Define “duplicates”, “original”, and “same” well enough to answer the Ship of Theseus problem.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
If not, what additional aspects need be included? If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious? Because I assumed that’s what you meant by
So, I am reasonably certain that I am (part of?) a number which is being processed by an algorithm.
That breaks all of my moral values, and I have to start again from scratch.
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
So, it passes the Turing test, as I adjudicate it? It’s a simulation of me which sits at a computer and engages with me over the internet?
When I tell you that you are the copy of me, and prove it without significantly changing the conditions of the simulation or breaking the laws of physics, I predict that you will change your position. Promptly remove the nearest deck of cards from the pack, and throw it against the ceiling fairly hard. Only all of the black cards will land face up.
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious?
When I recognize that numbers in general are conscious entities which experience all things simultaneously, (proof: Consider the set of all universal turing machines. Select a UTM which takes this number as input and simulates a world with some set of arbitrary conditions.) I stop caring about conscious entities and reevaluate what is and is not an agent.
Define “duplicates”, “original”, and “same” well enough to answer the Ship of Theseus problem.
Can I summarize the last question to “Omega writes a computer program which outputs ’I am conscious, experience qualia, etc. and this contradicts my position on the ethics of simulations”?
If not, what additional aspects need be included? If so, the simulation is imperfect because I do not believe that such a contradiction would be indicated.
Well, it talks to you first. IDK what you would talk about with a perfect copy of yourself, but it says what you would expect an actual conscious copy to say (because it’s a perfect simulation.)
You don’t think finding yourself as a conscious sim would indicate sims are conscious? Because I assumed that’s what you meant by
So, it passes the Turing test, as I adjudicate it? It’s a simulation of me which sits at a computer and engages with me over the internet?
When I tell you that you are the copy of me, and prove it without significantly changing the conditions of the simulation or breaking the laws of physics, I predict that you will change your position. Promptly remove the nearest deck of cards from the pack, and throw it against the ceiling fairly hard. Only all of the black cards will land face up.
When I recognize that numbers in general are conscious entities which experience all things simultaneously, (proof: Consider the set of all universal turing machines. Select a UTM which takes this number as input and simulates a world with some set of arbitrary conditions.) I stop caring about conscious entities and reevaluate what is and is not an agent.