Religion requires epistemic blindspots, but does religion require epistemic blindspots? That is, is requiring epistemic blindspots a property of religion itself, or is religion one among many subclasses of the type of thing that requires epistemic blindspots? In the former case, raising the sanity waterline to specifically eliminate religion would raise the sanity waterline; in the latter case, it might lower it.
What do you think would happen to the sanity waterline if all the Seventh-Day Adventists in America became atheists and joined an antifa group? Would it rise?
Seventh-Day Adventists’ epistemic blindspots (from the atheistic perspective) are things like “God exists” and “we’ll live forever in Heaven because we’re right about when the Sabbath is” and “eventually the Catholic Church, mainstream Protestant groups, and the US government will get together to pass a law requiring observance of a Sunday Sabbath, and we’ll be horribly persecuted for a while but it’s OK because Jesus will come back soon after that”. Antifa groups’ epistemic blindspots are things like “liberal norms serve fascists and must be eroded ASAP”, “mob violence is the most important form of political activism”, and “murder is good when it’s people we disagree with getting killed”.
And Seventh-Day Adventists are more prone to epistemic blind spots than religions that don’t share the unusual Christian innovation of elevating orthodoxy above orthopraxy, such as Shinto or mainstream American Judaism, both of which are clearly religions. (We have quite a few adherents of mainstream American Judaism in these circles; try asking a few of them about the utility of ritual, the upsides and downsides of religion, etc.)
Religion is one among many subclasses of the type of thing that requires epistemic blindspots, whatever that thing is. But there’s another problem, which is that religion doesn’t exist. The consensus in religious studies is that there’s no coherent way to define ‘religion’—the category exists for strange historical reasons that are particular to the pre-secularization West and certainly don’t hold everywhere. You can go to China or Japan or ancient Rome and ask, “is this religious? is this secular?”, and they’ll just look at you funny. (Admittedly, there’s a complication, in that contact between ‘pagans’ and Christians or Muslims occasionally results in the local variety of paganism adopting the Christian or Muslim idea of ‘religion’—see e.g. here.)
Is Confucianism a religion? It has rites, holy texts, a quasi-prophet (Confucius) and influential quasi-theologians, such as Mencius, Dong Zhongshu, and Zhu Xi. How about Communism, the Hotep movement, or LW? What makes Louis Farrakhan a religious figure and Maulana Karenga a secular one?
I have no interest in “targeting” religion for annihilation, or anything like that. I don’t disagree with anything you say here. Religion is just one subset of a class of failure mode that theoretically goes underwater when a society becomes saner. For the sake of defining my terms, I guess I’m just using “being religious” as a catchall for “possessing ontological beliefs that are not grounded in empirically knowable facts”, but I’m not really interested in defending the details of that definition. I think people know what cluster in thingspace I’m pointing to when I say “religion”.
Maybe I should have said something like this in the main post, but, consider a society that looks like ours except all school-aged children spend at least a semester studying the Human’s Guide to Words section of the Sequences. How many absolutely stupid thoughts, beliefs, conversations would just never happen in that world? A lot of those thoughts/beliefs/conversations would be religio-centric, and a lot wouldn’t be. The more “rationality interventions” you add, the fewer ostentatiously dumb things are permitted in the wider social milieu, and bad ideas “go underwater”. That’s the idea, anyway.
Religion requires epistemic blindspots, but does religion require epistemic blindspots? That is, is requiring epistemic blindspots a property of religion itself, or is religion one among many subclasses of the type of thing that requires epistemic blindspots? In the former case, raising the sanity waterline to specifically eliminate religion would raise the sanity waterline; in the latter case, it might lower it.
What do you think would happen to the sanity waterline if all the Seventh-Day Adventists in America became atheists and joined an antifa group? Would it rise?
Seventh-Day Adventists’ epistemic blindspots (from the atheistic perspective) are things like “God exists” and “we’ll live forever in Heaven because we’re right about when the Sabbath is” and “eventually the Catholic Church, mainstream Protestant groups, and the US government will get together to pass a law requiring observance of a Sunday Sabbath, and we’ll be horribly persecuted for a while but it’s OK because Jesus will come back soon after that”. Antifa groups’ epistemic blindspots are things like “liberal norms serve fascists and must be eroded ASAP”, “mob violence is the most important form of political activism”, and “murder is good when it’s people we disagree with getting killed”.
And Seventh-Day Adventists are more prone to epistemic blind spots than religions that don’t share the unusual Christian innovation of elevating orthodoxy above orthopraxy, such as Shinto or mainstream American Judaism, both of which are clearly religions. (We have quite a few adherents of mainstream American Judaism in these circles; try asking a few of them about the utility of ritual, the upsides and downsides of religion, etc.)
Religion is one among many subclasses of the type of thing that requires epistemic blindspots, whatever that thing is. But there’s another problem, which is that religion doesn’t exist. The consensus in religious studies is that there’s no coherent way to define ‘religion’—the category exists for strange historical reasons that are particular to the pre-secularization West and certainly don’t hold everywhere. You can go to China or Japan or ancient Rome and ask, “is this religious? is this secular?”, and they’ll just look at you funny. (Admittedly, there’s a complication, in that contact between ‘pagans’ and Christians or Muslims occasionally results in the local variety of paganism adopting the Christian or Muslim idea of ‘religion’—see e.g. here.)
Is Confucianism a religion? It has rites, holy texts, a quasi-prophet (Confucius) and influential quasi-theologians, such as Mencius, Dong Zhongshu, and Zhu Xi. How about Communism, the Hotep movement, or LW? What makes Louis Farrakhan a religious figure and Maulana Karenga a secular one?
I have no interest in “targeting” religion for annihilation, or anything like that. I don’t disagree with anything you say here. Religion is just one subset of a class of failure mode that theoretically goes underwater when a society becomes saner. For the sake of defining my terms, I guess I’m just using “being religious” as a catchall for “possessing ontological beliefs that are not grounded in empirically knowable facts”, but I’m not really interested in defending the details of that definition. I think people know what cluster in thingspace I’m pointing to when I say “religion”.
Maybe I should have said something like this in the main post, but, consider a society that looks like ours except all school-aged children spend at least a semester studying the Human’s Guide to Words section of the Sequences. How many absolutely stupid thoughts, beliefs, conversations would just never happen in that world? A lot of those thoughts/beliefs/conversations would be religio-centric, and a lot wouldn’t be. The more “rationality interventions” you add, the fewer ostentatiously dumb things are permitted in the wider social milieu, and bad ideas “go underwater”. That’s the idea, anyway.