When you refer to our universe, you necessarily reference measure as part.
Um, no. I don’t know of any fundamental dynamical laws in QM that use measure. You can calculate the evolution of the wavefunction without mentioning measure at all. It only appears when we try to make probabilistic predictions about our subjective experience. You could equip the same big evolving wavefunction with a different measure, and get superintelligent elves. Or no?
You could equip the same big evolving wavefunction with another measure, and get superintelligent elves. Or no?
Yes, but then you won’t be talking about our world in the usual sense, because, say, classical world won’t work as expected anymore given those laws (measure). If you don’t include measure, you don’t get any predictions about what you expect to see in reality, while that’s what physics is normally all about.
Uh… So, our subjective experience matches the Born probabilities because our minds are implemented with macroscopic gears, which require classical physics (and thus Born probabilities) to function in a stable manner? This sounds like it might be an explanation, but we’d need to show that other probability rules lead to unstable physics (no planets, or no proteins, or something like that). And even if we had proof of that, I think some leftover mystery would still remain.
I begin to feel that the mystery has been dissolved. Even if other measures (or indeed physical laws) lead to lawful enough processes that can also support evolution, it doesn’t impact the notion of anticipation, because our anticipation matches our evolution, and our evolution exists in the process under our measure.
Also, it’s not specifically minds that are macroscopic and depend on measure, it’s evolution itself that is thus macroscopic and selects replicators that replicate under that measure. For minds, anticipation matching measure is just another psychological adaptation, not necessarily a perfect match, but close enough.
As another crazy hypothesis, building on the previous one, it’s possible that we don’t particularly care about our reality or our measure, like we don’t care whether a person is in a biological body or uploaded, so that we will build our goodness out of different mathematics, having no effect on our reality. Thus, when we run the FAI, “nothing happens” in our world. Let’s hope this applies to most UFAIs, that will therefore have no ill effect, because they don’t care about our world or our measure.
I disagree with your first two paragraphs. Without a demonstration that the Born rule is somehow special (yields the most stable world for working complex machines, or something), the argument is still disappointingly circular. For example, if some other rule turns out to be even more conducive to evolution, the anthropic question arises: why aren’t we in that world instead of this one? (Kinda like the Boltzmann brain problem, but in reverse.) Fortunately, checking the macroscopic behavior that arises from quantum physics under different assumed measures is a completely empirical question. Now I just need to understand enough math to build a toy model and see for myself how it pans out. For the record, I’m about 70% confident that this line of inquiry will fail, because other worlds will look just as stable and macroscopically lawful as ours.
An FAI that doesn’t help our world is a big fat piece of fail. Can I please have a machine that’s based on less lofty abstractions, but actually does stuff?
Could you frame the debate to avoid ambiguity? What argument do you refer to (in your own words)? In what way is it circular? (I feel that the structure of the argument is roughly that the answer to the question “what is 2+2?” is “4″, because the algebraic laws assumed in the question imply 4 as the answer, even though other algebraic laws can lead to other answers.)
For example, if some other rule turns out to be even more conducive to evolution, the anthropic question arises: why aren’t we in that world instead of this one?
We just aren’t, this question has no meaning. Why are you you, and not someone else? When you refer to yourself, you identify a particular concept (of “yourself”). That concept is distinct from other concepts, and that’s the end of it. Two given concepts are not identical, as defined.
It’s entirely possible that other rules (measures) are also conductive to evolution, but look at them as something happening “far away”, like in universes with different fundamental constants. And over there, other creatures could’ve also biologically evolved. I’m not arguing with that, so finding other rules that produce good-enough physical processes doesn’t answer any questions. Why am I a human, and not a dolphin?
An FAI that doesn’t help our world is a big fat piece of fail. Can I please have a machine that’s based on less lofty abstractions, but actually does stuff?
We can’t outright assume anything about preference. We need to actually understand it. Powerful optimization is bound to be weird, so absurdity heuristic goes out the window. And correspondingly, the necessary standard of understanding goes up a dozen of notches. We are so far away from the adequate level that if a random AGI is built 30 year from now, we still almost certainly fail to beat it. Maybe 50 or 100 years (at which point uploads start influencing progress) sounds more reasonable, judging by the rate of progress in mathematics. We need to work faster.
You are committing the general error of prematurely declaring a question “dissolved”. It’s always better to err in the other direction. That’s how I come up with all my weird models, anyway.
I just took a little walk outside and this clarification occurred to me: imagine an algorithm (Turing machine) running on a classical physical computer, sitting on a table in our quantum universe. The computer has the interesting property that it is “stable” under the Born rule: a weighted-majority of near futures ranked by the 2-norm have the computer correctly executing the next few steps of the computation, but for the 1-norm this isn’t necessarily the case—the computer will likely glitch or self-destruct. (All computers built by humans probably have this property. Also note that it can be defined in terms of the wavefunction alone, without assuming weights a priori.) Then the algorithm will have “subjective anticipation” of a weird kind: conditioned on the algorithm itself running faithfully in the future, it can conclude that future histories with higher Born-weight are more likely.
This idea has the drawback that it doesn’t look at histories of the outside world, only the computer’s internals. But maybe it can be extended to include observations somehow?
You are committing the general error of prematurely declaring the question “dissolved”. It’s always better to err in the other direction.
“Beginning to feel” that the question is dissolved is far from the level of certainty required to “declare it dissolved”, merely a hunch that it’s the right direction to look for the answer (not that it’s a question I’m especially interested in, but it might be useful to understand it better).
I agree with your description in the second paragraph, but don’t clearly see what you wanted to communicate through it. (Closest salient idea is Hanson’s “mingled worlds”.)
Um, no. I don’t know of any fundamental dynamical laws in QM that use measure. You can calculate the evolution of the wavefunction without mentioning measure at all. It only appears when we try to make probabilistic predictions about our subjective experience. You could equip the same big evolving wavefunction with a different measure, and get superintelligent elves. Or no?
Yes, but then you won’t be talking about our world in the usual sense, because, say, classical world won’t work as expected anymore given those laws (measure). If you don’t include measure, you don’t get any predictions about what you expect to see in reality, while that’s what physics is normally all about.
Uh… So, our subjective experience matches the Born probabilities because our minds are implemented with macroscopic gears, which require classical physics (and thus Born probabilities) to function in a stable manner? This sounds like it might be an explanation, but we’d need to show that other probability rules lead to unstable physics (no planets, or no proteins, or something like that). And even if we had proof of that, I think some leftover mystery would still remain.
I begin to feel that the mystery has been dissolved. Even if other measures (or indeed physical laws) lead to lawful enough processes that can also support evolution, it doesn’t impact the notion of anticipation, because our anticipation matches our evolution, and our evolution exists in the process under our measure.
Also, it’s not specifically minds that are macroscopic and depend on measure, it’s evolution itself that is thus macroscopic and selects replicators that replicate under that measure. For minds, anticipation matching measure is just another psychological adaptation, not necessarily a perfect match, but close enough.
As another crazy hypothesis, building on the previous one, it’s possible that we don’t particularly care about our reality or our measure, like we don’t care whether a person is in a biological body or uploaded, so that we will build our goodness out of different mathematics, having no effect on our reality. Thus, when we run the FAI, “nothing happens” in our world. Let’s hope this applies to most UFAIs, that will therefore have no ill effect, because they don’t care about our world or our measure.
I disagree with your first two paragraphs. Without a demonstration that the Born rule is somehow special (yields the most stable world for working complex machines, or something), the argument is still disappointingly circular. For example, if some other rule turns out to be even more conducive to evolution, the anthropic question arises: why aren’t we in that world instead of this one? (Kinda like the Boltzmann brain problem, but in reverse.) Fortunately, checking the macroscopic behavior that arises from quantum physics under different assumed measures is a completely empirical question. Now I just need to understand enough math to build a toy model and see for myself how it pans out. For the record, I’m about 70% confident that this line of inquiry will fail, because other worlds will look just as stable and macroscopically lawful as ours.
An FAI that doesn’t help our world is a big fat piece of fail. Can I please have a machine that’s based on less lofty abstractions, but actually does stuff?
Could you frame the debate to avoid ambiguity? What argument do you refer to (in your own words)? In what way is it circular? (I feel that the structure of the argument is roughly that the answer to the question “what is 2+2?” is “4″, because the algebraic laws assumed in the question imply 4 as the answer, even though other algebraic laws can lead to other answers.)
We just aren’t, this question has no meaning. Why are you you, and not someone else? When you refer to yourself, you identify a particular concept (of “yourself”). That concept is distinct from other concepts, and that’s the end of it. Two given concepts are not identical, as defined.
It’s entirely possible that other rules (measures) are also conductive to evolution, but look at them as something happening “far away”, like in universes with different fundamental constants. And over there, other creatures could’ve also biologically evolved. I’m not arguing with that, so finding other rules that produce good-enough physical processes doesn’t answer any questions. Why am I a human, and not a dolphin?
We can’t outright assume anything about preference. We need to actually understand it. Powerful optimization is bound to be weird, so absurdity heuristic goes out the window. And correspondingly, the necessary standard of understanding goes up a dozen of notches. We are so far away from the adequate level that if a random AGI is built 30 year from now, we still almost certainly fail to beat it. Maybe 50 or 100 years (at which point uploads start influencing progress) sounds more reasonable, judging by the rate of progress in mathematics. We need to work faster.
You are committing the general error of prematurely declaring a question “dissolved”. It’s always better to err in the other direction. That’s how I come up with all my weird models, anyway.
I just took a little walk outside and this clarification occurred to me: imagine an algorithm (Turing machine) running on a classical physical computer, sitting on a table in our quantum universe. The computer has the interesting property that it is “stable” under the Born rule: a weighted-majority of near futures ranked by the 2-norm have the computer correctly executing the next few steps of the computation, but for the 1-norm this isn’t necessarily the case—the computer will likely glitch or self-destruct. (All computers built by humans probably have this property. Also note that it can be defined in terms of the wavefunction alone, without assuming weights a priori.) Then the algorithm will have “subjective anticipation” of a weird kind: conditioned on the algorithm itself running faithfully in the future, it can conclude that future histories with higher Born-weight are more likely.
This idea has the drawback that it doesn’t look at histories of the outside world, only the computer’s internals. But maybe it can be extended to include observations somehow?
“Beginning to feel” that the question is dissolved is far from the level of certainty required to “declare it dissolved”, merely a hunch that it’s the right direction to look for the answer (not that it’s a question I’m especially interested in, but it might be useful to understand it better).
I agree with your description in the second paragraph, but don’t clearly see what you wanted to communicate through it. (Closest salient idea is Hanson’s “mingled worlds”.)