unless you have reason to believe they are unique or somehow superior in some way to the rest of the population.
Ahah, no, no particular reason, to the contrary, they’re not especially good, and I am in favor of eugenetics (applied to those who do not exist yet, not those who are already alive!).
But as a genetic machine, you “should” care deeply, for a very particular definition of “should”—simply because if you do not, and that turns out to have been genetically related, then yours will indeed die out.
Yes, I understand the argument, and that probably that’s exactly what will happen. On the other side, I feel no special loss pondering that the human genetic pool in the future will be composed by this or that sequence of adenosine and citosine.
The spectre of death is greatly lessened when you think there is a good chance that things you love will live on after you, remembering, maybe forever.
I think that’s a cognitive illusion, but I understand that it can generate positive emotions who are not an illusion, by any means.
I understand that having kids, as much as unethical I think it is (that is, mildly), still generates for the way that some are built, some very strong good emotions, and those are not at all unethical. Everyone has to balance the two, I guess.
I think that’s a cognitive illusion, but I understand that it can generate positive emotions who are not an illusion, by any means.
More a legacy kind of consideration, really—I do not imagine any meaningful part of myself other than genes (which frankly I was just borrowing) live on. But—If I have done my job right, the attitudes and morals that I have should be reflected in my children, and so I have an effect on the world in some small way that lingers, even if I am not around to see it. And yes—that’s comforting, a bit. Still would rather not die, but hey.
“I think that’s a cognitive illusion...” No one has yet shown that personal identity consists in anything other than self-identification, i.e. that I happen to consider myself the same person as 10 years ago and expect in 10 years to be someone who believes himself to have had my past. If that is the case, there is no reason for a person not to self-identify with anyone he wants, as for example his own descendants (cf. Scott Alexander’s post). In this way there is no more and no less cognitive illusion in wanting to live on through one’s descendants than in wanting to be physically immortal.
No one has yet shown that personal identity consists in anything other than self-identification, i.e. that I happen to consider myself the same person as 10 years ago and expect in 10 years to be someone who believes himself to have had my past.
I just tried to consider myself as being the coffee cup in front of me, but I can’t seem to manage it. Then I tried considering myself to be the chap who lives next door, but that doesn’t work either. There seems to be a certain ineluctability about my identification with this body and this mind which is left unaccounted for by sticking onto it XML tags saying .
Yes, there are reasons why you consider yourself the same as some particular person and not another. That doesn’t prevent other people from having other reasons for considering themselves identified with other bodies, as for example people who believe in reincarnation. Their belief may be less natural than yours, but it is neither more nor less objective (i.e. neither belief has anything objective about it, at least as far as we can tell.)
That doesn’t prevent other people from having other reasons for considering themselves identified with other bodies, as for example people who believe in reincarnation.
Some people justify claims of reincarnation by claiming to remember past lives, not merely to “identify with” them. The belief does have something objective about it: it can be tested. Such claims have generally failed of substantiation.
In short, my reasons are objectively good; theirs are objectively bad. What do you mean by “less natural”, if not this?
I said their belief was “less natural” because human nature is more inclined to your kind of belief (thus it is universal) than to their kind of belief (which is much less universal.) However, whether the reasons in question are good or bad, they are subjective in both cases.
You seem to be supportive of cryonics (e.g. in this comment). Are you in favor of cryonics in the case that you are revived as an upload? If so, what makes you think the upload would be you, rather than “this body”, which would be dead?
Ahah, no, no particular reason, to the contrary, they’re not especially good, and I am in favor of eugenetics (applied to those who do not exist yet, not those who are already alive!).
Yes, I understand the argument, and that probably that’s exactly what will happen. On the other side, I feel no special loss pondering that the human genetic pool in the future will be composed by this or that sequence of adenosine and citosine.
I think that’s a cognitive illusion, but I understand that it can generate positive emotions who are not an illusion, by any means.
I understand that having kids, as much as unethical I think it is (that is, mildly), still generates for the way that some are built, some very strong good emotions, and those are not at all unethical.
Everyone has to balance the two, I guess.
More a legacy kind of consideration, really—I do not imagine any meaningful part of myself other than genes (which frankly I was just borrowing) live on. But—If I have done my job right, the attitudes and morals that I have should be reflected in my children, and so I have an effect on the world in some small way that lingers, even if I am not around to see it. And yes—that’s comforting, a bit. Still would rather not die, but hey.
“I think that’s a cognitive illusion...” No one has yet shown that personal identity consists in anything other than self-identification, i.e. that I happen to consider myself the same person as 10 years ago and expect in 10 years to be someone who believes himself to have had my past. If that is the case, there is no reason for a person not to self-identify with anyone he wants, as for example his own descendants (cf. Scott Alexander’s post). In this way there is no more and no less cognitive illusion in wanting to live on through one’s descendants than in wanting to be physically immortal.
I just tried to consider myself as being the coffee cup in front of me, but I can’t seem to manage it. Then I tried considering myself to be the chap who lives next door, but that doesn’t work either. There seems to be a certain ineluctability about my identification with this body and this mind which is left unaccounted for by sticking onto it XML tags saying .
Yes, there are reasons why you consider yourself the same as some particular person and not another. That doesn’t prevent other people from having other reasons for considering themselves identified with other bodies, as for example people who believe in reincarnation. Their belief may be less natural than yours, but it is neither more nor less objective (i.e. neither belief has anything objective about it, at least as far as we can tell.)
Some people justify claims of reincarnation by claiming to remember past lives, not merely to “identify with” them. The belief does have something objective about it: it can be tested. Such claims have generally failed of substantiation.
In short, my reasons are objectively good; theirs are objectively bad. What do you mean by “less natural”, if not this?
I said their belief was “less natural” because human nature is more inclined to your kind of belief (thus it is universal) than to their kind of belief (which is much less universal.) However, whether the reasons in question are good or bad, they are subjective in both cases.
You seem to be supportive of cryonics (e.g. in this comment). Are you in favor of cryonics in the case that you are revived as an upload? If so, what makes you think the upload would be you, rather than “this body”, which would be dead?
Of course a belief is a state of mind. That does not mean it is not objectively true or false.
Enough to not pooh-pooh the idea, but not so much as to have signed up for it myself. I don’t have a settled opinion on the nature of uploads.