules of the simulation in which the copy exists; assuming it is only the starting condition which differs, the two are indistinguishable.
If ‘person’ is understood to mean ‘sentient’, then I conclude that the robot is a person. If ‘person’ is understood to mean ‘human’, then I conclude that the robot is a robot.
Assuming that the premise is possible; assuming that life-support is also maintained identically (the brain of the robot has identical blood flow through it, which requires that the robot brain have a physically identical structure); the robot is as sentient as I am and it’s decisions are defined to be identical to mine. It is not as much me as the direct descendent of me is.
Assuming that the robot uses a perfect simulation of a brain instead of a real one, it is as sentient as if it were using a brain. It is not identical with the previous robot nor with me.
Undesirable. Since the matrix lord does not make decisions in any context I am aware of, it can’t be wrong.
Ditto
‘Same’ has lost meaning in this context.
I can’t tell the difference between this case and any contrary case; either way, I observe a universe in which I have not yet been tortured.
It is not always meaningful to refer to ‘human’ when referencing a different level. What is a matrix lord, and how do I tell the difference between a matrix lord and physics?
Well, a matrix lord can talk, assume a human shape, respond to verbal requests etc. as well as modify the current laws of physics (including stuff like conjuring a seat out of thin air, which is more like using physical law that was clearly engineered for their benefit.
However, the questions are meant to be considered in the abstract; please assume you know with certainty that this occurred, for simplicity.
The matrix lord can cause a person to poof into (or out of) existence, but the person so created is not a matrix lord. If the matrix lord is communicating to me (for example, by editing the air density in the room to cause me to hear spoken words, or by editing my brain so that I hear the words, or editing my brain so that I believe, the edits used by the lord are different from him.
I don’t see what the distinction is between “Objects have now accelerated toward each other by an amount proportional to the product of their masses divided by the cube of the distance between them” and “There is now a chair here.” Both are equally meaningful as ‘physical law’.
Fair enough. Your evidence that the Matrix Lord exists is probably laws of physics being changed in ways that appear to be the work of intelligence, and conveying information claiming to be from a Matrix Lord.
Or they could have edited your brain to think so; the point is that you are reasonably certain that the events described in the question actually happened.
So, I am reasonably certain that I am (part of?) a number which is being processed by an algorithm.
That breaks all of my moral values, and I have to start again from scratch.
Cop-out: I decide whatever the matrix lord chooses for me to decide.
Fair enough.
How about if it’s Omega, and you’re real as far as you can tell:
And a new one, to balance out the question that required you to be in a sim:
Omega scans you and simulates you. The simulation tells you that it’s still conscious, experiences qualia etc. and admits this seems to contradict it’s position on the ethics of simulations. Do you change your mind on anything?
Define “duplicates”, “original”, and “same” well enough to answer the Ship of Theseus problem.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
If not, what additional aspects need be included? If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious? Because I assumed that’s what you meant by
So, it passes the Turing test, as I adjudicate it? It’s a simulation of me which sits at a computer and engages with me over the internet?
When I tell you that you are the copy of me, and prove it without significantly changing the conditions of the simulation or breaking the laws of physics, I predict that you will change your position. Promptly remove the nearest deck of cards from the pack, and throw it against the ceiling fairly hard. Only all of the black cards will land face up.
When I recognize that numbers in general are conscious entities which experience all things simultaneously, (proof: Consider the set of all universal turing machines. Select a UTM which takes this number as input and simulates a world with some set of arbitrary conditions.) I stop caring about conscious entities and reevaluate what is and is not an agent.