Propositions (8), (9), and (10), however, are in a completely different category of improbability: double-digit negative exponents, if you’re being conservative.
It would of course be sacrilegious to place (8) below (9) and (10). Nevertheless even in the case of apparently overwhelming evidence, if you disagree with a mainstream belief 10^(-20) times you will be wrong rather a lot more than once.
Meanwhile, quantum tunnelling is a specific phenomenon which, if possible (very likely) gives fairly clear bounds on just how ridiculously improbable it is for a marble statue to wave. Even possible improbable worlds which make quantum tunnelling more likely still leave (8) less probable than (9) (but perhaps not 10).
I personally place (10) at no less than 10^(-5) and would be comfortable accusing anyone going below 10^(-7) of being confused about probabilities (at least as related to human beliefs).
Nevertheless even in the case of apparently overwhelming evidence, if you disagree with a mainstream belief 10^(-20) times you will be wrong rather a lot more than once.
Like most majoritarian arguments, this throws away information: the relevant reference class is “mainstream beliefs you think are that improbable”. (edit: no, I didn’t read the whole sentence) In that class, it’s not obvious to me that one would certainly be wrong more than once, if one could come up with 10^20 independent mainstream propositions that unlikely and seriously consider them all while never going completely insane. Going completely insane in the time required to consider one proposition seems far more likely than 10^-20, but also seems to cancel out of any decision, so it makes sense to implicitly condition everything on basic sanity.
Meanwhile, quantum tunnelling is a specific phenomenon which, if possible (very likely) gives fairly clear bounds on just how ridiculously improbable it is for a marble statue to wave. Even possible improbable worlds which make quantum tunnelling more likely still leave (8) less probable than (9) (but perhaps not 10).
(9), and (10) for some definitions of “Christianity”, being more likely than (8) seems conceivable due to interventionist simulators (something I really have no idea how to reason about), but not for any other object-level reason I can think of. Can you think of others?
I personally place (10) at no less than 10^(-5) and would be comfortable accusing anyone going below 10^(-7) of being confused about probabilities (at least as related to human beliefs).
I’d be inclined to accuse anyone going above… something below 10^-7… of being far too modest.
Like most majoritarian arguments, this throws away information: the relevant reference class is “mainstream beliefs you think are that improbable”.
No, that is the reference class intended and described (“apparently overwhelming evidence”).
In that class, it’s not obvious to me that one would certainly be wrong more than once, if one could come up with 10^20 independent mainstream propositions that unlikely and seriously consider them all while never going completely insane.
Your prior is wrong (that is, it does not reflect the information that is freely available to you).
Going completely insane in the time required to consider one proposition seems far more likely than 10^-20, but also seems to cancel out of any decision, so it makes sense to implicitly condition everything on basic sanity.
Considering normal levels of sanity are sufficient. Failing to account for the known weaknesses in your reasoning is a failure of rationality.
I’d be inclined to accuse anyone going above… something below 10^-7… of being far too modest.
I am comfortable accusing you of being confused about probabilities as related to human beliefs.
It would of course be sacrilegious to place (8) below (9) and (10). Nevertheless even in the case of apparently overwhelming evidence, if you disagree with a mainstream belief 10^(-20) times you will be wrong rather a lot more than once.
Meanwhile, quantum tunnelling is a specific phenomenon which, if possible (very likely) gives fairly clear bounds on just how ridiculously improbable it is for a marble statue to wave. Even possible improbable worlds which make quantum tunnelling more likely still leave (8) less probable than (9) (but perhaps not 10).
I personally place (10) at no less than 10^(-5) and would be comfortable accusing anyone going below 10^(-7) of being confused about probabilities (at least as related to human beliefs).
Like most majoritarian arguments, this throws away information: the relevant reference class is “mainstream beliefs you think are that improbable”. (edit: no, I didn’t read the whole sentence) In that class, it’s not obvious to me that one would certainly be wrong more than once, if one could come up with 10^20 independent mainstream propositions that unlikely and seriously consider them all while never going completely insane. Going completely insane in the time required to consider one proposition seems far more likely than 10^-20, but also seems to cancel out of any decision, so it makes sense to implicitly condition everything on basic sanity.
(Related: Horrible LHC Inconsistency)
(9), and (10) for some definitions of “Christianity”, being more likely than (8) seems conceivable due to interventionist simulators (something I really have no idea how to reason about), but not for any other object-level reason I can think of. Can you think of others?
I’d be inclined to accuse anyone going above… something below 10^-7… of being far too modest.
No, that is the reference class intended and described (“apparently overwhelming evidence”).
Your prior is wrong (that is, it does not reflect the information that is freely available to you).
Considering normal levels of sanity are sufficient. Failing to account for the known weaknesses in your reasoning is a failure of rationality.
I am comfortable accusing you of being confused about probabilities as related to human beliefs.