To phrase my intent more precisely: whatever the decision theory we will come to believe in[1] is, we vow to behave in a way which is the closest analogue in that decision theory of the formal specification we gave here in the framework of ordinary Bayesian sequential decision making.
It is also possible we will disagree about decision theory. In that case, I guess we need to defer to whatever is the most concrete “metadecision theory” we can agree upon.
I like where you are going with this. One issue with that phrasing is that it may be hard to fulfill that vow, since you don’t yet know what decision theory you will come to believe in.
To phrase my intent more precisely: whatever the decision theory we will come to believe in[1] is, we vow to behave in a way which is the closest analogue in that decision theory of the formal specification we gave here in the framework of ordinary Bayesian sequential decision making.
It is also possible we will disagree about decision theory. In that case, I guess we need to defer to whatever is the most concrete “metadecision theory” we can agree upon.
I like where you are going with this. One issue with that phrasing is that it may be hard to fulfill that vow, since you don’t yet know what decision theory you will come to believe in.
Well, at any given moment we will use the best-guess decision theory we have at the time.