True, but there are also the questions of, should I try to ensure that exactly one of myself exists at any given moment? Instead of just trying to preserve my body, should I be content with just creating a million copies of my mind in some simulation, apathetic to whether or not my “original” still exists anywhere? Or should I be content with creating agents that aren’t like me and don’t have my exact history of experiences, but have the same goals as I do? It seems that these issues depend on sort of dualist questions of mind and whether or not there is moral value assigned to preserving this “self”.
True, but there are also the questions of, should I try to ensure that exactly one of myself exists at any given moment? Instead of just trying to preserve my body, should I be content with just creating a million copies of my mind in some simulation, apathetic to whether or not my “original” still exists anywhere? Or should I be content with creating agents that aren’t like me and don’t have my exact history of experiences, but have the same goals as I do? It seems that these issues depend on sort of dualist questions of mind and whether or not there is moral value assigned to preserving this “self”.