In which case your genes will be deselected from the gene pool, in favor of those of my children, so it’s maybe not a good argument to make.
Meh, I don’t have any special attachment to my genes, and I think that those who do should reconsider. After all, why we should? It’s not an upload or anything like that, just a special set of dna code which resembles me only very vaguely. What’s the good if they are transmitted instead of some other set of genes?
So—there’s probably no good reason for you—as a mind—to care about your genes, unless you have reason to believe they are unique or somehow superior in some way to the rest of the population.
But as a genetic machine, you “should” care deeply, for a very particular definition of “should”—simply because if you do not, and that turns out to have been genetically related, then yours will indeed die out. The constant urge and competition to reproduce your particular set of genes is what drives evolution (well, that and some other stuff like mutations). I like what evolution has come up with so far, and so it behooves me to help it along.
On a more practical note—I take a great deal of joy from my kids. I see in them echoes of people who are no longer with us, and it’s delightful when they echo back things I have taught them, and even moreso when they come up with something totally unexpected. Barring transhumanism, your kids and your influence upon them are one of the only ways to extend your influence past death. My mother died over a decade ago—and I see elements of her personality in my daughters, and it’s comforting.
I don’t hold a lot of hope for eternal life for myself—I’m 48 and not in the greatest health, and I am not what the people on this board would consider optimistic about technology saving my mentation when by body fails, by any means (and I dearly would love to be wrong, but until that happens, you plan for the worst). But—I think there’s a strong possibility my daughters will live forever. And that is extremely comforting. The spectre of death is greatly lessened when you think there is a good chance that things you love will live on after you, remembering, maybe forever.
unless you have reason to believe they are unique or somehow superior in some way to the rest of the population.
Ahah, no, no particular reason, to the contrary, they’re not especially good, and I am in favor of eugenetics (applied to those who do not exist yet, not those who are already alive!).
But as a genetic machine, you “should” care deeply, for a very particular definition of “should”—simply because if you do not, and that turns out to have been genetically related, then yours will indeed die out.
Yes, I understand the argument, and that probably that’s exactly what will happen. On the other side, I feel no special loss pondering that the human genetic pool in the future will be composed by this or that sequence of adenosine and citosine.
The spectre of death is greatly lessened when you think there is a good chance that things you love will live on after you, remembering, maybe forever.
I think that’s a cognitive illusion, but I understand that it can generate positive emotions who are not an illusion, by any means.
I understand that having kids, as much as unethical I think it is (that is, mildly), still generates for the way that some are built, some very strong good emotions, and those are not at all unethical. Everyone has to balance the two, I guess.
I think that’s a cognitive illusion, but I understand that it can generate positive emotions who are not an illusion, by any means.
More a legacy kind of consideration, really—I do not imagine any meaningful part of myself other than genes (which frankly I was just borrowing) live on. But—If I have done my job right, the attitudes and morals that I have should be reflected in my children, and so I have an effect on the world in some small way that lingers, even if I am not around to see it. And yes—that’s comforting, a bit. Still would rather not die, but hey.
“I think that’s a cognitive illusion...” No one has yet shown that personal identity consists in anything other than self-identification, i.e. that I happen to consider myself the same person as 10 years ago and expect in 10 years to be someone who believes himself to have had my past. If that is the case, there is no reason for a person not to self-identify with anyone he wants, as for example his own descendants (cf. Scott Alexander’s post). In this way there is no more and no less cognitive illusion in wanting to live on through one’s descendants than in wanting to be physically immortal.
No one has yet shown that personal identity consists in anything other than self-identification, i.e. that I happen to consider myself the same person as 10 years ago and expect in 10 years to be someone who believes himself to have had my past.
I just tried to consider myself as being the coffee cup in front of me, but I can’t seem to manage it. Then I tried considering myself to be the chap who lives next door, but that doesn’t work either. There seems to be a certain ineluctability about my identification with this body and this mind which is left unaccounted for by sticking onto it XML tags saying .
Yes, there are reasons why you consider yourself the same as some particular person and not another. That doesn’t prevent other people from having other reasons for considering themselves identified with other bodies, as for example people who believe in reincarnation. Their belief may be less natural than yours, but it is neither more nor less objective (i.e. neither belief has anything objective about it, at least as far as we can tell.)
That doesn’t prevent other people from having other reasons for considering themselves identified with other bodies, as for example people who believe in reincarnation.
Some people justify claims of reincarnation by claiming to remember past lives, not merely to “identify with” them. The belief does have something objective about it: it can be tested. Such claims have generally failed of substantiation.
In short, my reasons are objectively good; theirs are objectively bad. What do you mean by “less natural”, if not this?
I said their belief was “less natural” because human nature is more inclined to your kind of belief (thus it is universal) than to their kind of belief (which is much less universal.) However, whether the reasons in question are good or bad, they are subjective in both cases.
You seem to be supportive of cryonics (e.g. in this comment). Are you in favor of cryonics in the case that you are revived as an upload? If so, what makes you think the upload would be you, rather than “this body”, which would be dead?
Uhm... I’d say < 0.1%, considering that almost no other sets of genes (aka “people”) seems bent on controlling the expansion of the human population, and I don’t suppose my genes are somewhat special. Plus, that would imply that genes ‘care’ somehow about the group of humans as a whole, which they definitely don’t.
Although the extent to which my genes determine the shape of my mind is an interesting angle. Not enough cogent to revert my original point, since it’s clear that who I am today is also the result of > 30 years of experiences and cognition, but it’s an interesting point to consider: should I value more people who are more like me?
“Your genes are responsible for X” is ambiguous because that statement may or may not imply a certain amount of directness. My genes are responsible for the fact that I have a driver’s license, in the sense that if I had the genes of a wombat, I wouldn’t have a driver’s license, but that’s not what most people would mean by that.
Meh, I don’t have any special attachment to my genes, and I think that those who do should reconsider. After all, why we should? It’s not an upload or anything like that, just a special set of dna code which resembles me only very vaguely.
What’s the good if they are transmitted instead of some other set of genes?
So—there’s probably no good reason for you—as a mind—to care about your genes, unless you have reason to believe they are unique or somehow superior in some way to the rest of the population.
But as a genetic machine, you “should” care deeply, for a very particular definition of “should”—simply because if you do not, and that turns out to have been genetically related, then yours will indeed die out. The constant urge and competition to reproduce your particular set of genes is what drives evolution (well, that and some other stuff like mutations). I like what evolution has come up with so far, and so it behooves me to help it along.
On a more practical note—I take a great deal of joy from my kids. I see in them echoes of people who are no longer with us, and it’s delightful when they echo back things I have taught them, and even moreso when they come up with something totally unexpected. Barring transhumanism, your kids and your influence upon them are one of the only ways to extend your influence past death. My mother died over a decade ago—and I see elements of her personality in my daughters, and it’s comforting.
I don’t hold a lot of hope for eternal life for myself—I’m 48 and not in the greatest health, and I am not what the people on this board would consider optimistic about technology saving my mentation when by body fails, by any means (and I dearly would love to be wrong, but until that happens, you plan for the worst). But—I think there’s a strong possibility my daughters will live forever. And that is extremely comforting. The spectre of death is greatly lessened when you think there is a good chance that things you love will live on after you, remembering, maybe forever.
Ahah, no, no particular reason, to the contrary, they’re not especially good, and I am in favor of eugenetics (applied to those who do not exist yet, not those who are already alive!).
Yes, I understand the argument, and that probably that’s exactly what will happen. On the other side, I feel no special loss pondering that the human genetic pool in the future will be composed by this or that sequence of adenosine and citosine.
I think that’s a cognitive illusion, but I understand that it can generate positive emotions who are not an illusion, by any means.
I understand that having kids, as much as unethical I think it is (that is, mildly), still generates for the way that some are built, some very strong good emotions, and those are not at all unethical.
Everyone has to balance the two, I guess.
More a legacy kind of consideration, really—I do not imagine any meaningful part of myself other than genes (which frankly I was just borrowing) live on. But—If I have done my job right, the attitudes and morals that I have should be reflected in my children, and so I have an effect on the world in some small way that lingers, even if I am not around to see it. And yes—that’s comforting, a bit. Still would rather not die, but hey.
“I think that’s a cognitive illusion...” No one has yet shown that personal identity consists in anything other than self-identification, i.e. that I happen to consider myself the same person as 10 years ago and expect in 10 years to be someone who believes himself to have had my past. If that is the case, there is no reason for a person not to self-identify with anyone he wants, as for example his own descendants (cf. Scott Alexander’s post). In this way there is no more and no less cognitive illusion in wanting to live on through one’s descendants than in wanting to be physically immortal.
I just tried to consider myself as being the coffee cup in front of me, but I can’t seem to manage it. Then I tried considering myself to be the chap who lives next door, but that doesn’t work either. There seems to be a certain ineluctability about my identification with this body and this mind which is left unaccounted for by sticking onto it XML tags saying .
Yes, there are reasons why you consider yourself the same as some particular person and not another. That doesn’t prevent other people from having other reasons for considering themselves identified with other bodies, as for example people who believe in reincarnation. Their belief may be less natural than yours, but it is neither more nor less objective (i.e. neither belief has anything objective about it, at least as far as we can tell.)
Some people justify claims of reincarnation by claiming to remember past lives, not merely to “identify with” them. The belief does have something objective about it: it can be tested. Such claims have generally failed of substantiation.
In short, my reasons are objectively good; theirs are objectively bad. What do you mean by “less natural”, if not this?
I said their belief was “less natural” because human nature is more inclined to your kind of belief (thus it is universal) than to their kind of belief (which is much less universal.) However, whether the reasons in question are good or bad, they are subjective in both cases.
You seem to be supportive of cryonics (e.g. in this comment). Are you in favor of cryonics in the case that you are revived as an upload? If so, what makes you think the upload would be you, rather than “this body”, which would be dead?
Of course a belief is a state of mind. That does not mean it is not objectively true or false.
Enough to not pooh-pooh the idea, but not so much as to have signed up for it myself. I don’t have a settled opinion on the nature of uploads.
What odds would you place on your genes being responsible for your sense of responsibility for overpopulation?
Uhm...
I’d say < 0.1%, considering that almost no other sets of genes (aka “people”) seems bent on controlling the expansion of the human population, and I don’t suppose my genes are somewhat special. Plus, that would imply that genes ‘care’ somehow about the group of humans as a whole, which they definitely don’t.
Although the extent to which my genes determine the shape of my mind is an interesting angle. Not enough cogent to revert my original point, since it’s clear that who I am today is also the result of > 30 years of experiences and cognition, but it’s an interesting point to consider: should I value more people who are more like me?
I don’t have an answer at the moment.
“Your genes are responsible for X” is ambiguous because that statement may or may not imply a certain amount of directness. My genes are responsible for the fact that I have a driver’s license, in the sense that if I had the genes of a wombat, I wouldn’t have a driver’s license, but that’s not what most people would mean by that.